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Foreword 
This new Bruegel Blueprint, edited by Carlo Altomonte and Gábor Békés, represents an
important contribution to the debate on competitiveness. The book compiles the works
of a number of eminent scholars who are active in this debate, and stems from ‘Map-
Compete’, a Seventh Framework Programme research project that assessed data avail-
ability and requirements for the analysis of competitiveness in  European Union
countries. Three aspects of the debate stand out prominently in this book.
First, looking at the distribution of firms, it is a recurring pattern that only a few firms
are key for productivity, influencing the competitiveness of sectors and even entire
economies. Trying to understand what drives competitiveness necessarily involves
understanding what drives the performance of top companies. What kind of framework
conditions do they need in order to strive and prosper? More than cheap labour, the
important factors are the quality of human capital, institutional framework conditions
and access to markets.
Second, the authors emphasise the need to be able to reallocate resources towards
such productive firms. This echoes longstanding demands from macroeconomists. In
times of major shocks and major adjustments, it is important to have labour markets
that allow people to move from some companies to others. For example, when trying
to change current account patterns, it is indispensable to shift some resources from
the non-tradeable to the tradeable sector. But the insights here go further: even within
industries, it is important that people with certain existing skill sets essentially move
from one company to the next, working in the same profession but more productively
thanks to the superior organisation of the new firms. Regulations that in certain coun-
tries make it difficult for firms to grow beyond a certain threshold size put limits on
such productivity growth.
Third, there is the issue of international trade and global value chains. Since production
processes are increasingly split across global production chains, competitiveness is
not primarily determined by local production costs but rather by the ability of firms to
viii
effectively use this production chain. One contribution in this Blueprint shows that
local labour costs are just a small percentage of the overall production cost. Instead,
non-price competitiveness, quality and branding become important drivers of
competitiveness.
Finally, any informed debate on competitiveness requires availability of, and access
to, reliable, up to date and refined data and indicators. A common element of the
analyses in all chapters of this Blueprint is that they rely to some extent on either novel
datasets or novel analytical methodologies, or both. As such, the continuous
development of new data sources and technological improvements in data gathering
and accessibility remain key issues for policymaking and research.
This Blueprint will not settle all the questions about competitiveness. But it certainly
represents an important step towards gaining a more differentiated understanding of
growth, productivity and competitiveness and the important role public policy needs
to play.
Guntram B. Wolff
Director of Bruegel, Brussels, January 2016
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Executive summary
One of the most important lessons learned during the 2008-09 financial crisis was
that the informational toolbox on which policymakers base their decisions about com-
petitiveness became outdated in terms of both data sources and data analysis. The
toolbox is particularly outdated when it comes to tapping the potential of micro data
for the analysis of competitiveness – a serious problem given that it is firms, rather
than countries that compete on global markets.
This Blueprint provides some concrete examples from recent advances in the analysis
of competitiveness. The book is organised around European Central Bank Governor
Mario Draghi’s definition of a competitive economy as one in which “institutional and
macroeconomic conditions allow productive firms to thrive and in turn, the develop-
ment of these firms supports the expansion of employment, investment and trade”.
This point of view led us to highlight throughout the book the role of a small number of
highly-productive firms as drivers of competitiveness at the country and industry level
and, associated with that, the relevance for economic growth of the extent to which an
economy is able to reallocate labour and capital towards those more-productive firms.
Equally important is the context in which these productive firms operate, and thus the
significance of developments in international trade and international fragmentation
of production through the changing patterns of global value chains.
There are four main implications for policy from the work outlined in the chapters of
this Blueprint:
(1) A few large, very productive and internationally active firms have a great influence
on the performance and growth potential of countries, regions and sectors. As a result,
average measurements, which are the parameters on which most policies are gener-
ally based, do a poor job of grasping the actual level of competitiveness within coun-
tries (regions) and between them. Hence, similar sets of policy dictated ex-ante by
similar average competitiveness measures at the country level (eg unit labour costs)
might end up producing very different outcomes ex-post, because of the underlying
1
heterogeneity of firm performance in the different countries.
(2) Rigidities in the labour market affect different firms in different ways and generate
a misallocation of resources that has a significant effect on competitiveness and em-
ployment. In particular, centralised wage-bargaining institutions seem to be associated
with a greater share of companies reducing the number of employees during economic
downturns. Labour market reforms that allow wages to be aligned to heterogeneous
levels of firm productivity are thus key to fostering a proper allocation of economic re-
sources and, through this channel, a significant improvement in competitiveness and
growth.
(3) Exporting, and more broadly international activities, is another key feature of com-
petitiveness. Being active on global markets is closely associated with innovation and
growth. An important element for national competitiveness is the extent to which in-
stitutional conditions allow firms that are currently not exporting to grow to levels of
productivity that enable them to tap into international markets. In addition to exporting
to unrelated parties, the emergence of global value chains suggests that selling to
multinationals at home or the ability to build up a chain of suppliers are equally im-
portant and policy-relevant channels. In turn, as the changing pattern of global value
chains is a significant driver of export growth, it is important to work at both the multi-
lateral and bilateral level (eg the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP)
to foster trade facilitation and the reduction of non-tariff barriers.
(4) The chapters of this book relied on either novel datasets, or novel analytical
methodologies, or both, and contributed to the development of measures on which fu-
ture analyses might be based. Developing datasets using firm-level data, matching
company information with trade data, deriving evidence about global value chains or
elaborating the quality of products will all help better identify competitiveness. Har-
monisation of national efforts, and creation of EU-wide datasets are crucial in order to
develop and test new measures that policymakers can use in the future.
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31 Measuring competitiveness in
a granular and global world
Carlo Altomonte and Gábor Békés
Competitiveness imbalances between member states have been one of the drivers of
the crisis in the European Union. Closing these gaps, and improving ‘competitiveness’
throughout Europe is thus at the heart of the current policy agenda. The EU institutions
increasingly monitor imbalances using quantitative measures of aggregate competi-
tiveness, and these indicators feature prominently in the evaluation of each member
state's structural reform policies. For these reasons there is an overall increasing effort
to quantify the concept of competitiveness, and even qualitative information about
countries’ business environments is translated into quantitative indices.
However, one of the most important lessons learned during the crisis is that such an
informational toolbox on which policymakers base their decisions can become out-
dated in terms of both data sources and data analysis. There is in fact no shared defi-
nition of competitiveness, let alone a consensus on how to consistently measure it
across countries and over time, with a number of aggregate indicators often pointing
in different directions. The toolbox is particularly outdated when it comes to tapping
the potential of micro data for the analysis of competitiveness – a serious problem
given that it is firms, rather than countries that compete on global markets.
The aim of the MAPCOMPETE project was to help fill this gap by providing inputs for a
thorough assessment of competitiveness indicators and the potential development
of new ones. Importantly, for all aspects of competitiveness, a crucial issue for the
project has been to comprehensively map data availability and accessibility, and to
provide a critical overview of new analytical methods that become possible as new
data sources become available to researchers. These new developments in the analy-
sis of competitiveness have been systematically explored by the European Central
Bank's Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet), a research network with which
the MAPCOMPETE project has worked in close coordination1.
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Capitalising on both projects, this Blueprint provides some concrete applications from
recent advances in the analysis of competitiveness. The book is organised around the
definition of a competitive economy as one “in which institutional and macroeconomic
conditions allow productive firms to thrive and in turn, the development of these firms
supports the expansion of employment, investment and trade”2. Thus three recurrent
themes will feature in the different chapters of this Blueprint:
• The analysis of firm-level characteristics, highlighting the role of a small number of
highly-productive firms and the importance in general for competitiveness analysis
of the concept of ‘granularity’.
• The interplay of firms' behaviour with structural economic factors, in particular the
capacity of an economy to shuffle labour and capital towards more productive firms,
ie efficiency of resource allocation.
• The role of international trade, seen both as the output of competitive firms (ex-
ports), and as a structural feature conditioning the same firms, given the recent
trends in the international fragmentation of production and the evolution of global
value chains (GVCs).
The concept of ‘granularity’ in the economic literature captures the idea that economic
phenomena, rather than being the result of an homogeneous process carried out by
atomistic, indistinguishable agents, can be driven to a great extent by a few outstand-
ing individuals or companies that play a dominant role in regional and national eco-
nomic performance. In most countries, a handful of firms are responsible for a large
part of economic activity, including export sales and foreign direct investment. Within
narrowly defined (4-digit SIC) US manufacturing industries, Syverson (2004) found
that firms in the ninetieth percentile of the (total factor) productivity (TFP) distribution
are on average 1.92 times more productive than the tenth percentile. In other words,
though producing the same products with the same endowments of labour and capital,
the top productive firms are able to produce twice as much as the least productive
firms. These within-industry differences are significantly larger than the difference in
average TFP measured across industries. The situation is not different in Europe. As
shown by Mayer and Ottaviano (2007), in European countries on average about one
percent of these 'Happy Few' firms produce more than 75 percent of output or of foreign
sales3.
1. A summary of the results of the CompNet project is provided in Di Mauro, F. and M. Ronchi (2015) Assessing
European competitiveness: the contribution of CompNet research, available at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/research-networks/html/researcher_compnet.en.html.
2. Mario Draghi, speech on ‘Competitiveness: the key to balanced growth in monetary union’, Paris, 30 November
2012, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp121130.en.html.
A GRANULAR AND GLOBAL WORLD  MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS
5
The finding that a handful of firms determine to a great extent the aggregate economic
outcomes has two important policy implications. First, it underlines how countries are
subject to the actions of a few dozen companies. For instance, Gabaix (2011) esti-
mated that even for the US economy, the business cycle movements of the largest
100 firms explain a third of the aggregate movements in output growth. The impact is
a fortiori much greater for smaller countries or regions that accommodate only one or
a few of those ‘top’ enterprises. Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Mejan (2014) look at the
universe of French firms between 1990 and 2007, decomposing aggregate sales fluc-
tuations (in both domestic and foreign markets) and identifying reactions to macro,
sectoral and firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks. Similar to the findings of Gabaix (2011)
for the US, they confirm the substantial contribution of firm-specific shocks to aggre-
gate volatility in France, with the magnitude of the effect of firm-level shocks being
similar to those of sectoral and macroeconomics shocks, common to all firms. Second,
the presence of heterogeneous firms in an economy provides a major additional chan-
nel through which aggregate productivity and thus competitiveness can be boosted.
Recent literature (Bartelsman et al, 2013; Hopenhayn, 2014; Gopinath et al, 2015)
takes advantage of the availability of cross-country competitiveness indicators built
from firm-level data to show that a significant part of the differences in productivity
between countries can be accounted for by differences in allocative efficiency. That
is, aggregate productivity in a country might, in part, be lagging behind because capital
and labour are not allocated efficiently between firms within an industry. In other
words, some technology or policy-induced frictions in factor markets might prevent
productive inputs from flowing into the firms that would use them in the most produc-
tive way.
Removing these frictions thus provides a potential new channel for boosting aggregate
productivity, ie the reallocation of resources away from poorly-performing firms to-
wards the most productive firms, with gains that in some cases can be quantified as
an additional 30 percent, with proportional impacts on potential output (Bartelsman
et al, 2013). CompNet research shows that this is particularly the case for the euro
area, with major policy implications: “the type of policies that could release an upward
shock to potential growth are not just those focused on price flexibility. They include
[...] on the TFP side, policies that encourage the reallocation of resources – which could
be powerful in the euro area given the wide and skewed distribution between the least
and most productive firms”4.
3. An even greater within-industry heterogeneity has been reported in China and India, with average ninetieth to
tenth decile ratios in terms of productivity in excess of 5:1 (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
4. Mario Draghi, speech on ‘Structural reforms, inﬂation and monetary policy’, ECB Forum on Central Banking,
Sintra, 22 May 2015, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150522.en.html.
6Beyond granularity and reallocation, another key issue in thinking about national
competitiveness is international trade. The world economic picture has been recently
characterised by the emergence of global value chains (GVCs), ie the break-up of
production processes into ever-narrower discreet activities and tasks, combined with
the international dispersion of these activities and tasks5. Since the 1990s,
international trade has thus increasingly involved multiple flows of inputs and semi-
finished products across borders, as different production steps have been moved to
different countries. This in turn has led to trade growing much faster than GDP, also as
a result of the so-called ‘double counting’ in gross trade figures: because of the
increasing geographic disintegration of production, gross exports from a given country
include not only the value added generated domestically, but also the foreign value
added generated in any other country, imported into the home country as an
intermediate, and then re-exported. Moreover, the figures might also include domestic
value added originally embodied in export flows that subsequently returns home and
is absorbed in the home country, and value added generated by intermediates
crossing borders several times before being finally absorbed. These inputs moving
back and forth between countries are counted every time as exports, but they
contribute to global GDP only once they are absorbed in final goods. Such double
counting, which is essentially driven by GVCs, has been estimated to account for about
25 percent of gross trade flows (Koopman et al, 2014). As a result, the gross export
figures of any country have become increasingly less informative over time, especially
if one is interested in the contribution that exports make to domestic GDP growth and
to the transmission of shocks between countries.
As a response, economists have recently devised a methodology for decomposing
each trade flow into its different value added components, eg domestic versus foreign
value added (Koopman et al, 2014; Wang et al, 2013). They also have developed new
datasets that allow us to better quantify and measure the complex interconnections
of the World Input-Output structure, and its implications for national competitiveness6.
Another key development in the analysis of competitiveness stemming from interna-
5. For a comprehensive review, see Manufacturing Europe’s future, Bruegel Blueprint, edited by Reinhilde
Veugelers (2013) available at http://www.bruegel.org/download/parent/795-manufacturing-europes-
future/ﬁle/1683-manufacturing-europes-future/, and Amador and Di Mauro (eds) (2015) The Age of Global Value
Chains: Maps and Policy Issues, a VoxEU.org eBook, available at http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/ﬁles/GVCs-
ebook.pdf.
6. A milestone in this process has been the European-sponsored WIOD (World Input-Output Database) research
project. See Timmer et al (2013) for the methodological details. More information on the WIOD project and the
data are available at http://www.wiod.org. The WTO-OECD have also started their own research programme on
global value chains: data and methodological details can be found at
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-wtojointinitiative.htm.
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7tional trade is related to new findings about the importance of non-price factors in driv-
ing exports. The standard price (cost) competitiveness argument states that the lower
the unit cost of production of a given good or service, the more competitive the firm/in-
dustry that produces it, and thus the higher the exports. Several indicators of standard
cost and price competitiveness (which we can refer to as harmonised competitiveness
indicators, HCIs) have been developed, including consumer price indices, domestic
sales producer price indices and unit labour costs in manufacturing. However, there
is no agreement on which of these measures best reflects a country’s competitiveness,
nor it is possible, from an empirical standpoint, to establish a general ranking of the
explanatory power of the different HCIs (Giordano and Zollino, 2015). In particular, in
cross-country research within the CompNet project, Christodoulopoulou and Tkacevs
(2014) found that in standard export equations, HCIs are normally able to explain be-
tween 60 and 70 percent of the export variation, the rest being dependent on compet-
itiveness-enhancing channels that are alternatives to cost reductions, such as
investment in research and development (R&D), other technological investments re-
lated to foreign technology transfers or the improvements in the quality of products.
This ‘non-price’ channel tends to generate a positive relationship between competi-
tiveness of firms and the prices charged by firms for final goods, ie the opposite of
what typical price-related competitiveness measures would consider a competitive-
ness-enhancing development. The reason for this apparent paradox is that in the short
run, investments in R&D, foreign technology and product quality translate into an in-
crease in the fixed and/or variable costs that firms have to make to upgrade their com-
petitiveness, and thus a necessary increase in the output price. But on the demand
side, consumers value quality and are willing to pay a higher price for high-quality
goods, which in turns makes these ‘quality’ firms competitive. As stated by Krugman
(2012), when dealing with the measurement of competitiveness and productivity in
Europe “the unit value measure has always been a poor measure, and probably es-
pecially so when you’re dealing with a country that tries to export high-quality stuff”7.
As granularity, resource allocation and trade are all key elements in a proper assess-
ment of competitiveness, the contributions collected in this Blueprint will feature them
to different extents. The first chapter, by Barba Navaretti, Bugamelli, Forlani and Otta-
viano, reviews a growing literature about how the microeconomic characteristics of a
population of firms can significantly affect aggregate outcomes, and how the ensuing
granularity affects the impact of policy shocks such as exchange rate fluctuations.
7. A widely used methodology to measure quality is provided by Khandelwal (2010) ‘The Long and Short (of)
Quality Ladders’, Review of Economic Studies, 77(4), 1450-1476.
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8Specifically, the authors test the empirical relationship between the trade performance
of a country/industry and different moments of the underlying productivity distribu-
tions beyond the simple average8. They find that asymmetry, the third moment of the
distribution, is highly and significantly correlated to the competitiveness indicator, es-
pecially for large and international economies, consistent with the evidence of few ex-
ceptionally productive firms operating within each industry. The main findings are
robust to different specifications, and different types of standard error. Most impor-
tantly, the results are not affected by sample composition, ie asymmetry (and mean)
is significantly correlated with export competitiveness independently of the exclusion
of countries from the estimation sample. Dispersion and, especially, rightwards asym-
metries are therefore novel key parameters that any policy aimed at fostering com-
petitiveness should take into account.
The second chapter, by Békés and Ottaviano, uses the idea of granularity to explore
the relationship between firm-level heterogeneity and regional competitiveness. The
authors argue that measuring regional competitiveness should be also based on com-
paring firm performance in different EU regions, rather than simply looking at average
regional performance indicators. Given the available data, the authors discuss a num-
ber of indicators linked to the ability of firms to access and penetrate world markets.
By also making use of a trade performance measure, they identify a novel index – ex-
port per worker from a region to non-EU destinations relative to the EU average – as a
novel proxy of a ‘regional competitiveness’ index. The variable captures the capacity
of a region’s firms to outperform the firms of the average EU region in terms of exports.
As such, it could be conveniently added to the regional policymaker's toolbox.
The key policy message of these chapters is that, because of granularity, country and
sector average measurements, which are the parameters on which most policies are
generally based, do a poor job of grasping the actual level of competitiveness both
within countries (regions) and between them. Even if some countries or sectors might
be similar in terms of average productivity, the underlying efficiency distributions
could be very dissimilar. As a result, similar sets of policy dictated ex ante by similar
average competitiveness measures might end up producing very different policy out-
comes ex post, because of the underlying heterogeneity of firm performance.
The next two chapters look at the interplay of granularity with reallocation of economic
activity, and its effects on aggregate productivity and growth, in particular through the
8. In statistical terms, the average of a distribution is referred to as its ﬁrst moment, the variance is the second
moment, the asymmetry the third and so on.
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lens of the labour market. The first contribution, by Fontagné, Santoni and Tomasi,
shows that labour ‘gaps’, ie the extent to which firms depart from an efficient use of
the labour input, have been increasing over the 2000s in France, leading to a
misallocation of resources. Controlling for firm characteristics, the authors observe
that most of the adverse evolution falls on the positive gaps, ie that the most productive
firms after 2003 have not been able to increase their labour use. Interestingly, the 50-
employees discontinuity associated with (stricter) regulations in the labour market in
France is one element associated with the misallocation, but does not entirely explain
the worsening of the situation. The authors then present a negative correlation between
resource misallocation and the trade performance of some selected French
manufacturing sectors, concluding from this that a number of subtle micro-economic
rigidities (in particular the difficult reallocation of resources between firms within
sectors) have contributed to the deterioration of the aggregate performance of French
manufacturing.
Micro-economic rigidities in the labour market also feature prominently in the chapter
by Di Mauro and Ronchi, who investigate to what extent the labour market bargaining
framework in which firms operate has shaped their response to the Great Recession.
Using novel firm-level datasets, which combine the CompNet and WDN datasets de-
veloped by the European System of Central Banks, the authors are able to exploit the
variability in the degree of centralisation of wage-bargaining institutions across firms
to explain different firm-level cost-cutting strategies following the Great Recession.
They show that wage-bargaining institutions play a statistically significant role in shap-
ing the way in which a negative shock is distributed by firms to their economy. In par-
ticular, they find that labour markets with a higher proportion of firms applying
centralised collective bargaining are characterised by a greater share of companies
reducing the number of employees. Results also suggest that the decision of many
EU countries to move, over the last two decades, from fully centralised bargaining to
multi-level regimes has not been enough to limit these reductions in employment.
Overall, the second pair of chapters show that heterogeneous firms end up being
differently exposed to a number of rigidities in the labour market, generating a
misallocation of resources that has a significant effect on competitiveness and
employment. In particular, centralised wage-bargaining institutions seem to be
associated with a larger share of companies reducing the number of employees during
economic downturns. Moreover, to the extent that centralised wage-bargaining
institutions hinder a proper alignment of wages to firms' productivity, they might also
create a barrier to workers' mobility between firms within sectors, resulting in the sub-
optimal trade performance of a country. Labour market reforms that allow wages to be
9
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aligned to heterogeneous levels of firm productivity is thus key to fostering a proper
allocation of economic resources and, through this channel, a significant improvement
in competitiveness and growth. This is the second policy message of this Blueprint.
Exporting – and more broadly international trade – is another key feature of compet-
itiveness analysed in the third pair of chapters in the Blueprint. As argued by the ‘Happy
Few’ models of self-selection, it is only the most productive firms that will be the ex-
porters, importers or foreign direct investors, and in general part of global value chains.
As a result, those firms will be much more likely to innovate and grow. Another impor-
tant element for national competitiveness is the extent to which institutional conditions
allow firms that are currently not exporting to grow to levels of productivity that enable
them to tap into international markets. Looking at the dynamics of trade flows and their
interplay with firm granularity, it is thus possible to gauge national or regional com-
petitiveness, and how the same interaction ends up with resources being efficiently
allocated (or not) between firms.
Bas, Fontagné, Martin and Mayer use detailed data on international trade flows for
France to present new evidence on the 'non-price' dimension of competitiveness. The
authors show that, in terms of price competitiveness, direct labour costs represent
just 23 percent, on average, of the total value of French exports and 44 percent when
including the cost of labour for domestic intermediate consumption. Hence the non-
price dimension is key to the competitiveness of the country. The authors show that
the loss of France's world trade share does not seem to be a result of poor geographic
or sectoral specialisation, insufficient exporter support, under-representation of SMEs
in exports or credit constraints, but, more fundamentally, is caused on average by an
inadequate ‘quality/price ratio’ for French products. By relying on a novel indicator of
non-price competitiveness, the authors show that when products are of high quality,
results are exceptional, as demonstrated by the luxury, aeronautical and electrical dis-
tribution goods sectors and/or by brands, which appear to play a key role in France's
exports. The authors also emphasise the importance of reallocating production factors
(labour and capital) to help the most productive companies develop faster and improve
quality.
The final chapter, by Altomonte, Colantone and Zaurino, looks at trade dynamics
through the lens of global value chains. Starting from the causes of the recent trade
slowdown, the authors try to understand whether such a slowdown is a temporary
phenomenon related to the economic cycle, or if it represents a ‘new normal’ resulting
from a structural change in global value chains. In particular, they show that those
components of trade that are most directly related to GVCs experienced the greatest
10
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drop over the ‘great trade collapse’ of 2009. Moreover, these components also display
the slowest speed of adjustment after an income shock. Taken together, these two
pieces of evidence suggest that at least part of a possibly GVC-induced trade slowdown
is cyclical in nature, and might be re-absorbed in the coming years. From this, the third
set of policy implications points at the importance of undertaking measures to smooth
the adjustment of trade back to its long-term relationship with GDP. This entails exerting
more political efforts on multilateral negotiations within the Doha round, but also on
bilateral agreements such as the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), as these agreements are instrumental in trade facilitation and the reduction of
non-tariff barriers. Another implication for policy is related to the interplay between
granularity and GVCs: as GVCs are relatively more important in some industries (eg au-
tomotive) than in others, the relative specialisation of countries in GVC-intensive in-
dustries might determine a different speed of adjustment of their exports to the
long-term average, creating another driver for (at least one element of) competitive-
ness divergence within the EU.
Another common trait of all the chapters is that they rely to some extent on either novel
datasets, or novel analytical methodologies, or both. As such, we hope that, beyond
contributing to the policy debate on competitiveness in Europe, the Blueprint could
also contribute to measures to improve the quality of the underlying data on which
the analyses are based. This is the last, crucial policy message of this Blueprint.
The continuous development and improvement in data gathering and accessibility re-
mains key for both policymaking and research. To give some examples from the pre-
vious analysis, the results of the the first two chapters in this volume would soon lose
relevance unless firm-level data across countries and regions, complete with the ex-
port dimension of firms, are updated and made available to researchers. So far it has
been possible to rely on recent data collected within the ECB's CompNet project, but
this data need maintenance and updating over time. As documented in the first Blue-
print produced by the MAPCOMPETE project9, however, official cross-country firm-level
data at the European level, although it exists, it is for the time being practically inac-
cessible to the average researcher, and thus has a very limited use in terms of policy-
relevant analysis.
In terms of reallocation, the traditional macro stream of literature dealing with the ef-
fects of centralisation of wage-bargaining institutions on employment and wage out-
comes has generally led to inconclusive results and shallow support for policy,
9. See Castellani and Koch (2015).
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because the variation in the level of bargaining used in these papers is exclusively be-
tween countries (in general the OECD indicators on Employment Protection Legisla-
tion), with no variation at sector or firm level. Hence it becomes difficult to distinguish
the impact of these variables from industry time trends, time dummies and country
dummies. When data can be brought to the firm-level, by contrast, an entire new range
of policy-relevant results emerge, as this Blueprint clearly shows. Despite this, national
statistical institutes do not seem to prioritise working towards greater availability of
data on collective bargaining regimes, and more in general on labour market institu-
tions at the micro-level.
The results obtained by this volume's last two chapters on the impact of global value
chains and non-price factors on growth and competitiveness, crucially rely on the pres-
ence of detailed and comparable trade data that goes well beyond average statistics
on imports and exports. The continuous availability of updated and detailed Input/Out-
put tables, and reliable information on traded products both in terms of quantity and
values (enabling unit export prices to be inferred) also remains central in all future
analysis of competitiveness.
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2 The importance of micro data
in assessing aggregate
outcomes10
Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Matteo Bugamelli, Emanuele Forlani
and Gianmarco Ottaviano
In recent years, researchers and policymakers have been able to use sophisticated
databases to provide insightful economic analysis. The increasing variety of available
microeconomic databases and the improvement in the quality of data (in terms of both
scope and detail) has provided empirical support to underpin the analysis of the link
between microeconomic structures and aggregate fluctuations. 
In particular, focusing on firm-level data, an increasing number of studies, both at em-
pirical and theoretical level, underline how micro-level shocks can determine macro-
economic outcomes: changes in aggregate welfare, GDP or trade flows crucially depend
on shocks that might occur at firm level.
Macroeconomic analysis would therefore benefit from information on the microeco-
nomic distribution of firms’ characteristics. For example, country competitiveness can-
not be properly evaluated without an understanding of the microeconomic dynamics
relating to firms’ competitiveness.
In this chapter, we extensively review the literature on the linkages between micro-
economic structure and macroeconomic outcomes, in particular in terms of welfare
and trade adjustments. The chapter will show how microeconomic dynamics at firm
level have significant implications for aggregate fluctuations.
10. This chapter is based on the authors’ research project, ‘It takes (more than) a moment: Revisiting the link
between ﬁrm productivity and aggregate exports’.
Similar averages hide very heterogeneous higher moments. Our starting point is the
CompNet (2014) project. Its initial results show that firm performance varies enor-
mously (TFP and labour productivity), both within and between countries and sectors.
These differences might not be detected in country and sector averages, which are the
parameters most used in policy formulation. Even if some countries or sectors are sim-
ilar in terms of average productivity, the underlying efficiency distributions could be
very dissimilar. For example, Figure 1 reports two kernel densities for the same distri-
bution family (Gamma) with equal mean but different standard deviation. It is straight-
forward to observe that the blue line has a longer and fatter-tailed distribution
compared to the red line. If the distribution of firms moves from the red line to the blue
line, averages would not detect this change. Thus small variations in the average pa-
rameters might hide significant differences in the characteristics of the underlying
population of firms. The key question is therefore whether these differences, generally
captured by the higher moments of the distributions, affect the aggregate outcomes,
and through which channels. In particular, we see that assumptions on population dis-
tribution can have a significant impact on the aggregate outcomes.
Figure 1: Simulated distribution
Source: MAPCOMPETE from simulated data (10,000 observations). Note: K: shape parameter, θ: scale parameter,
asim: asymmetry as Pearson's second skewness coefficient (ratio of mean-median to standard deviation), p50:
median, skew: skewness.
The granular result. The analysis of business cycles by Gabaix (2011) was an initial
very influential contribution on the ‘granularity’ of macro outcomes, ie on how they
can be reconducted to the non-negligible elements of an economy. Most research on
business cycles considers the role of idiosyncratic shocks at firm-level to be negligible,
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especially in large economies with millions of firms. The main argument in favour of
this is that individual shocks cancel out in the economy because of the statistical in-
dependence of firm level shocks and because of the large number of firms. Gabaix
(2011) shows instead how idiosyncratic shocks affecting large firms also affect ag-
gregate fluctuations and, through general equilibrium channels (input-output link-
ages), all other firms as well. This outcome holds if firm size distributions are fat-tailed,
ie large firma account for a considerable share of the economy, like the blue distribu-
tion in Figure 1. The law of large numbers no longer applies if the distribution of firms’
sales departs from normality and displays a ‘fat tail’. In this case idiosyncratic shocks
affecting individual (large) firms do not cancel each other out, and determine aggregate
effects. Building on the stylised fact that in the United States, firms’ distributions are
highly skewed and that the sales of the top 100 firms are equal to almost 30 percent
of GDP11, Gabaix provides theoretical and empirical evidence that firm-level shocks do
not average out as the number of firms increases (in particular in more concentrated
sectors). For the US economy, shocks affecting the top 100 firms are responsible for
one-third of the country’s GDP fluctuations.
Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Mejan (2014) empirically test these results based on the
universe of French firms between 1990 and 2007. They decompose aggregate sales
fluctuations (in both domestic and foreign markets) and identify reactions to macro,
sectoral and firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks. They confirm the substantial contri-
bution of firm-specific shocks to aggregate volatility12. The magnitude of the effect of
firm-level shocks is similar to that of sectoral and macroeconomics shocks, and affects
all firms. Di Giovanni et al (2014) also confirm the fat-tail result of Gabaix (2011) that
idiosyncratic shocks are especially important when the distribution of firms is highly
concentrated and that the input-output linkage is the main channel through which firm-
specific shocks propagate13. Both papers conclude that shocks at firm level, in partic-
ular in highly concentrated sectors, are fundamental to understand aggregate volatility.
Higher moments and aggregate trade. A further important question is whether granu-
larity, as captured by different features of size or productivity distributions, is also re-
11. The proportion is remarkably stable over a period spanning 1975 to 2010.
12. Di Giovanni et al (2014) distinguish between the volatility of domestic sales and sales to other destination
markets.
13. Considering a similar mechanism, Acemoglu et al (2013) analyse how ﬁrm-level shocks determine aggregate
ﬂuctuations in function of the interaction between different sectors. At a regional level, the same channels might
play an even more relevant role. Glaeser (2011), for example, points out how Detroit’s economic prosperity was
strongly connected to a few sectors and mainly to three ﬁrms: Chrysler, Ford and General Motors. Given the
highlighted channels and the low industrial diversiﬁcation, any idiosyncratic shock affecting those ﬁrms or their
main suppliers has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the welfare of the area.
lated to the overall trade performance of countries and sectors. The theoretical and the
empirical literature on trade with heterogeneous firms (Bernard et al, 2003; Melitz,
2003) highlighted the importance of firm characteristics in trade outcomes and iden-
tified the need to dissect the extensive and the intensive margins of trade. In a similar
vein, the descriptive evidence in Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) and Barba Navaretti et
al (2011) showed that granularity is especially important in trade and in international
activities in general, where concentration of exports or foreign direct investment among
the largest players is larger than concentration of output or employment. For example,
Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) show that aggregate exports are driven by a small number
of top exporters. On average, the top 10 percent of exporters in Europe account for 80
percent of aggregate exports, and the top exporters export many products to many
destinations (75 percent of total aggregated exports come from firms with more than
10 exported products and 10 destination markets).
However, in the standard trade model with heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003), the
mean productivity of the underlying population of firms is the only parameter of pro-
ductivity distributions that affects aggregate trade flows. In other words, higher mo-
ments of the distributions, catching the granularity of the underlying population of
firms, do not affect aggregate outcomes. This results rest on three key assumptions:
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) consumers’ preferences; iceberg-type trade
costs and Pareto productivity distributions (Chaney, 2008). 
The average (weighted) productivity remains the only indicator that explains aggregate
exports, also in a slightly different framework. Costinot et al (2012) developed and
tested a model of Ricardian comparative advantage with CES preferences across sec-
tors, Fréchet productivity distribution and iceberg trade costs. First, they defined a the-
oretical model in which aggregate exports depend on the average productivity and not
on the higher moments of the distribution. Second, they found evidence that exports
are positively correlated with average productivity (defined as the inverse of weighted
producer price index). Also in this framework, the higher moments of productivity dis-
tribution seem negligible for aggregated exports.
Barba Navaretti et al (2015) apply this prediction of the standard trade model – that
only the first moments of the productivity distributions (ie the mean) matter for
aggregate exports – to the data, as their null hypothesis to be tested. They find strong
and robust evidence rejecting the null hypothesis. The export propensity is positively
correlated to the first moment (mean), but also to the asymmetry and dispersion of
the underlying productivity distributions14. Using the CompNet dataset (2014), this
empirical exercise is carried out in two stages. First, a gravity equation is estimated to
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calculate the origin fixed effect (ie the multilateral resistance term at origin-sector-
year level). The estimated values measure the exporter competitiveness netted out
of importing country and country-pair specific characteristics. Second, the empirical
relationship between this competitiveness indicator and the different moments of the
productivity distributions are tested. Asymmetry, the third moment of the distributions,
is highly and significantly correlated to the competitiveness indicator, especially for
large and international economies. According to the theoretical model, the estimates
also include average wages and number of firms to control for input price bias and
market size, respectively. The main findings are robust to different specifications, and
different types of standard errors. Most importantly, the results are not affected by
sample composition, ie asymmetry (and mean) is significantly correlated with export
competitiveness independently of the exclusion of countries from the estimation
sample.
Figures 2 and 3 show unconditional correlations for individual countries and for clus-
ters of countries/sectors based on their being below or above mean productivity. Barba
Navaretti et al (2015) shows that the average productivity (or size) of firms is not suf-
ficiently informative for analysing aggregate outcomes. Dispersion and, especially,
rightwards asymmetries are therefore key parameters that any policy aimed at fos-
tering exports should take into account15.
Trade costs, intensive and extensive margins and aggregate exports. A further issue
is to what extent size and productivity distributions affect the intensive and the
extensive margins of international trade. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) examine
the welfare gains from trade liberalisation and show how these depend on firms’ size
distribution, on the basis of a multi-country model of production and trade calibrated
to the observed distribution of firm size. If firms are distributed according to Zipf’s law,
which implies fat-tailed distributions, a reduction in the fixed cost of entry, for example
induced by trade liberalisation, has a relatively small effect on welfare. This is so
because the extensive margin of trade (new imported goods or new exporters) has a
small effect on aggregated welfare, given that marginal firms, those near the exporting
cut-off, account for a relatively small share of total output. Most of the welfare gains
derive instead from a reduction in iceberg-type variable costs and changes in the
14. Asymmetry is measured at sector level as the ratio of mean minus median to standard deviation. Dispersion is
evaluated as the ratio of the productivity value at the 80th percentile to the productivity value at the 20th
percentile.
15. In several respects, at the sectoral level the model used by Barba Navaretti et al (2015) is observationally
equivalent to the Ricardian model of Costinot et al (2012). From this viewpoint, Barba Navaretti et al (2015) can
be interpreted as looking into ﬁner detail at how higher moments of the ﬁrm productivity distribution within
sector-country pairs might affect revealed comparative advantage across countries.
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Figure 3. Unconditional correlation: country fixed effects and asymmetry
Source: Barba Navaretti et al (2014) Note: X is defined as the ratio of labour productivity mean (by country
sector year from CompNet) to the sector-year sample mean (ie the mean is the same for all the countries in
each year-sector pairs). The mean of X-ratio is one. The graphs on the left describe the correlations for the coun-
try-sector-year observations which above the CompNet sector-year mean (relatively more productive country-
sector in EU). The graphs on the right describe the correlations for the country-sector-year observations below
the CompNet sector-year mean (relatively less productive country-sector in EU).
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intensive margin of large incumbent firms. If firms are more uniformly distributed,
results are inverted. The reduction in fixed costs generates a greater effect on welfare
than under Zipf precisely because entry and the extensive margin now influence
considerably aggregate output (the relative importance of the intensive margin is
unchanged). Note that within this framework, the shapes of the distributions are
relevant because of the relative magnitude of the effects on aggregate outcomes that
large firms have compared to small firms, and also because the distance from
productivity cut-offs and the relative size of marginal firms influence the likely impact
of entry and the extensive margins.
Another important factor that influences aggregate trade outcomes is the role of dis-
tance from market. Chaney (2013) shows how the discouraging effect of distance is
in itself influenced by the characteristics of the underlying size distributions. He shows
theoretically and empirically that the negative effect of distance is smaller when firms
are large and therefore distributions especially skewed.
The shape of the distributions, though, might matter not only because of the relative
magnitudes of the firms engaged in foreign trade, but also because firms of different
size or different productivity level might have different strategic behaviour, and there-
fore react differently to changes in trade costs. This is the key theme of Bermann et al
(2012), who look at the impact of exchange rate changes on aggregate trade elastici-
ties for a sample of French firms. They first carry out a very detailed analysis of firm-
level responses to exchange rate fluctuations, showing that high-productivity firms
are more likely to engage in pricing-to-market strategies, and therefore are less likely
to pass through exchange rate swings into their final price in destination markets. Con-
sequently, for these firms, export expansion following a devaluation will be more lim-
ited than for less productive firms. This result can also be used to analyse the impact
of distributions on aggregate outcomes. By aggregating firm-level data at the industry
level, Berman et al (2014) show that under Pareto distributions, the elasticity of ex-
ports (in value here) is lower in sectors with a higher productivity dispersion (the in-
verse of parameter k) or concentration as measured by a Herfindal index. Both
measures capture the rightward skew of the productivity distribution.
Their results have also implications for the analysis of the extensive and intensive
margins of trade which are consistent with Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013). When
16. In most of the international trade models, ﬁrms’ heterogeneity is described by a Pareto distribution for its
tractability and appealing features (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
17. On the other side, the mean and higher moments are deﬁned as a function of the only dispersion parameter
(and lower bound).
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productivity distributions are especially skewed, a devaluation has also a limited effect
on the extensive margins. 
The theoretical underpinning of the analysis of the effects of trade costs on margins
and how these are affected by the shapes of the distribution is rooted in the earlier
theoretical paper by Chaney (2008). He introduces in his theoretical framework a fur-
ther ingredient, which is the interaction between the shape of the distributions and
the elasticity of substitution between varieties. If the elasticity is high under Pareto
distributions (fat tails once more), the extensive margin is of limited relevance for ag-
gregate exports. This derives from the common situation that marginal firms are small
and account for a small share of aggregate exports, but also from the fact that the mar-
ket share of these new entrants is depressed even further by the high substitutability
of their products with other varieties. In this case, therefore, the effect of the extensive
margin is small and most of the adjustment is again on the intensive margin of large
firms. In contrast, when elasticity is low, each firm has a large and fairly stable market
share; therefore even marginal low productivity firms acquire a relatively large share
after entry. The effect of the extensive margin on aggregate exports is in this case more
sizeable. 
The effect of the extensive margin is more relevant – dominant in Pareto distributions,
according to Chaney (2008) – if the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods is high.
Beyond Pareto. Most of the reported findings (especially in international trade) rely
on the hypothesis that firms’ characteristics (such as size or productivity) are distrib-
uted according to a probability function of the exponential family and in particular the
Pareto distribution16. Pareto distribution has been extensively used by researchers to
model firms’ heterogeneity because its tractability. Moreover, Pareto distribution
seems to approximate quite well the right tail of the observed distribution of firm
sizes17.
Head et al (2014) underline that also the lognormal distribution “(i) maintains some
desirable analytic features of Pareto, (ii) fits the complete distribution of firm  sales
rather than just approximating the right tail, and (iii) can be generated under equally
plausible processes”. The authors show that the use of lognormal distribution produces
differences in the gains from trade, compared to Pareto distribution.
Bas et al (2015) made another attempt to analyse the implications of introducing dif-
ferent distributions. Their main contribution is to show that trade elasticities (with re-
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spect to tariffs in this case) vary in different destination markets if the Pareto assump-
tion is dropped. Pareto predicts the same elasticity for all destinations, which is pro-
portional to the dispersion index of Pareto (see also Head and Mayer, 2014). In
particular, using lognormal distributions for productivity, Bas et al (2015) compute ex-
pected bilateral elasticities, and show that productivity heterogeneity (within sector)
is crucial to explain the aggregate variations of bilateral exports to trade cost shocks.
For example, constant elasticity would underestimate or overestimate the trade impact
of tariff liberalisation in function of the initial level of trade.
Moving away from the assumption of (untruncated) Pareto distribution also has strong
implications for the measurement of welfare gains arising from trade liberalisation.
Under specific assumptions, Arkolakis et al (2012) show that welfare gains depend
only on the share of domestic expenditure and (constant) trade elasticity. Their out-
come is compatible with a Pareto distribution of technology, where the trade elasticity
is proportional to the dispersion parameter of a Pareto distribution. 
Differently, Melitz and Redding (2015) show that because variations in the theoretical
distribution (from untruncated to a truncated Pareto distribution) generate variable
trade elasticities across country pairs in the model, changes in welfare are proportional
to changes in the domestic productivity cut-off so that welfare gains from trade liber-
alisation depend on the underlying micro structure. In this framework, it is necessary
to analyse adjustments at firm level to properly evaluate welfare gains. 
While, in the case of untrucated Pareto distribution, welfare is just defined by constant
elasticity and domestic expenditure (as in Arkolakis et al, 2012), the introduction of
truncated Pareto emphasises the role of bilateral elasticities and changes in produc-
tivity cut-off. Melitz and Redding (2015) also suggest that small changes in the shape
of firms’ productivity distribution (from untruncated Pareto) have a large impact in the
evaluation of welfare gains because of variable trade elasticity. Therefore, assumptions
about productivity distribution are not insignificant for the computation of welfare
gains, and the existence of appropriate data, which allows the description of the un-
derlying micro structure, is crucial.
Analysis of aggregate outcomes. The recent literature reveals the existence of two po-
tential approaches to evaluate aggregate shocks from micro level data. First, there is
a ‘micro’ approach that requires knowledge of the full population of firms and their
characteristics, such as productivity and exports (Bas et al, 2015). Using the full pop-
ulation of firms, this approach allows the underlying distribution to be better charac-
terised (eg Pareto or lognormal) and how shocks in trade costs spread from firm level
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to macroeconomic level to be analysed in detail. Even if the micro approach allows the
description of the transmission mechanisms (from micro to macro), the data require-
ment is relatively huge. For example, Bas et al (2015) need detailed firm-level data for
France and China to compute bilateral trade elasticities for both countries. In addition,
the micro approach would be extremely data-intensive for cross country comparisons.
A second approach, ‘macro’, looks at the moments of underlying distributions using
summary statistics. For example, Barba Navaretti et al (2015) analyse the export com-
petitiveness of countries using the moments of firms' productivity distributions (eg
mean and asymmetry). This macro approach is less data intensive and allows cross-
country analysis, but it requires a specific database that reports statistics on the mo-
ments of distributions (such as CompNet, 2014). 
Even if the micro and macro approaches present advantages and disadvantages de-
pending on the research objective, the two approaches highlight the role of underlying
micro structure to properly analyse and estimate aggregate outcomes.
The literature reviewed in this chapter shows that microeconomic characteristics of
the underlying population of firms can significantly affect aggregate outcomes. Cru-
cially, features of productivity and size distributions also affect the impact of policy
shocks inducing changes in trade costs, such as exchange rate fluctuations or trade
liberalisation. In light of this, the availability of micro level data or aggregate statistics
that describe in detail the underlying distribution of firms’ characteristics (CompNet,
2014) are crucial to provide insightful analysis of macroeconomic shocks to econo-
mists and policymakers.
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3 Micro-founded measurement
of regional competitiveness in
Europe
Gábor Békés and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano
3.1 Introduction
Enhancing ‘competitiveness’ is a popular objective of economic policymaking, both at
national and the regional levels. International regional competitiveness recently was
developed into the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth objectives of the Europe
2020  policy programme18. While a huge amount of development funding is allocated
to help meet these objectives, the concept of ‘competitiveness’ remains rather mys-
terious and is often debated. There is neither any generally accepted definition nor
any robust agreement on how to measure it. While this is true for both nations and re-
gions, the focus of this chapter is on the regional level.
The regional level is important because regional diversity within the European Union
is substantial, and regional disparities matter at the national level in a context in which
GDP per capita differences between regions within EU countries are comparable to the
differences between the more- or less-developed EU countries. For instance, while Ro-
mania has a per capita GDP that is 32 percent of the per capita GDP of Germany (at
PPP), the poorest Romanian region (North-East) has a per capita GDP that is just 26
percent of the per capita GDP of the richest (Bucharest). As a result of pronounced re-
gional disparities, even within the same country, people living in poor regions have
much fewer work opportunities and, as long as local services are financed by local
governments through local taxation, also much less access to education and health
care. This is why measuring ‘regional competitiveness’ as a driver of regional economic
performance has been considered an objective worth pursuing.
18. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/index_en.htm.
In this chapter we will do three things. First, in section 3.2 we discuss the conceptual
underpinnings of why it is interesting to unpack the economic performance of a coun-
try into the economic performance of its regions. In particular, based on the academic
literature, we will discuss how ‘proximity’ matters in the sense that several key inter-
actions between people and firms that are at the core of economic performance peter
out very rapidly as distance increases, making the local context the scale at which
most of the action takes place. On the other hand, we will argue that, once the local
context is targeted, the economy becomes extremely ‘granular’ in the sense that local
economic performance even more than national performance ends up being driven
by the fortunes of a handful of firms that are large (at least in the local context). In
other words, it is the importance of ‘proximity’ that makes ‘granularity’ more salient.
Second, in section 3.3 we explore the implications of ‘proximity’ and ‘granularity’ for
how one may want to think of and measure ‘regional competitiveness’. The basic idea
is that, if ‘proximity’ makes the regional dimension crucial and ‘granularity’ implies that
a few large firms determine regional destinies, a natural way to assess regional per-
formance is to look at how large firms fare across regions. We will then argue that, given
available data, an effective way to gauge how large firms fare is to look at their ability
to access and penetrate world markets. In this respect, we will propose a pragmatic
definition of ‘regional competitiveness’. This type of firm typically accounts for domi-
nant shares of employment, sales and profits. Such firms are more capital intensive
and pay higher wages. They invest more in capital and human resources. They are the
main drivers of innovation. Our approach is practical because it measures ‘regional
competitiveness’ in terms of actual rather than potential outcomes, and focuses on
an outcome variable that is correlated but more easily measurable that several other
obvious outcome variables.
Third, in section 3.4 we discuss the data needed to compute our proposed measure of
‘regional competitiveness’, if this data is are currently available for EU regions and how
its availability could be improved. We note here that the administrative definition of
‘region’ does not necessarily coincide with the relevant definition based on the inten-
sity of actual interactions between people and firms. This is an old issue with a long
tradition on which we have little to add, apart from stressing that data is typically col-
lected according to the administrative definition and this is the definition that matters
most in terms of regional policies. Section 3.5 offers some conclusions. Two illustrative
examples are presented in the Annex.
To our knowledge, the closest research to ours is Konings and Marcolin (2011), who
use firm-level data to assess the competitiveness of Belgian and German regions. In
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line with our work, the concept that the authors use does not “engage in measuring
different potential drivers of productivity (with the risk of omitting some), but will di-
rectly capture the productivity level of firms that are active in a particular region”. Sim-
ilarly, they note the importance of large firms, arguing that by using firm-level data
they are “also able to analyse the dependence of regions on a few large firms, which
reveals potential vulnerability in terms of relocation threats”. The data is derived from
EU company accounts contained in the Amadeus dataset by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) for
2005 and 2008 for medium and large-sized companies. Konings and Marcolin (2011)
compute labour productivity (value added per worker), and calculate the ratio of the
average labour cost and average labour productivity, to obtain a measure of the relative
cost of a unit produced – the preferred measure of competitiveness. Our method is an
alternative that focuses even more on the ‘outcome’ of competition, but is nevertheless
likely to be correlated with the Konings and Marcolin measure.
Two caveats are in order in relation to the research in this chapter. First, because the
ideal data is not available, this chapter should be taken as a methodological contribu-
tion to the policy debate on ‘regional competitiveness’ rather than an attempt to pre-
cisely measure ‘regional competitiveness’. Accordingly, we will use the available data
to provide specific examples rather than an overall assessment of ‘regional competi-
tiveness’ across the EU. Moreover, our examples serve only to take snapshots of the
situation at one point in time, leaving aside the question of how patterns evolve through
time. Second, we do not take any stance on the relationship between ‘regional com-
petitiveness’ and ‘regional convergence’ in economic performance. One might want
(all) regions to be ‘competitive’ because one wants them to compete. From this per-
spective, competition between regions might be considered good in itself. However,
competition is a dynamic process and one should not expect necessarily a balanced
distribution of economic activities at any point in time. Because of the pull of ‘proxim-
ity’, one might even expect some degree of (sound) regional imbalances at all points
in time.
3.2 A new foundation for regional policy: performance of regions is driven by
localised externalities and granularity
Why is it interesting to unpack the economic performance of a country into the eco-
nomic performance of its regions? The answer has to do with the concepts of ‘proximity’
and ‘granularity’.
3.2.1 Proximity
Firms compete not only on the basis of their internal capabilities, resources and
business networks, but also in the context of the business environments they come
from. Institutions, regulations, demand conditions and many other factors in their
countries of origin determine the quality and the availability of their inputs (from labour
to intermediate goods and services) and their sales opportunities. As suggested by a
long line of academic and business consultancy studies, national determinants are
essential. 
However, several key interactions between people and firms that are at the core of
economic performance are effective at a smaller scale than the country level. These
processes include labour market interactions, knowledge spillovers, trade transactions
between collaborating firms and even mutual trust. The fact that some important eco-
nomic interactions are constrained by proximity is one of the reasons why the concept
of ‘regional competitiveness’ might be worth exploring. Even within a country, regions
can offer rather varied business environments, including variation in labour force qual-
ity, in agglomeration and diversity of firms, in research and development infrastructure,
and in urban services.
Agglomeration forces
Concentration of economic activity in some regions within a country, or in some cities
within a region, has been identified as a key driver of economic performance.
Firms agglomerate to benefit from ‘Marshallian externalities’ such as the spreading of
knowledge among similar industries, a greater pool of labour to choose from or the
ability to access indivisible goods such as conference venues or airports. Hence, when
operating within proximity of each other, firms can save on transaction costs and enjoy
greater productivity. This is argued, for example, in so-called ‘new economic geography’
models (see eg Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; or Baldwin et al, 2003) and in
models of regional growth with knowledge spillovers (Ciccone and Hall, 1996). These
models suggest that interactions between people and firms with a positive value
greater than that signalled by market prices (‘positive externalities’) can arise through
several channels, such as sharing indivisible goods, saving on the costs of matching
workers with firms, and learning from each other (Duranton and Puga, 2004). When
‘positive externalities’ require people and firms to be close to each other, they generate
‘agglomeration forces’ leading to the geographical co-location of economic activities.
At the same time, competition between co-localised people and firms for locally scarce
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resources generates ‘dispersion forces’ that cut into the benefits of agglomeration.
In ‘new economic geography’ models, proximity has several major implications. First,
when firms co-locate, they offer more job opportunities and hence attract people. This
increases the size of the local market and reduces the need to import final goods from
elsewhere, thus reducing the average transport cost embedded in the consumption
bundle of local residents. Second, proximity also entails cheaper transport between
firms, because the producers of intermediate goods are located closer to their end
users. Third, the total factor productivity (TFP) of firms (ie their efficiency in using given
amounts of inputs to produce output) might also increase because of knowledge
spillovers from other producers. As long as all these effects entail some degree of ‘ex-
ternality’, the impact of proximity on income will be more than proportional to the num-
ber of co-located firms.
A fourth implication is related to labour productivity in larger and denser areas, partic-
ularly in cities (Puga, 2010). This greater efficiency of labour might be partly explained
by productivity gains at the firm level translated into gains of marginal labour produc-
tivity. It is also explained by ‘spatial sorting’ as richer job opportunities where firms
co-locate are disproportionately seized by more talented people. Several studies find
that about half of the earning surplus achieved in denser areas comes from spatial
sorting. However, there are some aspects of larger and denser urban areas that are
conducive to learning and personal improvement fostered by peer pressure, more
valuable experience and easier access to a variety of educational services.
Agglomeration and dispersion forces are in practice quite hard to disentangle. However,
their combined effect on labour productivity can be estimated and has been found to
be positive. For example, Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002) find that the
elasticity of labour productivity to people’s density is 6 percent and 5 percent on av-
erage in the US and the EU respectively. These early findings are in the ball park of re-
cent estimates for European countries that control for firm selection and the exogenous
attributes of different urban areas (Duranton et al, 2012).
Both agglomeration and dispersion forces may strengthen each-other back and forth.
This ‘cumulative causation’ – as devised by Myrdal in 1957 – may be present between
agglomeration and innovation as this is stressed by models of regional growth. These
models add to the ‘new economic geography’ perspective a dynamic dimension in
terms of endogenous growth spurred by technological progress and localised
knowledge spillovers. From this perspective, innovation is key, with agglomerated
production and agglomerated innovation reinforcing each other. For example, Minerva
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and Ottaviano (2009) provide a model in which economic interactions between regions
are affected by both the transport costs of exchanging goods and the communication
costs of exchanging knowledge. When innovation takes place in a region, this
generates faster growth and higher income, which in turn increases demand and local
profits. But higher profits make additional innovation more attractive. This leads to faster
growth so that cumulative causation between agglomeration and growth kicks in.
Distance decay
By now there is a large body of evidence suggesting that the impact of agglomeration
decays rapidly with distance. This pattern is observed for various types of economic
interactions such as trade in intermediate inputs or knowledge cross-fertilisation
spillovers in academia or business.
Firms trade with one another by buying and selling raw materials, intermediates or
capital goods (‘demand and cost linkages’). To save on transport costs, they often clus-
ter together, especially within sectors. Duranton and Overman (2005) consider man-
ufacturing sectors in Britain and investigate the extent of co-location of firms within
sectors and the role of distance. They find that about half of the four-digit sectors are
localised and localisation mostly takes place at small scales below 50 kilometres.
Gains from proximity to other companies are localised – also when considering trade
relationships. For instance, Amiti and Cameron (2007) use the theoretical framework
developed by Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) to estimate the benefits of ag-
glomeration arising from vertical linkages between Indonesian firms using a manu-
facturing survey of firms at Indonesian district level. Their results show that positive
externalities arising from demand and cost linkages are quantitatively important and
highly localised. Strengthening cost linkages (through better access to suppliers) or
demand linkages (through closer proximity to corporate customers) from the 10th to
the 90th percentile raises wages and thus labour productivity by more than 20 percent.
These productivity gains are, however, highly localised, spreading over only a short
distance: 90 percent of the spillover is observed in close proximity to the firm (within
108km for proximity to customers and within 262km for proximity to suppliers).
Spatial concentration enhances productivity and drives wages higher – but only when
there are productivity shocks. Using US data, Rosenthal and Strange (2008) estimate
the relationship between agglomeration externalities related to human capital and
workers’ wages at Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level with 1239 spatial units at
hand. First, the spatial concentration of employment is found to be positively related
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to wages, with the urban density premium being driven by proximity to college-edu-
cated workers. Second, these effects decline sharply with distance: benefits of edu-
cation and gains from being close to educated people fall dramatically with distance.
In particular, the wage-increasing effect of being close to educated people falls by 75
percent as the distance rises from 5 to 15 miles.
Knowledge spillovers – the transfer of scientific or practical information between com-
panies – is a key motivation for investment support programmes offered in most coun-
tries and regions. Lychagin et al (2010) measure spillovers from knowledge
laboratories in the US. They use a measure of geographic proximity based on the dis-
tribution of the locations of inventors working for firms instead of the firm HQ addresses
to better capture the flow of scientific knowledge. They find that 90 percent of knowl-
edge transmission happens within a few hundred kilometres of labs, and spillovers
are small or virtually non-existent beyond 500km.Anderson, Quigley and Wilhelmsson
(2009) consider knowledge spillovers in Sweden after a policy intervention aimed at
decentralising post-secondary education throughout the country. They use annual es-
timates of output per worker for each of 284 local civil divisions to measure local pro-
ductivity. Innovative activity is found to be related to the comprehensive records of
patent awards, which also include the inventor’s home address. Estimates clearly sug-
gest that productivity gains are highly localised. The spillovers from researchers em-
ployed at old and new institutions are concentrated: roughly 40 percent of the
cumulative gain in productivity materialises within 10km of the old institution. For new
universities, this attenuation effect is even greater.
All in all, estimates suggest that positive externalities are typically effective in a narrow
radius of 5-25km for interactions between people and 50-150km for interactions be-
tween firms. Hence, proximity matters and this makes it useful to unpack the economic
performance of a country into the economic performance of its regions.
3.2.3 Granularity
In most countries, a handful of firms are responsible for a large proportion of economic
activity, including export sales and foreign direct investment19.
19. For details, see Gabaix (2011), di Giovanni and Levchenko (2011) or Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
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Dominant ﬁrms
Gabaix (2011) estimates that the business cycle movements of the largest 100 firms
in the US explain a third of the aggregate movements in output growth. In European
countries, even after disregarding firms with fewer than 10 employees, as most
datasets do, 1 percent of the firms produce over 75 percent of output or of foreign
sales. These are the dominant firms that are also important for their impact on business
cycles. This dominance is exacerbated at a regional level, and the more so the finer
the level of spatial disaggregation. Kleinert et al (2012) show how the features of a
small number of large foreign-owned firms can explain several aspects of regional
business cycles in France. ‘Granularity’ captures this idea that a few selected compa-
nies play a dominant role in regional and national economic performance. In principle,
it has little to do with externalities. Firm size might follow a ‘power law’ (ie exhibit log-
linear distribution), a property initially uncovered by Gibrat (1931) in the case of
French firms. More recent research by Axtell (2001) on US firms estimates a power
law with exponent 1.059 ± 0.054. This is very close to 1, a special case of the power
law known as Zipf’s law. In this special case, the second largest firm is half the size of
the largest, the third largest firm is one-third of the largest, and so on. This can be shown
to be the result of random firm growth. If different firms grow randomly with the same
expected percentage growth rate (which equals the average firm growth rate) and face
the same variance in percentage grow rates, the limit distribution of firm sizes con-
verges to Zipf’s law, characterised by the presence of a few dominant firms.
While other factors might also contribute to the emergence of few dominant firms (such
as public intervention or imperfect competition), the key point is that the importance
of ‘proximity’ makes the local context the scale at which most of the action takes place
and, once the local context is targeted, the economy becomes extremely ‘granular’ be-
cause local economic performance even more than national performance ends up
being driven by the fortunes of a handful of firms that are large (at least relative to the
local context).
‘Million dollar plants’
Granularity makes it natural for local leaders to commit public funds to attracting in-
vestment from large companies. This might imply particularly large sums in the case
of large multinationals. Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) report that in 1991
BMW was given $115 million in grants to subsidise a new plant in Greenville-Spartan-
burg county in South Carolina in return for an investment creating new jobs. The cost
and benefit analysis hinged on the hope that BMW would create an additional 2000
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jobs and generate massive gains within the county. Comparing the economic perform-
ance of counties that managed to attract similarly large investments – called ‘million
dollar plants’ – with those of counties that almost managed but did not quite succeed,
Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) were able to identify the associated gains
by measuring spillovers to other businesses, wages and house prices. They found that
industry in the winning county benefited substantially over the five years following
the investment: output rose, the TFP of existing companies grew and wages in-
creased20. These gains have to be weighed against the possible monopsonistic power
(in which only one buyer exists for the products or services of several vendors) of
dominant firms with respect to local workers, local suppliers and local authorities
(Kleinert et al, 2012).
3.3 ‘Regional competitiveness’
We now explore the implications of ‘proximity’ and ‘granularity’ for of the assessment
and measurement of ‘regional competitiveness’.
‘Competitiveness’ is a notoriously elusive concept. In its most general definition it
refers to the performance of the unit of analysis relative to some chosen benchmark.
Specific definitions then differ in terms of the unit of analysis, the exact measure of
performance or the chosen benchmark.
Among the several definitions of competitiveness, two stand out as particularly rele-
vant for the discussion of ‘regional competitiveness’: a macroeconomic definition that
takes the country as the unit of analysis; and a microeconomic definition that focuses,
instead, on the firm. The concept of ‘national competitiveness’ is often used in the
analysis of a country's macroeconomic performance relative to its trading partners,
with an emphasis on the factors that help explain relative export performance. These
include both more qualitative factors, such as technological innovativeness, product
specialisation and product quality, and more quantitative factors, such as cost-effec-
tiveness and productivity. The problem with this approach is that, even when all factors
are favourable, they do not necessarily lead to more exports because they might
mostly show up as exchange-rate appreciation and better terms of trade. That is why
standard measures of national competitiveness rely on a more restricted notion of rel-
ative performance related to international cost or price differentials (Riley, 2012). This
is the logic underpinning the dominant use of the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
20. This does not imply that subsidies were in fact a good public investment.
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– with the underlying relative price and cost indicators – to measure a country’s na-
tional competitiveness21.
The use of the term ‘competitiveness’ to refer to relative national trade performance
has been heavily criticised by economists22, for two reasons. First, it gives the impres-
sion that trade performance is an objective worth pursuing per se at the national level,
whereas the trade balance should be viewed as only a channel through which a coun-
try can borrow from or lend to other countries. And whether borrowing or lending are
good or bad cannot be assessed in absolute terms but rather depends on the return
on investment. Second, it suggests that factors, such as technological innovativeness,
product specialisation, product quality, cost-effectiveness and productivity, have some
value only because they help the country gain international market shares, whereas
they should be considered as important per se because, even in autarky, they would
affect national living standards.
A reason for this confusion between ends and means arguably lies in the application
to the analysis of country performance of notions first developed to describe firm per-
formance. From this microeconomic point of view, competitiveness refers to the fact
that a firm outperforms its ‘competitors’ in terms of size (employment, output, revenue)
and profitability thanks to everything that affects the perceived quality of the firm’s
products and its cost-effectiveness in supplying them. When benchmark competitors
consist of all firms in the same sector producing in the same place, a firm’s competi-
tiveness boils down to its own ability to generate more added value from any given
amount of inputs, ie from its measured total factor productivity (TFP). When benchmark
competitors consist, instead, of all firms in the same sector selling in the same place,
a firm’s competitiveness is a nexus of its measured TFP and all the external factors
that determine the quality-cost effectiveness of the place where the firm supplies from.
These external factors link the microeconomic and the macroeconomic aspects of
competitiveness (with the caveat that what is good for the firm is not necessarily good
for the place where the firm operates, and vice versa).
The distinction between the macroeconomic and microeconomic definitions of
competitiveness percolates to the regional level. However, when it comes to ‘regional
competitiveness’, the notion of competitiveness as a relative performance outcome
driven by a given set of factors is often lost. For example, underlying the European
Commission's ‘Regional Competitiveness Index’ (RCI) there seems to be a notion of
21. http://www.bis.org/publ/econ39.htm; https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/hci/html/index.en.html.
22. See, for example, Krugman (1994).
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competitiveness as a process with its own inputs and outputs. Specifically:
“...the index is based on eleven pillars describing both inputs and outputs
of territorial competitiveness, grouped into three sets describing basic, efficiency
and innovative factors of competitiveness. The basic pillars represent the basic
drivers of all economies. They include (1) Quality of Institutions, (2) Macro-eco-
nomic Stability, (3) Infrastructure, (4) Health and the (5) Quality of Primary and
Secondary Education. These pillars are most important for less developed re-
gions.
“The efficiency pillars are (6) Higher Education and Lifelong Learning (7)
Labour Market Efficiency and (8) Market Size. The innovation pillars, which are
particularly important for the most advanced regional economies, include (9)
Technological Readiness, (10) Business Sophistication and (11) Innovation.
This group plays a more important role for intermediate and especially for highly
developed regions. Overall, the RCI framework is designed to capture short- as
well as long-term capabilities of the regions”23.
This notion of ‘regional competitiveness’ as a process drifts away from both the macro-
economic and the microeconomic definitions of competitiveness. Bundling outputs
and inputs of the process together as ‘pillars’ creates a taxonomy that may be some-
what useful to rank regions on a set of more or less reasonable criteria, but transforms
the concept of competitiveness into a magic black box of limited practical use.
Based on the macroeconomic and microeconomic traditions, we want to put forward,
instead, the idea that the most useful way to think about ‘regional competitiveness’ is
in terms of a measurable relative outcome driven by measurable factors. The only
meaningful outcome that can be called ‘competitiveness’ of a region is the performance
of its firms relative to their competitors in benchmark regions.
The focus on firm performance has several advantages. First, while it is true that what
is good performance for a region’s firms is not necessarily good performance for its
people, in practice the two are highly correlated. Second, ‘competitiveness’ might be
a disputed concept in the case of places, but it is a generally accepted concept in the
case of firms. Third, when it comes to regional policy, much ‘competition’ between re-
gions is about attracting ‘competitive firms’ because these hire more workers, offer
better job security, pay higher wages, invest more (also in human resources), generate
more revenues and profits, and therefore allow regions to raise more tax revenues for
23. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/6th_report/rci_2013_report_ﬁnal.pdf.
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any given tax rate.
The fact that ‘competitive firms’ are better in a number of ways raises the thorny ques-
tion of which measure of performance should be used to identify them. Recent devel-
opments in the academic literature on international trade come to the rescue. These
developments show that all measures of firm performance are driven by firm TFP24.
They also show that the best proxy of exceptional TFP for a firm is its export participa-
tion and intensity: whether or not the firm is an exporter, and how much it exports.
Hence, exports become a crucial indicator of ‘competitiveness’25. This bridges the
macroeconomic and microeconomic views on ‘competitiveness’, and has the addi-
tional advantage of avoiding the direct estimation of firm TFP, which often requires un-
achievable standards in terms of data availability and still faces some open
methodological issues26. Data on European firms reveals a positive correlation at the
firm level between TFP and export share of revenues. Focusing on exports has also an
additional advantage related to the concept of ‘granularity’. As already discussed, ‘gran-
ularity’ captures the idea that a few selected companies play a dominant role in re-
gional and national economic performance. Because of export costs, export
participation and intensity are the best indicators that a firm belongs to that selected
group because they do not require any typically noisy measure of ‘TFP thresholds’.
Specifically, consider the export activities of firms located in different EU regions and
active in a sector s. Consider a EU origin region o and a non-EU export destination d
that is far enough from Europe and without former colonial, cultural or language links
with any EU country to be equally ‘accessible’ from all EU regions (eg China). Let Lo,s
denote employment by sector s in region o and Xo,s denote exports of sector s from
region o to destination d. Analogously, let Ls denote total EU employment in sector s
and Xs denote total EU exports to d in sector s. Then compute the share of region o in
total EU exports normalised by the share of region o in total EU employment in the sec-
tor. We take the resulting ‘normalised export share’
NXSo,s = (Xo,s/Xs)/(Lo,s/Ls)
24. See, for example, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
25. Firms that not only export but are also directly investing abroad (FDI) are even more exceptional. Indeed,
‘internationalisation’ in general (ie selling to customers on a global market) is what we have in mind. However, we
prefer to focus on exports because data is more easily available. Considering FDI as well would increase the
importance of the top 5 percent of ﬁrms.
26. See, for example, Bartelsman et al (2013).
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as our measure of the ‘regional competitiveness’ of region o in sector s. This can be
rewritten as
NXSo,s = (Xo,s/Lo,s)/(Xs/Ls)
which is export per worker from region o to destination d relative to the EU average.
Hence, our ‘regional competitiveness’ captures the capacity of a region’s firms to out-
perform the firms of the average EU region in terms of exports. It is worth stressing that
this does not imply that we see exporting as good in itself. Rather, we focus on exports
because it is a strong indicator of the TFP of firms in the region.
According to the academic literature on which this argument is based, export proxies
‘exceptional firm productivity’ because firms have to be very productive in order to
generate the revenues needed to cover the additional costs they face in serving foreign
markets. Some of these costs arise from the fixed initial investment required to break
into a market (such as the costs of creating a distribution network), others are recurrent
and vary with the amounts shipped (such as transport costs and tariff barriers). Fixed
export costs affect the number of producers that are able to export (‘extensive margin’);
variable export costs affect the amount of shipments per exporter (‘intensive margin’).
To capture these two aspects, we denote the numbers of exporters and producers in
region o (in the EU) by no,s (ns) and No,s (Ns) respectively. This allows us to decompose
the normalised export share into two multiplicative components as
NXSo,s = (no,sxo,s / No,s/lo,s) / (nsxs/nsls) = [(no,s / No,s) / (ns / Ns)] x [(xo,s / lo,s)/(xs / ls)]
where xo,s (xs) denotes average export per exporter and lo,s (ls) denotes average em-
ployment per producer in region o (in the EU) respectively. We then use the ‘extensive’
and the ‘intensive’ normalised export shares
NXSo,s = (no,s/No,s)/(ns/Ns)
NXSo,s = (xo,s/lo,s)/(xs/ls)
to measure region o’s ‘extensive regional competitiveness’ and ‘intensive regional com-
petitiveness’ in sector s. These capture the extent to which regional competitiveness
is affected by fixed versus variable export costs. In particular, the importance of the
extensive margin suggests that firms have to be productive enough in order to break
into the export market. This implies that regional competitiveness is driven not only
38
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by the TFP of the average firm (which affects the extensive margin) but also by the
proportion of local firms with a TFP that is high enough to overcome the fixed costs of
exporting. Hence, our measure of regional competitiveness puts a premium on the
concentration of firms in the upper tail of the TFP distribution (‘granularity’)27. As these
are the firms that hire more workers, offer better job security, pay higher wages, invest
more (also in human resources) and generate more revenues and profits, this premium
is not unwarranted28.
A final caveat is in order. Our notion of regional competitiveness is sectoral in nature,
the idea being that it does not makes much sense to try to gauge the relative perform-
ance of two regions by comparing the productivity of firms that operate in different
sectors. However, the inter-sectoral perspective can also be important from a risk-shar-
ing point of view: is it better for a region to be very competitive in fewer sectors or some-
what less competitive in a greater number of sectors? The answer depends on how
risk is shared with other regions through labour and capital mobility or redistributive
policies29. Inter-sectoral specialisation might also mat ter in terms of growth potential
because specialising in some products at the country level has been shown to bring
higher growth than specialising in others30. Both aspects, however, shift the focus from
regional to national competitiveness and this goes beyond the scope of our analysis. 
3.4 Measurement issues
3.4.1 Ideal data
In this section, we contrast our first best approach to the realities of data. We start by
describing what an ideal dataset – building on existing but not easily accessible data
– would look like, followed by a discussion of major issues and challenges. We ac-
knowledge that while the data we need does exist, access to that data is very difficult
in most countries, and coming up with a harmonised, distributed data approach is hard.
27. See Barba Navaretti et al (2014) for a discussion of the importance of the higher moments of the productivity
distribution in explaining aggregate export performance. Duranton et al (2012) discuss how these moments are
shaped by agglomeration economies.
28. See, for example, Gabaix (2013) for a discussion of the role of large ﬁrms in economic activity at the national level.
Large ﬁrms are even more important at the regional level as implied by the notion of ‘balls and bins’ put forth by
Armenter and Koren (2014). 
29. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) show that GDP growth is much more volatile in poor countries than in rich countries for
four reasons: they specialise in more volatile sectors; they specialise in fewer sectors; they experience more
frequent and more severe aggregate shocks; and their macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are more highly correlated
with the shocks of the sectors they specialise in.
30. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) show that, all else being equal, countries specialising in the types of goods
that rich countries export tend to grow faster than countries specialising in other goods.
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For any given year, the competitiveness index for a region o and industry sector s is
created in several steps. The data need is quite extensive. First, we need firm-level bal-
ance-sheet data with information on the number of employees and industry classifi-
cation. This data is available for almost all EU countries but often with limitations. It is
missing for Croatia, for Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Poland, firms are only surveyed
beyond a size limit (typically 10-50 employees).
Second, we need information about the location of the firm, at least to regional level.
For several countries, a NUTS2 or NUTS3 code is directly available. In other countries,
the city or the postcode of the headquarters is available in addition to financial data,
although it sometimes requires merging data from corporate registries. Third, we need
firm-level datasets matched with customs data with detailed information about ex-
ports, including destination countries, and ideally, products as well. Customs data is
more and more available in Europe.
Provided that all data is available, the key task is to decide on aggregation details.
Based on availability information31, considering NUTS2 regions, 2 digit NACE revision
2 industry classification should work for almost all countries. We present an example
of the procedure using Hungarian data in the Annex to this chapter.
Another option would be to use private/survey data, as used by Konings and Marcolin
(2011). The advantage of such dataset is availability for many countries. At the same
time, in the absence of trade data, it can only use balance-sheet information that is
often hard to compare across countries that differ substantially in accounting and re-
porting standards.
3.4.2 Data problems and challenges
A: Regional deﬁnitions
Before turning to data issues to generate our preferred variable, we should acknowl-
edge that the administrative definition of region does not necessarily coincide with
the relevant definition based on interactions. A key area of study in economic geogra-
phy is the modifiable area unit problem, the notion that aggregation based on different
scopes and boundaries might yield different outcomes. In particular, the size of regions
seems to be an important driver of some measured elasticities32.
31. See chapter 2 of Castellani and Koch (2015) as well as http://mapcompete.eu/meta-webtool.
32. See Briant et al (2012) and Békés and Harasztosi (2015).
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Another aspect, recognised by the EU in its competitiveness report by Annoni and Dijk-
stra (2013, p5) is related to accounting for employment in large cities. This is not a
problem for Paris (as Ile-de-France includes commuters), but it is for London, which is
actually cut into two NUTS2 regions. The problem is also particularly significant for
Brussels, Prague, Berlin, Amsterdam and Vienna. Annoni and Dijkstra (2013) detail
several other regional boundary-related issues.
Given data requirements, this is not a real issue for us. NUTS2 seems the realistic area
of study. Looking at evidence from MAPCOMPETE, we know that data is typically col-
lected according to the administrative definition, at NUTS2 or NUTS3 level. It is only in
a few countries, such as France or Hungary, where data might be actually linked to cor-
porate registries with information on the municipality in which the firm is located.
One potential solution might be to start with NUTS2 level, but consider some additional
regional aggregation.
B: Narrow industries, small regions
Calculating this index faces a challenge specific to the use of anonymised data: data
providers retain the right to suppress observations to prevent external identification
of corporate data. In particular, calculating values at regional and sectoral level often
runs into secrecy problems. One typical barrier to computation of each region-sector
cell is a minimum requirement of firm count: each cell has to be made up of at least a
few firms (3-6 depending on countries). This might be an issue when sectors are nar-
rowly defined or regions are small. At this stage we believe this not a major issue, but
it might matter for small regions and small sectors – requiring sectoral aggregation.
C: Extreme granularity – top-ﬁrm accounting
The next problem is more important because it goes to the core of our exercise. Data
providers also suppress cells when one firm is too important (for example, its sales
represent more than 70 percent of total sales of firms in that cell). As a result, when
the sector-region cell includes the top firm in that sector, the cell result may be sup-
pressed even if there are other firms present. Given the narrow approach, this can gen-
erate a huge bias.
These problems could be reduced by aggregating industries (such as food and bever-
age) or aggregating regions. This is a key reason for choosing NUTS2 as more realistic
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level as opposed to NUTS333. However, the large-firm problem might still arise and there
is no easy fix. It can only be solved by cooperation between national statistical insti-
tutes and Eurostat.
Beyond issues relevant to this index, the main obstacle in calculating our preferred
index is access to data. As argued by Koch and Castellani (2015), data availability is
typically good to excellent in EU countries, but accessibility is often rather difficult. To
calculate our index, one needs access to the raw data. However, because of differences
between countries and lack of access points for researchers, this latter approach is
rather cumbersome. Furthermore, in several countries, such as France and Germany,
there are legal barriers to access.
As a result, the only possible way to calculate these indices would be to get Eurostat
to coordinate a project with scientific involvement, through which national statistical
offices would calculate values based on a common and harmonised approach.
D: Firms: observation and reality – from establishments to value chains
The typical unit of observation is the legal entity. This might cause problems in the
presence of multi-plant firms or business groups. When part of the economic activity
takes place in other location away from the headquarters, performance might be
wrongly assigned. In several EU countries, there are plans to improve data quality and
collect information about establishments and groups, but in the short run, this is an
important caveat to any index.
Another measurement problem relates to multinational groups. Data on exports to non-
EU countries is collected and assembled by national and EU institutions. Ideally, the
final destination is recorded. However, multinational companies exercise great freedom
in terms of organising in which country authorities actually carry out customs proce-
dures. Hence, a multinational company’s Czech affiliate might export to China, but this
will not be picked up because the company might concentrate its customs activity in,
say, the Netherlands. Once again, there is very little we can do other than acknowledge
that our measure is likely to be biased towards regions that are more specialised in
global commerce.
In particular, some sectors might be organised rather differently in terms of value
chains and distribution networks. This might lead to countries that are specialised in
33. To see NUTS3 level data, one should aggregate sectors into a handful of macro sectors.
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some sectors exporting more or less directly to non-EU countries. Industries with flatter
value chains should create less bias because of the presence of distributors or spe-
cialised trading subsidiaries in some countries. For our purpose, we compare sectors
instead of aggregated economies, and we may disregard the wholesale sector.
E: Business services
Trade in services is typically not as well accounted for as trade in goods, potentially
mis-measuring performance of regions with strong service sectors. Fortunately, trade
in services is included in firm-level data34. The bad news is that measurement and pric-
ing issues might typically be of greater importance for services than for trade in goods. 
3.5 Conclusion and suggestions
This  chapter addressed some core issues discussed in this Blueprint. Granularity and
the roles of large firms are crucial to understand why regional competitiveness and ef-
forts to attract these firms are at the centre of many regions’ and cities’ policies. The
focus on exporting and the separation of extensive and intensive margins also under-
lines that performance of regions hinges on their capacity to foster firm development.
Only the most productive firms will be able to perform on global markets, and it is the
growth of these firms in a given region – by reallocation of resources from less pro-
ductive firms – that will generate high-paying jobs for the region’s employees. Here,
we have argued for a new approach in thinking about regional competitiveness and
offer a new measure of this.
First, we argued that there are some solid economic arguments in favour of thinking
in terms of regions as units. Proximity matters because agglomeration externalities
influence firm performance, these externalities decay fast with regions being close to
a relevant area for most spillovers, and granularity is key, as a few large firms matter
regionally more than in countries.
Second, we made a case in favour of an index that captures performance directly rather
than by averaging values from a mix of indicators. Such an ‘outcome’ measure has the
advantage of transparency and allows for future enquiries about the relationship be-
tween outcome (firm performance) and potential drivers such as infrastructure or local
R&D. Third, we proposed a measure based on firms’ sales in non-EU markets. This ap-
proach has the advantages of comparability across EU countries and easy calculation.
34. Included in trade data, HS6 starting with 98 and 99.
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Finally, we looked at data availability and access across Europe and concluded that
our index might be calculated given available data for almost all EU countries. However,
such an exercise would require either Eurostat coordination, or collaboration between
a large number of institutions. We believe that what is needed at this stage is a Euro-
stat-coordinated effort – with potential researcher participation. Once the index is cal-
culated, future research can concentrate on the analysis of key drivers of differences
in firm performance in various regions. Coordination with national statistical institutions
is also key in order to manage confidentiality issues.
Furthermore, with improved data quality, research into the importance and structure
of business groups, the diversity establishment networks and accounting practices
for the trade in services might shed light on potential biases in measurement.
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Annex
A: Example: Hungarian regions
Before creating variables, one needs to make some choices: (i) how to best define out-
side markets, (ii) what regional aggregation, and (iii) what sectoral aggregation. Here,
we use all countries outside Europe35. As for regional aggregation, NUTS2 level is nec-
essary to get sensible sector-level values. NUTS3 is only possible when using total
economy aggregates – ie when we assume simple additivity of industry competitive-
ness values. For most sectors, 2-digit level is the maximum to get enough firms. For a
few broad sectors, such as machinery, 3-digit level would be possible.
The first step uses firm-destination-product specific data, mostly available from cus-
toms. Product data is typically available at HS6 level. There are two alternatives to get
sector-level values when exports are given at product level. The more direct approach
is to sum export sales by products and apply a product-sector conversion filter to get
firm-destination-sector-level export data. We suggest using 2 digit NACE rev2 industry
setting. The second, easier but less precise approach is to classify all a firm’s exports
by the firm’s primary NACE code.
For each firm-NACE, calculate XO_id_nace: Firm-NACE-Export to outside Europe, X_id_nace:
Firm-NACE total export. Then generate XOS_id:=sum of XO_id_nace; XS_id:=sum of X_id_nace.
As noted earlier, NXS per region and sector is calculated as (XO,s/Lo,s)/(Xs/Ls).
The second step, is to work on firm level data to calculate, for each firm, L_id as the num-
ber of employees and Y_id as the total sales of firms. We can generate L_id_nace := L_id_
*X_id_nace /XS_id
35. EU28+ Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco,
Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican City.
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In the third step, we need to merge data to have firm-NACE level observations. We sum
by region-sector, to get total exports to outside EU by sector and region and to calculate
number of firms per region-sector, number of firms exporting to outside EU per region-
sector so that we can discuss extensive and intensive margins. Finally, we create num-
ber of employment per sector-region using L_id_nace.
Table 1 presents NXS index values for NACE2 manufacturing sectors in Hungary. Cal-
culations are based on total non-Europe (EU28+) exports36. For instance, let us con-
sider the food manufacturing sector (#10). By dividing exports value by employment,
and comparing them across regions, we disregard specialisation (ie the number of
firms). According to our measure, in this industry, the most competitive region is South-
East Hungary, where an average-sized firm exports to outside EU twice (215 percent)
the Hungarian average.
36. We repeated this exercise for EU28 exports and found a 60 percent correlation. China alone cannot be determined
at 2-digit industry level.
Table 1: NXS index values for Hungary
NUTS2 region Food Light
industry
Wood Chemicals Raw
materials
Fabr.
Metal
Budapest/Centre 131% 112% 48% 116% 120% 88%
Centre-West 32% 40% 335% 35% 102% 170%
West 65% 93% 100% 45% 118% 167%
South-West 25% 165% 135% 10% 7% 6%
North 29% 46% 24% 170% 4% 64%
North-East 63% 87% 10% 159% 194% 83%
South-East 215% 107% 11% 27% 49% 31%
NUTS2 region Electrical Machinery Motor Other
manuf.
Man.
average
Business
services
Közép-Magyarország 83% 102% 20% 80% 90% 133%
Közép-Dunántúl 293% 158% 170% 206% 159% 76%
Nyugat-Dunántúl 56% 207% 298% 22% 121% 5%
Dél-Dunántúl 91% 14% 5% 14% 45% 24%
Észak-Magyarország 29% 88% 84% 197% 67% 35%
Észak-Alföld 82% 47% 4% 136% 78% N/A
Dél-Alföld 13% 28% 47% 31% 58% 58%
Source: Central Statistics Office Hungary. Notes: The table shows NSX values for Hungary, at 2-digit NACE2 in-
dustries and NUTS2 regions. Values are calculated with only Hungarian data, ie 100 percent would be the av-
erage region-sector value in Hungary. Red numbers are based on imputations because of suppressed data
(too few firms or presence of very large firms). Business services: some selected sectors available in data.
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Considering manufacturing, the West and Centre-West regions are the most competitive
on average (weighted by employment in industries), followed by the Central region
(including Budapest). As is visible from the table, there is substantial variation between
regions. South-West does well in food, while North is competitive in chemicals.
B: Example:EFIGE results for selected EU regions
In the absence of official data, one could use private data or survey information. One
possibility could be to use Amadeus, the European firm-level database compiled by
Bureau van Dijk. Data includes balance-sheet information including export sales. How-
ever, this information is not available for most countries.The EFIGE survey offers a way
to compare regions in selected countries. The dataset covers 14,800 EU manufacturing
firms with at least 10 employees, located in seven countries: Austria, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The dataset includes a great deal of in-
formation about the internationalisation activities of these firms37.
The advantage of the EFIGE dataset is that for each firm, we know the share of sales
exported to outside Europe, calculated by multiplying (i) the ratio of exports to sales
and (ii) the ratio of non-Europe exports to total exports. Unfortunately, the sample is
not large enough to consider sectors.
Before turning to results, please note that the EFIGE dataset does not include exports
values, only size of the company by workforce. To partially remedy this, we merged
the data with information from Amadeus on total sales revenue. As a result, we gener-
ated our preferred index for most regions in six countries – Amadeus sales data is very
poor in the UK. We also generated a simplified index, available for all regions in the
sample: instead of adding up export sales in euros, we weight ‘normalised export share’
by labour only. Hence our second measure, is a regional labour weighted average non-
Europe exports to sales ratio.
Highest index values are attained by regions in the centre of France, north west of Ger-
many, north of Italy and some regions in Austria. Low values are attached to Hungarian
regions apart from the Centre, southern Italy, the eastern part of Germany and eastern
Spain. The simplified measure would put a great many UK regions on top as well.
Of course, this is just an illustration of our approach. Given data weakness, actual re-
sults should be treated with great caution.
37. For details, see Altomonte et al (2013).
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Figure 1: Map of NSX regional competitiveness index
Source: MAPCOMPETE. Notes: Calculated using the EFIGE survey for 2009. The index is calculated for most but
not regions in the sample in 6 EU countries (no UK data). Generated by weighing non-Europe export values by
labour (as defined above).
Finally, as noted in Section 3, we can calculate extensive and intensive margins, and
hence, investigate to what extent the share of firms exporting outside of the EU in a
region might determine that region’s performance. To do that we consider the EFIGE
universe as representative, and calculate the share of firms exporting overseas com-
pared to all firms. A simple OLS regression of the NSX index value on the share of over-
seas exporters suggests that the number of firms explains about 20 percent of a
region's performance, while 80 percent is explained by the average non-EU export
share of firms. Of course, this is just a simple exercise disregarding sectors.
For each region, we can calculate the difference between index value and its predicted
value – based on the number of firms exporting overseas. Table 2 shows the relative
importance of average export share – calculated as mean of regional values per coun-
try. This shows that Austria is special in the sense that the non-EU export performance
of Austrian regions is well above the levels suggested by the number of firms. Of
(524.3,42421]
(181,524.3]
(51,181]
[0,51]
No data
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course, this might just be a small-sample issue (fewer Austrian firms in the sample,
more prone to bias), but it shows that with better data, this could be an interesting
issue.
Figure 2: Map of NSX regional competitiveness index – simpliﬁed version
Source: MAPCOMPETE, EFIGE dataset. Notes: Calculated using the EFIGE survey for 2009. The index is calculated
for all regions in the sample in seven EU countries. Simplified version: generated only by using number of em-
ployees as weights disregarding labour productivity.
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(8.5,44]
(5.7,8.5]
(3.2,5.7]
[0,3.2]
No data
Table 2: Relative importance of ﬁrm average
Country Relative of ﬁrm average
Austria 2.91
France 0.50
Italy 0.20
Hungary -0.46
Germany -0.83
Spain -0.86
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
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4 Resource misallocation and
aggregate outcomes: towards
better assessment of
competitiveness
Lionel Fontagné, Gianluca Santoni and Chiara Tomasi
4.1 Introduction
From a firm-level point of view, measures of competitiveness are based on solid eco-
nomic theory foundations38. Being successful in business is not just about gaining
market share relative to competitors: it relates to the overall efficiency of the firm in
transforming inputs into outputs at the lowest possible cost (ie productivity). Since
this capacity is very unevenly distributed between firms within sectors, one of the key
drivers is ease of resource allocation. A relevant feature from the empirical literature
is however that resources do not flow freely from the least to the most productive firms,
even if more efficient firms are the most likely to survive in the market. Several market
distortions might thwart this process, including search, hiring and firing costs; capital
adjustment costs; distorted taxes and subsidies; hold-up and contracting problems.
A better knowledge of the economic forces shaping this process is essential in order
to design sound and effective policies.
The large variability at firm level is not confined to productivity (ie total factor produc-
tivity, TFP). Sales growth rates in the US, for example, show a standard deviation of
about 50 percent (Davis et al, 2007), which translates for one third of the firms into
an expected growth of more than 60 percent and for another third an expected decline
of more than 40 percent.
38. See http://mapcompete.eu/theoretical-and-policy-aspects-of-competitiveness-at-different-aggregation-levels/.
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The high variability of firms’ productivity, sales, entry and exit rates suggest that ag-
gregate indicators might not be able to capture the degree of resource ‘churning’ at the
micro level, within a sector or a region. Typically, a one percent aggregate increase in
an economic figure (eg number of jobs) is the outcome of individual performance rang-
ing at least from plus to minus 10 percent at the micro-economic level. This is where
allocation of resources plays an important role: notwithstanding the more structural
employment shifts, the capacity of churning to drive resources within sectors towards
the most efficient firms is conducive to aggregate performance.
Beyond within-sector firm heterogeneity, productivity differences are meaningful to
understand cross-country income differentials (Syverson, 2011; Hsieh and Klenow,
2010).A large portion of productivity differentials between countries can be atttributed
to input misallocation: with the distribution of resources between heterogeneous firms
have relevant consequences for aggregate outcomes in relation to both output and al-
location efficiency39. At the sector level, competitiveness and productivity are deter-
mined by heterogeneous individual firm performance and by the shape of the firm-size
distribution.
But how can this inefficiency in allocation of resources between firms within a given
sector be gauged? To get an idea of the order of magnitude of such inefficiencies,
Syverson (2004) reports for the US a TFP ratio of 1.9 among firms at the 90 percentile
and 10 percentile of industry distribution: within a narrow defined sector, the most pro-
ductive firms are able to produce almost twice the output of the less productive, with
the same amount of inputs. The degree of misallocation is even higher in China and
India, the gain in TFP by achieving the same allocative efficiency as the US would be
between 30-50 percent for China, and as much as 40-60 percent for India, while the
increase in output would be almost two times higher40.
A complementary approach to measuring the degree of allocative efficiency in different
countries, or within countries over time, is worth considering. This can be envisaged
from different points of view.
The first approach to evaluate the degree of resource misallocation looks at the dis-
persion of revenue-based productivity (Syverson, 2004; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
The rationale is that, without distortions, revenue-based productivity should be equal
for all firms in the same sector as differences in physical productivity are fully com-
39. See Syverson (2014), Dhingra and Morrow (2014).
40. See Hsieh and Klenow (2009); US productivity naturally displays gaps and a degree of misallocation; the
distribution is used just as a control group.
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pensated by firm price differentials. In other words, the marginal revenue products of
labour and capital should equate across firms. The higher the dispersion of productivity
(marginal products), the higher the degree of distortion faced by firms.
The second approach is grounded in a statistical argument: if resources were allocated
in a purely random way between firms, the covariance between firms’ size and pro-
ductivity would be zero (Bartelsman et al, 2009). Conversely, the higher the covariance
the more efficiently resources are allocated between firms41. The authors find that for
the US, the overall productivity is 50 percent larger than what a random allocation of
resources would give. Although there is misallocation of resources in the US, the out-
come is much better than a random allocation: more productive firms are larger while
the least productive are smaller than in the random case. This deviation from the ran-
dom benchmark is lower in Europe in general, pointing to less efficient allocation of
resources between firms.
Market rigidity, distorted regulations and other frictions might weaken the correlation
among firm size and productivity; at the limit (pure randomness), no difference is ex-
pected between entering, exiting and incumbent producers in their fundamentals
(such as size and productivity). Bartelsman et al (2013) provide a theoretical model
using heterogeneous firms and adjustment friction where the aggregate outcome is
significantly affected by selection and resource allocation42. The empirical evidence
reported in CompNet (2014)43 confirms the findings of Bartelsman et al (2009): from
2003-07 the distribution of inputs between firms in Europe could have been improved
significantly44.
A third and last approach starts from the microeconomic optimisation problem at firm
41. The procedure, following Olley and Pakes (1996), uses the covariance between ﬁrm size and productivity within
sectors to assess the efﬁciency of input allocation. Note that this is the static version of allocative efﬁciency, on a
cross-section framework; see Haltiwanger, (2011) for a discussion on static and dynamic allocative measures.
42. According to the model, an increase in the dispersion of distortions decreases aggregate consumption. Given the
extremely high correlation between consumption and output, it is likely that the same negative shock in distortions
should imply a decrease in output per capita; see Bartelsman et al (2013), online appendix.
43. The Competitiveness Research Network is composed of economists from the 28 national central banks of the
European Union member states and the European Central Bank, international organisations (World Bank, OECD,
European Commission), universities and think-tanks, and non-European Central Banks (Argentina and Peru) and
organisations (US International Trade Commission). CompNet's objective is to develop a more consistent analytical
framework for assessing competitiveness, with a better correspondence between determinants and outcomes.
44. Results from Bartelsman et al (2013) report relatively higher covariance for European countries than CompNet,
ranging from 15-38 percent and conﬁrming a sizeable efﬁciency gap relative to the US benchmark. The difference
between the two estimates relies on the combination of different weighting schemes in the two studies (in terms
of value added or employment of sectors) and different deﬁnitions of productivity (in terms of turnover or value
added per employee). Using the Bartelsman et al (2013) approach, we basically replicate their results for France.
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(or even plant) level, and aims to assess the extent to which firms depart from optimal
use of any factor. Resource misallocation defines the output loss due to inefficiencies
in input allocation at the firm level, and the impact of policy change at both firm and
aggregate level (Petrin and Sivasadan, 2013). This is the approach we follow in this
chapter.
We show that labour gaps have been increasing during the 2000s, and that general
determinants (distortions) have been driving this evolution, notwithstanding some
evidence of sectoral shocks. Controlling for firm characteristics, we observe – after a
transitional increase in negative gaps in 2001 and 2002 – that most of the adverse
evolution falls on the positive gaps. This means that the most productive firms after
2003 were unable to grow at the expected pace. The small firms are more affected by
distortions but this disadvantage has increased at a slower pace over time. Similarly,
the 50-employees discontinuity associated with regulations in the labour market is
present, but does not explain the worsening of the situation. We conclude from this
that more subtle micro-economic developments (the difficult reallocation of resources
between firms within sectors) have contributed to the deterioration of the aggregate
performance of French industry.
4.2 From micro shocks to aggregate performance
There are two channels that link microeconomic and aggregate performance. First, the
huge dispersion in firm-level outcomes implies that micro-economic behaviour does
matter for aggregate performance of a sector in a given country, or even for a country’s
aggregate competitiveness. The evolution of several macro-economic forces, such as
productivity, value added, employment and investment are then closely related to
what happens at the micro-level. The ‘granular’ hypothesis shows how the
idiosyncrasies of large firms affect aggregate GDP fluctuations and, through general
equilibrium channels, all other firms as well (Gabaix, 2011)45. For the US economy,
shocks effecting the top 100 firms are responsible for one-third of the country’s GDP
fluctuation.
A significant consequence of such micro and macro interdependence is that produc-
tivity shocks (such as R&D, investment behaviour or management changes) that effect
firms have a non-negligible impact on the state of the economy. The effect of firms’
'granularity' is also visible in export growth rates volatility (di Giovanni et al, 2014). Up
to half of the aggregate export volatility is due to firm-specific demand shocks, and
45. The law of large numbers no longer applies if the distribution of ﬁrms’ sales departs from normality and displays
a ‘fat tail’.
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the magnitude of the firm-level contribution is equal to the sum of sectoral and macro-
economics ones (common to all firms).
Sectoral links might act as another network through which microeconomic shocks
transmit and eventually generate “cascade effects” (Acemoglu et al, 2012). When pro-
duction structures imply inter-sectoral dependence (via the Input-Output mechanism),
microeconomic fluctuations do not average out at the aggregate level. The previous
evidence confirms that microeconomic characteristics at firm, sectoral and regional
level, significantly affect macroeconomic outcomes in terms of both output and eco-
nomic performance, suggesting that micro-macro linkages play a crucial role in shap-
ing aggregate competitiveness.
The second channel relates to how resource allocation matches firm heterogeneity.
Basically, resource misallocation within a sector implies that more efficient firms tend
to be smaller than their optimal size, while less efficient firms tend to be bigger than
optimum. This differs from the traditional view of countries specialising in sectors ac-
cording to their advantage and hence improving their overall efficiency. Within-sector
efficient allocation of resources comes on top of inter-sectoral efficiency in resource
allocation.
What one expects is indeed a reallocation of economic activity at firm level that tends
to benefit highly productive (low-cost) producers, resulting in an aggregate improve-
ment; but several factors might hamper this continuous flow of resources from less to
more efficient firms: business cycles46, labour and capital rigidity, the regulatory en-
vironment and competition. Accordingly, firm-level outcome variability is a crucial el-
ement in the design of policies in several fields: wage dispersion, employment flows,
business dynamics, productivity growth and technological change industry evolution
(Syverson 2014).
The awareness of the constraints preventing more efficient re-allocation of inputs
within sectors is relevant from a country perspective: it would be possible to boost pro-
ductivity (and by that raise income) by reallocating within sectors inputs and re-
sources already employed. But given the scale of the phenomenon, designing
appropriate policies to correct resource inefficiencies is a perilous exercise that re-
quires lots of information.
46. Lazear and Spletzer (2012) show that such reallocation of labour seems to be more relevant during expansionary
periods than recessions.
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4.3 Measuring resource allocation gaps
Given the highlighted interconnections between micro- and macroeconomic forces,
the quality of resource distribution across businesses could have significant effects
on productivity and per capita income at country level. As noted before, input or output
market imperfections (or any distortion) can create an incentive for less-productive
firms to produce too much while hindering the most efficient firms. Under such cir-
cumstances, the economy is producing less than its resources would allow solely be-
cause of inefficient distribution of resources. In order to evaluate the loss in output
because of a change labour market regulation in Chile, Petrin and Sivasadan (2013)
propose a new methodology to evaluate the degree of resource misallocation at the
firm level.
The following empirical work relies on Petrin and Sivasadan's (henceforth PS) method-
ology. Their approach, based on plant-level productivity estimates, aims to define the
output loss because of inefficiencies in the allocation of inputs and the impact of policy
change at both firm and aggregate level. The key concept of firm specific ‘mis-alloca-
tion’ is reflected in the “gap among the value of the marginal product and marginal
input price” (PS, 2013). Such gaps are computed at firm level using the estimated co-
efficients from usual TFP analysis and they can be further aggregated at sector or spa-
tial level. Moreover since those gaps are expressed in monetary terms, the direct
aggregation gives the value of lost output due to the induced distortion in resource
distribution across firms.
The economic intuition behind the methodology is that in a standard microeconomic
optimisation problem, an input's value of marginal product is equated with its marginal
cost, but many phenomena might move an economy away from such equilibrium. The
analysis of firms’ gap distribution is useful also to identify sectors (or regions) with
the higher degree of ‘misallocation’ and to evaluate such misallocation in monetary
terms. More importantly, the PS identification strategy works for evaluating policy
changes or macro-shocks to the input environment (mark-ups, hiring, firing and search
costs, capital adjustment costs, taxes and subsidies, hold-up and other contracting
problems, and non-optimal managerial behaviour).
4.4 Data
The evaluation of input allocation is performed using balance-sheet firm-level data to
retrieve TFP estimations, from which we derive the marginal contribution of production
inputs. Using firm (or industry) specific input prices it is possible to derive a monetary
56
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value of the allocation inefficiencies at firm level. The main source of firm-level data is
the French BRN47 dataset obtained from the fiscal administration. It contains balance-
sheet information collected from firms’ tax forms, along with detailed information on
firms’ balance sheets, including total, domestic and export sales, value added, and
many cost items including wages, materials expenditures and so on, along with the
sector and the region in which the firm operates.
The dataset covers the period 1993-2007 and gives a very detailed representation of
the aggregate economy. We stop our exercise in 2007 in order to leave aside the dif-
ferent responses of firms to the subsequent economic crisis. The fact that the infor-
mation comes from tax authorities ensures an overall very high quality of data. After
excluding implausible observations, namely those reporting negative or zero values
for our variables of interest, and cleaning the data of potential outliers48, we end up
with an unbalanced panel of more than 137,000 firms for the French manufacturing
47. Bénéfice Réel Normal, the normal tax regime for French ﬁrms. Database was accessed at the Banque de France.
48. We exclude observations with a growth rate of TFP variables – value added, ﬁxed capital, material inputs and
services – above/below the 99th/1st percentile of the relative distribution. We also make sure that ﬁrm balance
sheets covers 12 months. Results are robust to changes in the thresholds.
Table 1: Number of ﬁrms in the estimation sample (by year)
No. ﬁrms % single plant % within same département
1993 69,740 0.795 0.891
1994 68,268 0.805 0.897
1995 69,232 0.811 0.901
1996 67,728 0.811 0.9
1997 69,407 0.809 0.899
1998 68,849 0.807 0.897
1999 68,624 0.807 0.897
2000 67,798 0.801 0.895
2001 66,409 0.795 0.891
2002 67,241 0.791 0.89
2003 66,557 0.79 0.889
2004 65,717 0.79 0.889
2005 64,232 0.779 0.883
2006 63,062 0.777 0.882
2007 63,122 0.779 0.884
Source: Fontagné and Santoni (2015).
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sector49. Yearly, we have around 67,000 firms of all sizes and single-plant firms repre-
sent 80 percent of the observations: meaning that in the vast majority of the cases we
observe production functions at the plant level. In addition, most firms, even if multi-
plant, are located within the same département.
4.5 The dynamics of TFP
Before outlining our results in terms of productivity, we must check whether compo-
sition effects drive the observed results: the population of firms is not constant and
we know from the repeated evidence in the literature that exporters are more produc-
tive. Accordingly, a changing proportion of exporters in the population might change
the aggregate outcome. We observe in Figure 1 that changes in the proportion of ex-
porters in our sample are marginal and will hardly affect the results. Out of a yearly
population of roughly 67,000 statistical units belonging to the manufacturing sector,
we have some 30,000 exporters.
We can now examine the distribution of TFP across firms across time. In Figure 2, we
plot this distribution for three years: 1995, 2000 and 2005. We observe two
phenomena: a shift to the right and a flattening of the distribution. This means that
firms are overall increasingly productive over time, notwithstanding a slightly higher
dispersion. Such an increase in productivity over time does not come as a surprise:
technical changes and the ongoing rationalisation efforts of firms confronted with
competition necessarily translate into increases in efficiency in the absence of a major
economic crisis. This does not mean however that the use of resources is increasingly
close to optimal efficiency. Notwithstanding the trend in aggregate productivity,
inefficiencies in factor allocation might be an obstacle to fully reap gains associated
with technical progress. Evidence for such misallocation is provided by the labour gaps
that we computed.
49. We limit the analysis to the manufacturing sector only to ease the interpretation of TFP estimation coefﬁcients as
marginal products; the underlying methodology however can be applied to other sectors as well.
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Figure 1: Distribution of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sample, number of exporters
and single-plant ﬁrms
Source: Fontagné and Santoni (2015).
Figure 2: TFP distribution of ﬁrm values, selected years 
Source: Fontagné and Santoni (2015). Note: Figure 2 reports the distribution of manufacturing firm TFP for se-
lected years. Values have been standardised to have zero mean and a standard deviation equal to 1. The three
distributions are statistically different at 1 percent confidence level.
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4.6 The labour gap: the value of resource (mis)allocation
As explained in the preceding section, we estimate, within each sector, the marginal
value attached to the misallocation of labour between firms, based on a simple
production function with constant returns to scale (an assumption supported by the
data). The gap is defined as the real value of the marginal product of an additional
worker in a plant (or firm) minus the associated cost for that firm. A positive gap means
that it would be worth hiring one more worker, while vice versa for the negative gap.
Within a given industry, some firms are ‘too large’ in terms of employment and other
firms are ‘too small’. The annual difference between marginal product and factor cost
could for instance be €15,000 in a firm and -€5,000 in another firm. The average gap
is then simply defined as the mean of the absolute values of the two, €10,000 in this
example.
Figure 3 shows the mean negative and positive gaps for the manufacturing sector, after
aggregating individual gaps by firm value added, and similarly sector-level gaps with
sector-level value added. This choice is consistent with our definition of the marginal
product in value added (and not in turnover) terms. The order of magnitude of the av-
erage gap in French manufacturing firms is approximately €10,000. This decomposes
to a large positive mean gap and a more limited negative mean gap. However, the fre-
quency of the negative gap is much higher than that for the positive gap, which drives
the absolute value of the absolute gap close to the absolute value of the negative gap.
Figure 3: Average labour gap, €000s – real terms – manufacturing sector
Source: Fontagné and Santoni (2015).
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The second result is that the absolute gap has been increasing in the 2000s (Figure
3), pointing to an increasingly inefficient allocation of resources and possibly revealing
distortions hampering economic optimisation at firm level. This evolution contrasts
with the slight decrease and subsequent relative stability of the gap up to 2002.
In certain clearly identified sectors, external shocks may have imposed rounds of re-
structuring, leading to transitory gaps. The case of clothing illustrated in Figure 4 is a
good example. The Chinese accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Decem-
ber 2001 and the progressive phasing out of quotas associated with the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing are a good example of an external shock imposing a profound
shift of resources within the affected sector in high-wage countries in the early 2000s.
Companies able to cope with such tough competition are present in different market
segments and have different positions in global value chains. Figure 4 shows that re-
cently clothing (which was first affected by this shock) has exhibited a worse evolution
than to the two related sectors of textiles and leather.
Figure 4: Average absolute labour gap, €000s – real terms – selected sectors
Source: Fontagné and Santoni (2015).
However, not all manufacturing sectors have been confronted with external shocks,
and internal factors might well have prevented factor reallocation between firms in
France in the 2000s. A detailed analysis of the evolution of labour and product markets
regulations would be needed to identify these determinants. This would go beyond
our objectives in this chapter, which simply aims to provide evidence for such gaps.
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Figure 5: Geographic distribution of labour gaps
Source: MAPCOMPETE. Note: Labour gaps computed for single-plant enterprises. Darker blue indicates a larger
mean gap.
One way to address the previous question – do we observe a general widening of the
gaps or is it a sectoral phenomenon? – is to observe the gaps at geographical level.
Figure 5 shows the mean gap for each French département in 2000 and 2007 and asks
whether the adverse evolution of the gaps is geographically concentrated, which would
suggest a strong sector dimension, or dispersed suggesting more horizontal phenom-
enon. We also expect a more detrimental evolution in peripheral regions because of
the increasing toughness of international competition. To proceed, we focus on sin-
gle-plant firms, because multi-plant companies might have plants located in different
départements.
The evidence on the geographical distribution of labour gaps in 2000 is clear-cut, and
not necessarily intuitive: gaps are concentrated in the Ile de France, or close to France's
eastern borders. In order to correctly interpret this snapshot, it must be kept in mind
that we are considering gaps in value terms, and that we have not controlled for the
characteristics of the départements. Locations with high value added per employee
on average could well have larger gaps other things being equal. As a confirmation of
this hypothesis, one can double check that peripheral regions (the centre of France
lacks connections to good infrastructure and has limited urbanisation) exhibit limited
gaps in cross section. More interestingly, the evolution of gaps over time confirms the
impression. The magnitude of the mean gaps is increasing in most places, suggesting
that the overall worsening of gaps observed from 2000-07 is neither driven by sectoral
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nor geographical shocks but mirrors a systematic increasing difficulty of reallocating
resources between firms in that period. We now turn to the evolution of labour gaps
with the aim of better understanding the mechanisms at work.
4.7 Labour gap: mechanisms
We have so far observed the value of labour gaps without controlling for the charac-
teristics of the firms or for their locations. We now assess the labour gap relative to in-
dividual characteristics of firms, in order to control for differences in size, productivity
and, in a second step, location.
In Figure 6, we plot the mean positive and negative gaps controlling for firms' charac-
teristics. What we observe is striking: the negative gap, overall, was constant up to
2001, before increasing substantially until the mid-2000s. During the three first years,
in addition, the positive gap was decreasing. But while the negative gap stabilised by
the end of the period covered by our analysis, the positive gap increased substantially.
This evolution points to increasing difficulty, or lack of willingness, to recruit by the
most efficient firms within sectors. In a nutshell, the recent problem with the aggregate
performance of French industry is that firms that should grow haven’t.
In the same spirit, we can ask whether agglomerations provide a better environment
for firms when it comes to assortative matching between employers and employees.
In Figure 7, we plot labour gaps for single-plant firms conditional on their location. This
is one way of clarifying what Figure 5 suggested. We plot firms located in highly-ur-
banised départements versus those in less-urbanised départements and observe little
difference over the whole time horizon. More precisely, there was a significant differ-
ence at the beginning of the period, confirming the above-mentioned hypothesis of
better matching in agglomerated economies, but this advantage vanishes over the pe-
riod, in line with the spread of larger labour gaps.
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Figure 6: Average labour gap conditional on ﬁrm characteristics 
Source: Fontagné and Santoni (2015).
Figure 7: Average labour gap conditional on ﬁrm characteristics highly vs. less-
urbanised départements
Source: Fontagné and Santoni (2015).
A last issue to tackle is the relationship between the labour gaps and the dynamics of
the firms. Plotting ‘young’ firms50 against the rest, we did not observe any significant
pattern (results available upon request). More interestingly, there is ample evidence
that a discontinuity is present in the French demography of firms around the 50 em-
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50. We deﬁne young ﬁrms as those with less than 5 year of activity.
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ployee threshold, above which firms must comply with a range of specific regulations
in the social arena. We confirm that such a discontinuity is present in our data, but it
results in only a marginal difference in labour-gap levels, not in their evolution over
time (see Figure 8).
Interestingly it appears that firms that choose to stay below the 50-worker threshold
report, all other things being equal, a slightly higher gap, most likely because they are
operating at a sub-optimal scale. Despite this small difference the sharp increase in
the wedge between labour marginal return and marginal cost seems to have affected
manufacturing firms irrespective of the threshold.
Figure 8: Average labour gap conditional on ﬁrm characteristics by employment
levels
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
4.8 Resource misallocation and external competitiveness
The inefficiencies in input allocation at the firm level discussed so far can have signif-
icant consequences for aggregate performance. In particular, the distribution of re-
sources across firms helps explain critical outcomes, such as foreign competitiveness
across sectors and countries.
As stressed by the most recent stream of the international-trade literature, a country’s
trade performance depends strongly on firm-level characteristics and on the realloca-
tion mechanisms across firms within sectors (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008;
Bernard et al, 2007). This literature, largely based on micro-level datasets, reveals that
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the international performance of countries is essentially driven by a few highly pro-
ductive firms, which make up the bulk of a country’s exporting activity measured on a
value basis. Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) find, for several European countries, that the
share of total exports accounted for by the top 10 percent of exporters is greater than
80 percent. Moreover, these few top exporters are relatively big and supply several
foreign markets with several differentiated products.
Empirical evidence shows that there are significant differences between firms involved
in international trade activities. One of the most robust and important results found
for all countries is that exporters are more productive than non-exporters, they pay
higher wages and they adopt more capital-intensive production techniques. Bernard
et al (2007), for instance, estimate that US exporting plants are more productive than
their domestic counterparts by 14 percent for value-added and 3 percent for TFP. Sim-
ilarly, Altomonte et al (2012) in the EFIGE project51 estimated that exporters exhibit a
10 percent higher TFP than non-exporters. Previous research has convincingly shown
that in most cases this ‘export premia‘ can be attributed to a self-selection effect, which
induces only the best performing firms to compete internationally52. In other words,
there exists a performance threshold or productivity cut-off above which firms are able
to maintain an international presence. Considering a ranking of all firms according to
their productivity levels, there will be three outcomes: firms with the lowest levels of
productivity will exit the market, firms that enter but only sell on the domestic market
and firms with the highest level of productivity that both export and sell domestically.
An important implication of the analysis of firm behaviour is that new sources of gains
from trade can be identified as a consequence of trade liberalisation. Empirical studies
show that a reduction in trade costs forces the least-productive firms to exit and to re-
allocate market shares from less-productive to more-productive firms. By forcing the
low-productivity firms to contract and by allowing the entry and the expansion of high-
productivity firms, intra-industry reallocation has, in turn, the effect of raising average
sectoral productivity. Bernard et al (2006), using US manufacturing firms, find that a
reductions in tariffs leads to higher aggregate productivity growth because of the exit
of lower productivity firms.
To sum up, the recent literature on international trade suggests that a country’s foreign
51. The EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness) projects provided
the ﬁrst comparable ﬁrm-level dataset covering seven European countries. The project was supported by the
European Commission through its 7th Framework Programme, and was coordinated by Bruegel.
52. See Wagner (2007) for surveys on empirical studies and The International Study Group on Export and Productivity
(2007); and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for international comparative evidence.
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competitiveness depends heavily on firm-level factors, especially productivity. Ac-
cording to this literature what matters for enhancing competitiveness abroad is the
firms’ ability to compete successfully in foreign markets, which in turn requires firms
to make a quantum leap in terms of productivity, overcoming a minimum performance
threshold induced by the additional costs of internationalisation. Inefficiencies in input
allocation might prevent a firm from moving from below to above the minimum per-
formance cut-off required to access foreign markets, with important implications both
at micro and macro level.
In this sense, policies that foster firms' productivity growth and reallocate resources
towards better-performing firms can boost the aggregate level of foreign competitive-
ness. By contrast, input and output market imperfections or any regulation that distorts
resource distribution across firms can create an incentive for less-productive firms to
produce too much and stay in the market and at the same time hinder the most effi-
cient firms. These distortions, therefore, hamper the reallocation of resources and mar-
ket shares from less to more productive firms, with significant consequences for overall
productivity and competitiveness improvements.
In line with this hypothesis we expect our measure of resource misallocation due to
market inefficiencies to be negatively correlated with export performance, both at the
firm and sectoral level. At the micro level we should observe that firms with higher
labour gaps are less likely to export and export less than firms with gaps close to zero53.
This correlation should be driven by negative rather than by positive gaps54.
In what follows, to ease interpretation, we use the (absolute) labour gap as a measure
of resource misallocation to explore the effects of allocative inefficiencies both on the
probability of a firm entering foreign markets (the ‘extensive margin’), and on a firm’s
total exports (the ‘intensive margin’). We then show how these inefficiencies have an
impact on sector export growth performance, focusing on the apparel industry com-
pared to textiles and leather.
53. Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013) study the effects of inefﬁciencies induced by export quotas and embedded
institutional frictions on ﬁrms’ export outcomes in the Chinese textile and clothing sectors. They observe that
market distortions can have an impact for existing ﬁrms in term of export value and also for potential exporters by
preventing productive ﬁrms from entering the export market.
54. We expect a stronger relationship between the export activity and the value of the ﬁrm misallocation in the negative
side, with exporters being less likely to have a negative rather than a positive gap. In other words, exporters that
suffer from misallocation are mainly ﬁrms that are smaller than their optimal size (showing positive rather than
negative gaps). Limitations on resources might prevent them from reaching foreign markets and reduce their total
volume of trade. However, domestic ﬁrms, those that are not able to compete on international market, are more
likely to be oversized (negative gaps).
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Figure 9: Average labour gap and export status conditional on ﬁrm characteristics
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
In Figure 9 we plot the average marginal effect of the labour gap (with 95 percent con-
fidence intervals) on the probability of being an exporter controlling for firm charac-
teristics55. The average marginal effects indicate whether the relationship between the
measure of allocative inefficiencies (labour gap) and a firm’s status with respect to its
export activity (export status) is positive or negative. Among the controls, we include
a firm's TFP which has been clearly identified as a crucial determinant of export pat-
terns. The coefficient for TFP (log TFP) is shown in the graph56.
The left-hand panel of Figure 9 shows our baseline results. We observe a negative re-
lationship between the (log) labour gap and a firm’s export status suggesting that, on
average, those firms with higher labour gaps have a lower probability of being ex-
porters. The coefficient for the gap variable is -0.0022 suggesting that doubling the
wedge between labour marginal return and cost for the marginal worker reduces, on
average, a firm’s propensity to enter foreign markets by 0.16 percentage points. This
implies that inefficiencies in inputs allocation are an obstacle to firms competing on
global markets. Results also confirm that productivity level has an important impact
in determining a firm's ability to reach foreign countries. A 100 percent increase in a
firm’s productivity is associated with a rise in the probability of exporting of 1 percent-
age point.
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55. We report the results of a linear probability model in which we control for ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity constant
over time and for year ﬁxed effects.
56. Note that to minimise simultaneity bias regressors are one-period lagged.
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The right-hand panel of Figure 9 shows a similar exercise but examines whether the
negative effect on the probability of being an exporter is stronger for those firms with
a relatively higher labour gap. Interestingly it appears that firms with a gap in the fifth
quartile of the distribution have a stronger negative impact on a firm's ability to suc-
cessfully operate in international markets.
Figure 10: Average labour gap and exports conditional on ﬁrm characteristics
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
Figure 10 shows the results of a similar exercise using as a dependent variable a firm’s
total exports. We confirm that allocation inefficiencies not only affect the probability
of exporting but also a firm's export value, conditional on being an exporter. The partial
elasticity suggests that a 100 percent increase in the labour gap for the marginal
worker determines a 2.2 percent reduction in a firm's exports, holding productivity and
other firm characteristics constant. The plot on the right-hand side confirms that the
negative effect is stronger for those firms with higher absolute labour gaps. As ex-
pected, productivity has a positive impact on firms' sales in foreign markets.
From a firm-level exercise we move to a sectoral-level analysis of the impact of re-
source misallocation on export performance. We provide here a regression model in
which we relate internationalisation performance to a sectoral indicator of inefficiency.
More precisely, for three different sectors – textiles, apparel and leather - we regress
the sectoral mean57 value of labour gaps on the annual growth rate of exports, control-
−0.022
0.31
−0.0098
−0.02
Log labour gap
Log TFP
Log labour gap
* Gap 5nd
quintile
Va
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Model 1: baseline
Dependent variable: (log) exports
Model 2: quintile
Dependent variable: (log) exports
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Average marginal effect
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.31
57. Results do not change if we take the median labour gap among ﬁrms belonging to the same sector rather than the
mean.
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ling for sectoral and year fixed effects. Figure 11 shows the estimation results when
considering all three sectors (left plot) and separately for apparel and textiles/leather
(right plot). In both cases we show that the export growth rate is, as expected, nega-
tively related to the average labour gap. Therefore, we confirm that trade outcomes are
better in those sectors in which firms have, on average, lower labour gaps. Interestingly,
when running separate regressions (right plot) we observe that the effect is stronger
for apparel rather than textiles or leather, a result in line with the hypothesis that the
economic performance in this sector has been to a great extent influenced by distor-
tions induced by external shocks.
Figure 11: Sectoral labour gap and exports conditional on ﬁrm characteristics
Source: MAPCOMPETE. Note: numbers in the scatter-plot refers to the NACE rev 2 industries, 13 Textiles, 14 Ap-
parel and 15 Leather.
Finally, in Figure 12 we propose a similar exercise for the three sectors by considering
long-term export growth rate. We divide the time span into four different periods (1994-
97; 1998-2000; 2001-04; 2005-07) and compute the growth rate for each interval.
The plot confirms that the negative effect of resource misallocation on trade perform-
ance holds also when considering longer time spans.
Though preliminary, our analysis shows how relevant the role of resource misallocation
on trade outcomes can be, both at micro and macro level. The results suggest that dif-
ferences between sectors or countries in terms of policies that distort the efficient al-
locations of resources between firms can have sizeable effects on trade performance. 
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Figure 12: Average labour gap and exports conditional on ﬁrm characteristics
Source: MAPCOMPETE. Source: Authors’ estimates. Note: numbers in the scatter-plot refers to the NACE rev 2 in-
dustries, 13 Textiles, 14 Apparel and 15 Leather.
4.9 Conclusions
Competiveness at country level is the result of the aggregation of individual firms’ com-
petitive positions. Thus, the ability of firms to employ productive resources in an effi-
cient way is crucial for aggregate performance. In this light, the allocation of resources
between firms plays a crucial role in the evolution of critical outcomes, such as foreign
competitiveness across sectors and countries. The recent international economics lit-
erature argues that a country’s trade performance depends heavily on firm-level char-
acteristics, especially productivity. In this framework, what matters for the
enhancement of aggregate competitiveness is firms’ ability to succeed in foreign mar-
kets by raising their productivity above a minimum performance threshold induced
by the additional costs of internationalisation. Input inefficiencies might thwart this
process, impacting adversely on the aggregate outcome.
Using a novel methodology proposed by Petrin and Sivadasan (2013), we are able to
assess the degree of resource misallocation at the firm level, measured as the gap be-
tween the value of the marginal product and marginal input, and to give a monetary
value to it. Our results show that the average gap in French manufacturing firms is ap-
proximately €10,000 and that the related average output loss represents about 0.38
percent of manufacturing value added. Labour gaps have been increasing since 2000,
and general determinants (distortions) have been driving this evolution across
France’s different départements and sectors. Controlling for firm characteristics, we
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observe that, after 2003, most of the adverse evolution falls on the positive gaps. In a
nutshell, the recent problem with French industry aggregate performance is that, in
the recent years, firms that should grow – the most productive ones – were unable to
grow at the expected pace. Regarding export capability, we observe a negative and
statistically significant relationship between the (log) labour gap and a firm's export
status suggesting that, on average, those firms with larger labour gaps have a lower
probability of being exporters. Looking at a firm's total exports, we observed that allo-
cation inefficiencies not only affect the probability of exporting but also a firm's export
value, conditional on being an exporter.
Awareness of the constraints preventing more efficient reallocation of inputs within
sectors is relevant from a country perspective: it would be possible to boost produc-
tivity (and through that to raise income) by reallocating within sectors inputs and re-
sources already employed. Input and output market imperfections or any regulation
that distorts resource distribution between firms can create an incentive for less-pro-
ductive firms to produce too much and stay in the market, while hindering the most
efficient firms. But given the scale of the phenomenon, designing appropriate policies
to correct resource inefficiencies is a perilous exercise that requires more and more
detailed data on firms’ economic behaviour and outcomes.
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5 Centralisation of wage
bargaining and ﬁrms’
adjustment to the Great
Recession: a micro-based
analysis
Filippo di Mauro and Maddalena Ronchi
5.1 Introduction
Whether labour market institutions, and wage-setting regimes in particular, shape the
response of firms to negative economic shocks is a contentious issue in labour eco-
nomics. Standard economic theory (Nickell and Andrews, 1983) predicts that cen-
tralised bargaining institutions are likely to hamper the smooth functioning of labour
markets and amplify the negative impact of aggregate shocks on employment by pre-
venting wages from adjusting downwards during economic downturns. Recently, this
theme has retaken centre stage in the policy debate as a result of high and persistent
unemployment caused by the Great Recession. More specifically, since the start of
the economic and financial crisis more than five million jobs have been lost, wiping
out the gains from almost ten years of strong job creation. However, behind this ag-
gregate data lies a very heterogeneous picture, with the structural development of un-
employment dynamics differing widely in different euro-area countries (the current
euro-area unemployment rate of 11.3 percent is the weighted average of national un-
employment rates that include a rate of close to 5 percent in Germany and 23 percent
in Spain). Despite a generally strong shock to GDP, in some countries the economic
and financial crisis only had a short-term effect, with little overall impact on employ-
ment losses, while in other countries it caused a dramatic and persistent increase in
unemployment. Against this background, understanding which factors are shaping
74
how the euro-area labour markets adjust to aggregate shocks is currently at the core
of the policy debate (see Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the European
System of Central Banks, 2012; and Ad hoc team of the European System of Central
Banks, 2015).
Figure 1: Employment share in construction (%)
Source: CompNet. Note: average over the period 2004-06.
Clearly, this cross-country heterogeneity results from a number of factors, including
different initial economic conditions. A first factor to consider is the varying sectoral
composition of employment (particularly the share of workers employed in construc-
tion) in euro-area countries (Figure 1). Given that the construction sector was severely
affected by the crisis and, unlike other sectors, started to suffer from pronounced
downsizing as early as 2007 (see Pissarides, 2013; Hoffmann and Lemieux, 2014),
differences in the proportion of workers employed in construction partly explain the
observed variability in the response of the labour market to the crisis. Another factor
driving cross-country heterogeneity in labour market dynamics is the historical trend
in unemployment rates, which have been systematically higher in some countries
than in others. Figure 2 shows that unemployment rates in the pre-crisis period ranged
from about 5 percent in Austria to above 10 percent in Spain, Estonia and Lithuania.
Finally, and more importantly from a policy perspective, cross-country heterogeneity
in unemployment rates reflects the relationship between labour market institutions
and the impact of shocks on employment. More specifically, among the different labour
market institutions, a natural explanation for the differences in labour market adjust-
ments is those institutional structures impinging on the adjustment margins and cost-
cutting strategies of firms, because differences in their functioning create
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cross-country differences in the way labour markets respond to aggregate shocks in
term of employment. 
Empirical evidence indicates that the economies that have managed to limit job de-
struction rates during the crisis tend to be characterised by more flexibility in the labour
market and, thus, by the ability to promptly adjust to new economic conditions (see,
for example, Burda and Hunt, 2011). The relevance of labour market institutions in ex-
plaining the impact of the crisis on employment is particularly evident if we compare
labour market adjustments within the group of countries experiencing a particularly
acute sovereign debt crisis. Although the severity of the crisis has been similar in these
countries, employment dynamics have differed depending on the degree of flexibility
of their labour market institutions.
This is particularly evident in Spain and Ireland. While both countries witnessed a dra-
matic increase in employment losses in the construction sector right after the financial
crisis hit, they fared quite differently during the sovereign debt crisis. The reason for
this diverging performance is that the Irish labour market was relatively flexible at the
time of the crisis and was further deregulated at the end of 2010 as part of the EU-IMF
programme. As a result, Irish unemployment stabilised after an initial large increase
and then fell. Conversely, Spain entered the crisis with an inflexible labour market and
labour market institutions, and only started undertaking relevant reforms in 2012,
meaning unemployment kept rising until 2013. More specifically, the limited capacity
of the Spanish labour market to adjust to the crisis was the result of a broadly regulated
system of wage bargaining characterised by a high degree of centralisation and the
Table 1: Unemployment rates (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Belgium 6.9 6.6 7.5 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.3 7.5 7 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.6 8.4 8.5
Germany 7.9 7.8 8.6 9.7 10.4 11.2 10.1 8.5 7.4 7.6 7 5.8 5.4 5.2 5
Estonia 14.6 13 11.2 10.3 10.1 8 5.9 4.6 5.5 13.5 16.7 12.3 10 8.6 7.4
Spain 11.9 10.6 11.5 11.5 11 9.2 8.5 8.2 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5
Italy 10 9 8.5 8.4 8 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.7 7.7 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7
Ireland 4.2 3.9 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.7 6.4 12 13.9 14.7 14.7 13.1 11.3
Lithuania 16.4 17.4 13.8 12.4 10.9 8.3 5.8 4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7
Austria 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.3 5.5 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.6
Portugal 5.1 5.1 6.1 7.4 7.8 8.8 8.8 9.2 8.7 10.7 12 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1
Romania 7.6 7.4 8.3 7.7 8 7.1 7.2 6.4 5.6 6.5 7 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.8
Slovenia 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.3 6.5 6 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.2 8.9 10.1 9.7
Source: Eurostat, annual average.
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indexation of wages to past inflation (European Central Bank, 2009). Consequently,
as can be seen in Figure 3, while wages in Ireland started to adjust downward as early
as late 2008, Spanish nominal compensation per employee kept rising until the end
of 2011, even though the country at that time was already suffering from a 12 per-
centage point increase in unemployment.
Figure 2: Unemployment and nominal compensation developments in Ireland and
Spain
Source: Speech by Mario Draghi, Annual Central Bank Symposium in Jackson Hole (2013)
As a result, whereas the Irish labour market facilitated some adjustment through prices,
the Spanish labour market adjusted primarily through quantities. Wage bargaining in-
stitutions are identified as one of the main reasons for the different strategies for cut-
ting labour costs at the firm level in Spain and Ireland, because of the power they have
to amplify the impact of a negative shock on employment by limiting downward wage
adjustment.
Given the criticism made by economists and policymakers regarding centralised bar-
gaining regimes that are responsible for restricting the options firms have to adjust
wages in response to new economic conditions, in Spain, as in other stressed coun-
tries, a number of these labour market rigidities have been addressed through labour
market reforms. As reported by the European Commission (Visser, 2013), the Pact for
the Euro of March 2011 and the ‘Six-Pack’ of regulations on economic governance
adopted by the European Council in October 2011 heralded a movement towards re-
forms that limit extended coverage and multi-employer bargaining and favour com-
pany bargaining over central and industry bargaining.
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5.2 Employment dynamics during the Great Recession: exploring the new CompNet
database
As documented in the preceding section, unemployment developments during the
economic and financial crisis varied widely in the countries of the euro area. In this
section, using information from the new CompNet database, we show whether and to
what extent firms’ growth dynamics vary between countries58.
Figure 3 illustrates differences in firms’ growth trajectories in Germany and three
groups of countries. More precisely, it reports the change in the proportion of firms
growing, shrinking or remaining in the same size class59. This proportion is calculated
using a ‘transition matrix’, a powerful tool reflecting firms’ movement along the distri-
bution of size classes during a three-year period. Figure 3 covers three-year windows
between 2000 and 2012. Figure 3 shows some interesting facts about firms’ growth
trajectories. First, the structure of firms’ growth dynamics was quite stable during the
pre-crisis period. At the same time, the economic crisis significantly altered the growth
dynamics in place before its outbreak. However, the response of labour markets in
terms of the proportion of firms downsizing varies widely between countries, with the
crisis having a particularly strong impact on the functioning of the labour market in a
group of ‘stressed’ countries (Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) and a group of eastern
European EU countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Romania), which experienced a dra-
matic increase in the share of firms shrinking, mainly at the cost of the proportion of
firms growing, while the crisis barely changed firms’ growth dynamics in a group of
non-stressed countries (Austria, Belgium and Finland). An exceptional case is that of
Germany, which experienced only a short interruption to the increasing trend in the
proportion of firms expanding during the crisis and a complementary increase in the
share of firms shrinking. Moreover, while in the group of eastern EU countries the tra-
jectories altered by the Great Recession have already started to revert to trend, there
is no such evidence in the group of stressed countries.
58. CompNet, the Competitiveness Research Network of the European System of Central Banks, began operations at
the end of 2011 with the goal of improving the existing set of indicators of competitiveness through a ﬁrm-level
data collection exercise relying on ﬁrms’ balance-sheet information. Please refer to Di Mauro, Lopez-Garcia and
the CompNet Task Force (2015) for detailed information on the newly expanded database of cross-country
comparable competitiveness-related indicators and to the CompNet website for general information on the network
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/researcher_compnet.en.html).
59. Firms are categorised into ﬁve size classes, depending on number of employees: ﬁrms with between one and nine
employees fall into size class (1), ﬁrms with ten to 19 employees fall into size class (2), ﬁrms with 20 to 49
employees fall into size class (3), ﬁrms with 50 to 250 employees fall into size class (4) and ﬁrms with 250
employees or more fall into size class (5).
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Our research links the cross-country heterogeneity in employment dynamics at the
firm level to the different functioning of existing labour market institutions. In particular,
given the constraints that collective agreements might put on wage adjustments, we
explore whether and to what extent the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining in-
stitutions shaped the response of firms to the Great Recession by explaining the rela-
tive importance of wages and employment adjustments.
Figure 3: Change to number of growing and shrinking ﬁrms
Source: CompNet dataset.
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Before moving to our empirical results, we report the main features of wage bargaining
institutions across Europe, highlighting their impact on the heterogeneous restrictions
on wage adjustment and reviewing the main studies that examine the effects of ag-
gregate shocks on collective agreements and labour market adjustments. We stress
the importance of micro data for obtaining robust and significant results and, as a con-
sequence, the added value of a largely unexplored database matching the CompNet
micro-distributed dataset with the Wage Dynamic Network (WDN) survey-based
dataset at the firm level60.
5.3 Wage bargaining regimes and the WDN dataset
The main goal of collective bargaining institutions is to establish a process of negoti-
ation between unions and employers’ organisations to agree upon rules regulating
wages and other working conditions. The scope of the agreements depends on coun-
try-specific regulations and on the relative bargaining power of unions and employers’
organisations. Historically, wage bargaining institutions arose as a stabilising tool and
as an instrument to help prevent wage deflation through the setting of a wage floor.
However, in many European countries, collective bargaining became the main mech-
anism through which unions can push for higher wages.
To study the effects of wage-setting institutions on economic outcomes, notably wages
and employment, the existing literature has focused on some specific features that
define wage-bargaining structures, such as the degree of centralisation, coordination,
union density and coverage (OECD, 1997, 2004 and 2012). Economic theory (Nickell
and Andrews, 1983; McDonald and Solow, 1981) and many empirical studies focus
on the levels at which bargaining takes place and predict that the degree of centrali-
sation in wage bargaining has an impact on economic performance. The underlying
reasoning is that agreements bargained at the firm level are more flexible than those
bargained at sector or national level and are therefore likely to give firms a greater mar-
gin of adjustment to adapt to new economic conditions.
According to the evidence collected by the WDN, there are some differences between
countries in the levels at which bargaining takes place. Sector-level agreements are
predominant in western European countries and cover the greatest proportion of work-
ers, while wage-bargaining systems are highly deregulated and organised at the plant
level in central and eastern European countries (ECB, 2009). However, the levels at
60. The WDN was established in 2006 and its main goal is the identiﬁcation of the mechanisms underlying wage
and labour cost dynamics. For further information on the network, refer to:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/researcher_wdn.en.html.
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which bargaining can take place do not have to be mutually exclusive, and therefore
this distinction is only a first approximation of the degree of centralisation of wage-
setting institutions. To deepen this analysis, a further distinction between single- and
multi-level bargaining systems is needed.
In the last two decades, several euro-area countries have experienced strong devel-
opment of multi-level bargaining structures, meaning that the same bargaining process
can take place at many levels. To account for this further distinction, throughout our
analysis we classify countries into two groups: two-tier and non-two-tier countries.
Among the sampled countries, the two-tier group is composed of Austria, Belgium,
Italy, Portugal and Spain, and is characterised by the possibility of supplementing
multi-employer pay agreements (ie those taking place either at the national or sectoral
level) with single employer agreements (ie agreements at plant level). It is fundamen-
tal to note that the negotiations on wage setting undertaken at the company level only
allow for wages to be set higher than those established at the central level, according
to the favourability principle. In other words, the multi-employer agreement is taken
as a wage floor and the negotiation at the plant level can operate only to improve work-
ers’ conditions61. Conversely, non-two-tier countries have, by definition, a single-level
bargaining structure that can be either fully decentralised (ie negotiations take place
at the firm level only) or fully centralised (ie negotiations take place at the national or
sectoral level only). In our analysis Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia are all defined as
non-two-tier countries at the time of the outbreak of the economic crisis (note that,
contrary to the rest of the countries included in this group, Slovenia has a largely reg-
ulated system in which multi-employer bargaining is more common than plant-level
bargaining)62. Clearly, according to this country classification, multi-level bargaining
can only occur in two-tier countries, while fully decentralised bargaining structures
only operate in countries that are not defined as two-tier. Conversely, in both groups
of countries, firms can operate under multi-employer bargaining or not subscribe to
any agreement.
61. Two-level bargaining does not necessarily mean multi-level bargaining, as it is deﬁned in this analysis. There is a
distinction between situations in which ‘opening clauses’ are allowed in centralised agreements and the
‘institutionalised’ version of multi-level bargaining. In the ﬁrst case, the labour legislation allows for derogation
from sectoral standards and enables, within certain limits, agreements on working conditions that deviate from
the binding sector-level wage agreement. In the second case, plant-level bargaining can coexist with multi-employer
bargaining only when the higher pay level agreements are taken as a ﬂoor and not as a ceiling. Therefore, in this
situation, which is the one present in the group of sampled countries, it is not possible to deviate from the binding
industry-level agreements and changes at the plant level are only allowed if they guarantee an improvement of
the working conditions already agreed at the central level.
62. Hungary, however, is included only in the wage equation as we do not have information on the transition matrices
for this country.
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Historically, the decision in a number of countries to move towards multi-level regimes
during the 1990s was mainly driven by criticism of centralised wage-bargaining insti-
tutions by the OECD (1994a), these being the most common institutions at that time
in European countries. According to these criticisms, multi-employer structures were
a major cause of the low degree of responsiveness of the labour market to the 1980s
job crisis (Visser, 2013). The general recommendation of the OECD was to “refocus col-
lective bargaining at the sectoral level to framework agreements, in order to give firms
more leeway to adjust wages to local conditions” (OECD, 1994b). Therefore, although
individual countries’ experiences vary considerably with respect to the historical de-
velopment of multi-level structures, the common factor behind the spread of firms
adopting this type of bargaining regime is the attempt to achieve a more decentralised
collective bargaining structure while avoiding a drastic move from fully centralised to
fully decentralised structures. The current level of decentralisation of countries defined
as two-tier can be considered as occupying the middle ground between multi-employer
and plant-level bargaining. Although the decision to introduce or expand the presence
of multi-level bargaining in the euro area was based on the hypothesis that these new
structures could integrate macroeconomic stability with greater decentralisation in
wage setting, we will show that the design of these structures seems ill-suited for
achieving this goal and that they do not permit adequate adjustments in the face of
economic shocks.
In the literature, the notion that wage bargaining institutions play a fundamental role
in shaping economic outcomes at both the micro and macro levels has received a lot
of attention, at least since the 1980s. Many empirical studies attempt to link cross-
country differences in unemployment to the degree of centralisation at which bargain-
ing takes place (for a survey, see Flanagan, 1999). A typical argument in labour
economics is that wage-setting institutions have the power to amplify the impact of a
negative shock on employment by limiting downward wage adjustments. For these
specific characteristics, they have recently been identified as an important factor be-
hind the dramatic rise of structural unemployment, especially in the stressed countries
(see Bertola et al, 2010; and Ad hoc team of the European System of Central Banks,
2015). The most influential argument relating to collective bargaining and unemploy-
ment is the hump-shaped relationship between centralisation of wage setting institu-
tions and real wages, proposed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). The basis of this
relationship is that countries with fully centralised or fully decentralised bargaining
institutions (ie where agreements take place at the national and firm level respec-
tively) will perform better in terms of employment than countries characterised by an
intermediate degree of centralisation (ie sector level). This statement is based on the
consideration that large and all-encompassing unions are able to recognise their mar-
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ket power and will therefore take an international approach to wage externalities by
taking into account both the inflationary and unemployment effects of wage increases.
Conversely, trade unions operating at the individual plant level have very limited mar-
ket power and consequently have their bargaining strength constrained by market
forces. Finally, in cases in which bargaining takes place at an intermediate level, which
in Europe is the most common situation covering the greatest proportion of workers,
unions can still exert some market power but are likely to ignore the macroeconomic
consequences of their actions.
However, irrespective of the estimation approach, drawing inferences about the rela-
tionship between collective bargaining institutions and macroeconomic performance
is a challenge (for a survey, see Freeman, 2007). Although the theoretical literature
assigns an important role to wage-bargaining institutions and an extensive empirical
literature tries to quantify this role, assessing institutions remains difficult and com-
parable information at an international level is still limited. The traditional macro stream
of literature dealing with the effects of centralisation of wage-bargaining institutions
on employment and wage outcomes has generally led to inconclusive results because
the variation in the level of bargaining used in these papers is exclusively across coun-
tries and often comes from ad-hoc studies (and is therefore not comparable across
counties). This implies not only that they draw conclusions from very limited data and,
thus, a few outliers can significantly bias the results, but also that they only marginally
vary over time (see Aidt and Tzannatos, 2005). For example, results obtained in studies
using OECD indicators are rarely significant or robust to variations in the specification
of the dependent variable, the composition of the sample or the time period considered
(see Baker et al, 2005). Because of the above-mentioned limitations, macro analyses
can tell us little about the underlying causal relationship between wage bargaining in-
stitutions and economic outcomes.
On the contrary, micro-data analyses reveal that bargaining systems matter. For ex-
ample, using firm-level data from the WDN, Bertola et al (2010) find that bargaining at
a level higher than that of the firm significantly increases the probability of reducing
employment. They conclude that firms covered by centralised wage bargaining struc-
tures are more likely to reduce labour costs by cutting the level of employment than
by cutting the level of wages because of the higher level of wage rigidities. Similar re-
sults are also presented in Cardoso and Portela (2009) and Jimeno and Thomas
(2011), which demonstrate that collective bargaining and minimum wage institutions
are both related to less wage flexibility at the micro level.
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5.4 Data and results
As the structure of labour markets is increasingly perceived as a determinant of the
macroeconomic performance of a country, we use a novel micro-distributed database
to assess the role of wage bargaining institutions in shaping economic outcomes, no-
tably wages and employment. More specifically, we exploit the variation of the level
at which bargaining takes place across firms in seven euro-area countries and relate
it to different firm-level cost-cutting strategies following the crisis. We are interested
in seeing whether, when faced with a negative shock, firms operating in centralised
bargaining structures are more likely to reduce labour costs by reducing employment
compared with firms operating in decentralised and/or more deregulated systems.
The novel and largely unexplored micro-level dataset used to perform this analysis is
the outcome of a merging procedure between the CompNet and WDN databases. The
rich structure of both databases allows us to relate the reaction of firms to the Great
Recession in terms of variation in employment and wages (inferred from CompNet and
absent in the WDN dataset) to self-reported features of labour market environments
at the firm level (inferred from the WDN and not present in CompNet). The goal of the
matching procedure is to produce a database that can be used to analyse (by exploit-
ing comparable information for different countries) firms’ growth dynamics by linking
them to information on both firms’ characteristics and on the relevant features of the
labour market environments in which they operate. The new dataset contains infor-
mation on:
• Five different firm size classes, depending on the level of employment – firms with
one to nine employees, firms with ten to 19 employees, firms with 20 to 49 em-
ployees, firms with 50 to 249 employees and firms with 250 employees or more;
• Four macro sectors – manufacturing, construction, trade and market services63;
• Seven countries: Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and
Spain64.
Two particular features of the dataset need to be stressed. First, while CompNet indi-
63. Where ‘market services’ comprises all the following disaggregated sectors in CompNet: transportation and storage,
accommodation and food services, information and communication, real estate, professional, scientiﬁc and
technological services and support activities. These sectors have been aggregated in order to be matched with the
market service sector as deﬁned in the WDN. The aggregation process followed the procedure already used by
CompNet (deﬁned in CompNet Task Force, 2014).
64. The group of selected countries results from the merging procedure and represents the number of countries that
are present in both datasets. One exception is Estonia which, although present in both samples, is not included in
our analysis because it implemented a labour regulation reform in 2009.
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cators vary over time between 1995 and 2012, the WDN dataset is a cross-section and
relates to the period from 2007 to 2009. However, as between 2006 and the end of
2011 no fundamental changes were observed in wage -bargaining institutions in the
group of sampled countries (Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks, 2012), we can treat the measures of bargaining insti-
tutions as time invariant during the time period we consider (ie 2006-12). Second, and
in contrast to the majority of previous studies (with the exception of Boeri, 2014), we
distinguish between multi-level and single-level bargaining (either at the firm or multi-
employer level). While many empirical studies have already assessed the effects on
wages and employment of both fully centralised and fully decentralised bargaining,
much less is known about multi-level structures, despite their extensive development
in a number of European countries during the last two decades. In this way, we are
able to check whether two-tier structures, designed to allow for more decentralisation
and more wage renegotiation than multi-employer regimes, perform better than fully
centralised structures.
From a more general point of view, while previous empirical studies using macro vari-
ables limit their analysis to aggregate figures of coverage and the degree of centrali-
sation at different bargaining levels, this micro-distributed dataset allows us to account
for the nature of firms taking part in the bargaining regime at issue. Consequently,
thanks to the use of cross-country, harmonised micro data, we can control for sectoral
and firm characteristics in addition to country-specific ones.
5.4.1 Centralisation of wage bargaining and employment reduction
Given that wage bargaining takes place predominantly in the form of collective bar-
gaining in Europe, understanding to what extent the structure of wage bargaining
regimes determines the scope of employment reaction to the economic crisis is im-
portant from a policy perspective. In particular, we are interested in studying the extent
to which a higher degree of centralisation of wage bargaining institutions implied
greater firm-level employment reduction during the Great Recession. To answer this
question, we ran the following estimation model: 
SSFcszt = ß1SFBcsz + ß2SFCcsz + ß3SFDcsz + TFPcst + ac + bs + cz + dt + ucszt
where SSFcszt stands for the share of shrinking firms in country c, sector s, size class
z at time t, calculated using the transition matrices previously described in section 2.
In order to focus on the period of the crisis we selected the following periods as three-
years rolling windows for our empirical analysis: 2006-09, 2007-10, 2008-11 and
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2009-12. The variables SFD, SFC and SFB, varying by size class, sector, and country,
represent respectively the share of firms engaging in fully decentralised bargaining,
in fully centralised bargaining, and operating in both levels of bargaining according to
the principles previously explained. As already pointed out, these variables are treated
as time invariant. Finally, ac, bs, cz, and dt control respectively for country, sector, size
and time-specific effects. In particular, country dummies account for unobserved na-
tional effects such as those that could derive from country-specific employment legis-
lation. Sector and firm-size dummies are included to control for unobserved technological
and market-structure differences between industries and different size firms.
Our results are reported in column 1 of Table 1 and show that the share of firms engag-
ing either in multi-level or multi-employer bargaining are significantly and positively
associated with the share of firms that reduced in size during the Great Recession. In
other words, an increase in the share of firms engaging in these two regimes of bar-
gaining within a cell (as defined by a firm’s size class, sector and country) leads to a
statistically significant increase in the share of firms reducing employment with re-
spect to our reference group (firms not engaging in any collective agreement). On the
contrary, and as expected, the coefficient of the share of firms in decentralised bar-
gaining regimes is not statistically different from that of our base group.
In column 2 we report the results for a second specification for which, in addition to
the variables already included, we also control for sectoral total factor productivity (in
logarithm). We add this variable to our previous specification because multi-level bar-
gaining is not randomly allocated across firms because of its add-up properties and
this prevents us from making causal inferences about the relationship between eco-
nomic outcomes and bargaining regimes. In particular, we know that multi-level struc-
tures are more common among more productive and bigger firms – which are in fact
more unionised – because they forces employers to pay a wage drift with respect to
the level set at the higher bargaining level. We partially control for the possibility of
having endogenous sorting of firms across the bargaining regimes by adding to our
specification the level of sectoral TFP of the starting year of each rolling window (ie
from 2006 to 2009) because it is exogenous to the single firm and more structurally
determined. The results show that when, on top of controlling for factors such as coun-
try, sector and firm size, which are already likely to largely explain the allocation of
firms across the different bargaining regimes, we also control for sectoral TFP, our pre-
vious findings hold up and remain statistically significant.
These results already point in the direction that multi-level bargaining regimes have a
positive and significant impact on the share of downsizing firms. To deepen the
86
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analysis and to explore whether multi-level bargaining allows for greater margins of
adjustment to shocks with respect to fully centralised structures, we run the same
equation as in columns 1 and 2 but only for two-tier countries (these results are shown
in columns 3 and 4). As predicted by the theory, we see that firms not subscribing to
any bargaining regime tend to lay off employees less frequently than firms operating
in fully centralised systems. On the contrary, engaging in multi-level bargaining seems
to have an even stronger impact on employment reduction with respect to fully
centralised regimes. We can explain this evidence by referring to the intrinsic nature
of multi-level structures, where plant-level bargaining can only generate a 'wage drift'
with respect to the pay level agreed at the higher level. For this reason, firms in multi-
level structures are likely to be characterised by smaller margins of adjustment than
firms engaging in either fully centralised or fully decentralised wage bargaining
systems.
Table 2: OLS model
Employment adjustment and centralisation of collective agreements
Share of shrinking
firms
(1) All countries
(2) All countries –
with sectoral TFP
(3) Two-tier
countries only
(4) Two-tier
countries only –
with sectoral TFP
Multi-level
0.2025*** 0.2160*** 0.0787*** 0.0784***
-0.0459 -0.0871 -0.0222 -0.0232
Multi-employer
0.1120*** 0.1221***
(base group) (base group)
-0.04 -0.0442
Plant-level
0.0697 0.0871
– –
-0.0537 -0.0538
No collective
bargaining
(base group) (base group)
- 0.1298*** - 0.1330***
-0.0429 -0.0488
Sectoral TFP
0.0062
–
-0.0095
-0.0102 -0.0104
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant
0.3143*** 0.3412*** 0.1501*** 0.2288***
-0.0191 -0.0267 -0.0114 -0.0494
Observations 362 343 254 235
R-squared 0.7765 0.7839 0.7641 0.7641
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
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In conclusion, this analysis shows that multi-level structures, although designed to
allow for more decentralisation in two-tier countries and for higher frequency in wage
renegotiation in response to shocks, perform worse than either fully decentralised or
fully centralised wage bargaining regimes. More generally, it turns out that the structure
of the wage-bargaining regime is an important factor in determining the extent of em-
ployment reaction to the economic crisis and demonstrating that the evidence we col-
lected is in line with theoretical predictions. In the next section, we complement this
evidence by analysing whether the way in which a shock tends to be allocated across
wages and employment partly depends on the degree of firm-level wage rigidity under
the different bargaining regimes.
5.4.2 Centralisation of wage bargaining and wage rigidity
In light of the intensity of the crisis, wage adjustments in response to the Great Reces-
sion in the euro area have been rather limited. As reported by the Task Force of the
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks (2012), “this ap-
parently limited adjustment seems to corroborate evidence [...] about the existence
of various obstacles to wage adjustments in European countries. At the same time,
there is a large degree of cross-country heterogeneity regarding the speed and size
of wage adjustment since the crisis. These heterogeneous adjustment patterns may
partially reflect cross-country differences in exposure to the recession as well as dif-
ferences in wage bargaining institutions.”
Against this background, we have shown that labour markets characterised by a greater
proportion of firms engaging in centralised bargaining (both single- and multi-level)
are characterised by a higher share of firms reducing employment if confronted with
a negative shock. To see whether this evidence could be partly driven by greater wage
rigidity, we ran a probit regression relating the probability of firm-level nominal wage
reductions to the share of firms operating in the different bargaining regimes. The es-
timated equation is the following:
WVcszt = ß1SFBcsz + ß2SFCcsz + ß3SFDcsz + ac + bs + cz + dt + ucszt
where WVcszt is a dummy equal to one if the variation in the average labour cost per
employee from one year to another – starting with the difference between wages in
2009 and wages in 2008 – was negative and equal to zero otherwise. The remaining
variables are defined as in the previous equation. The results are presented in table 2
where we also present the results when controlling for sectoral TFP (column 2) and
when focusing on the subset of two-tier countries only (columns 3 and 4).
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In line with theoretical models, our analysis shows that engaging in centralised bar-
gaining structures (both single- and multi-level) decreases the probability of cutting
wages during the Great Recession period. These results suggest that centralised bar-
gaining regimes put constraints on wage adjustments and, in turn, induce firms oper-
ating under these regimes to react to negative shocks mainly through reductions in
employment. On the other hand, firms operating in decentralised bargaining institu-
tions are more resilient to shocks in terms of employment levels, because they are
shown to also be able to adjust to changes in economic conditions through wage
changes. The same results hold when we control for sectoral TFP and when we limit
our analysis to the sub-sample of two-tier countries only.
Table 3: Probit model
Wage adjustment and centralisation of collective agreements
Wage reduction
probability
(1) All countries
(2) All countries –
with sectoral TFP
(3) Two-tier
countries only
(4) Two-tier
countries only –
with sectoral TFP
Multi-level
-1.6879* -1.8292* -2.4977** -3.1214**
(0.9681) (0.9860) (1.1889) (1.2783)
Multi-employer
-1.4817* -1.6630** -2.0082** -2.4646**
(0.7932) (0.8099) (1.0046) (1.0937)
Plant-level
-1.5505 -1.6501
– –
(1.0005) (1.0190)
No collective
bargaining
(base group) (base group) (base group) (base group)
Sectoral TFP
-0.3164
–
- 0.5998
(0.2521) (0.3134)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant
1.9298** 2.9647*** 2.3408*** 4.2605***
(1.1108) (1.1108) (0.6854) (1.1440)
Observations 537 517 320 300
R-squared 0.2762 0.2766 0.1621 0.1720
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hungary is included in the wage regres-
sion but data is lacking for the employment regression. The probit results are robust to removal of Hungary.
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
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5.5 Conclusions
For our empirical analysis we used a novel dataset that links information on firms’ char-
acteristics and growth trajectories from CompNet to information from the WDN dataset
on the labour market environment in which firms operate. We found that the way in
which the negative economic shock of the Great Recession was distributed across
wages and employment was associated with the degree of centralisation of wage-bar-
gaining regimes in theoretically sensible ways.
More specifically, our analysis found that differences between euro-area countries in
terms of employment adjustment seemed to reflect the degree of wage flexibility en-
tailed in the different bargaining regimes. Once we control for firms’ structural charac-
teristics, labour markets with a higher proportion of firms subscribing to centralised
collective bargaining are characterised by a higher proportion of firms reducing the num-
ber of employees and that this might be partly a consequence of greater wage rigidity.
As already emphasised, these regressions should not be interpreted as offering a
causal interpretation. In order to identify a truly causal relationship between the dif-
ferent structures of bargaining institutions and the relative importance of employment
and wage adjustment in reaction to shocks, we would need to control for potential firm
selectivity effects through a longitudinal database allowing us to identify some sources
of exogenous variation in the bargaining regimes. As highlighted by Hartog et al (1997),
controlling for the fact that firms subscribing to a specific bargaining regime might not
be representative of the overall population will remain a challenge “as long as no (sat-
isfactory) independent variables to control for the endogeneity of the bargaining
regime are available”. However, while the results previously found concerning the link
between the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining structures and economic out-
come can be interpreted only in the spirit of correlation anal ysis, they are robust to
controls for factors such as country, sector and size, which are likely to largely explain
the allocation of firms across different bargaining institutions.
The structure of the labour market, and particularly the degree of centralisation of wage
bargaining institutions, seems to matter for the way firms adjust to economic shocks.
Thanks to this new dataset we are able to disentangle different bargaining regimes, in-
cluding multi-level regimes, and relate them to firms’ growth trajectories in terms of em-
ployment and to nominal wage changes throughout the Great Recession. Therefore, in
addition to providing insights on the impact of labour market institutions on cost-cutting
strategies at the firm level, this chapter intends to promote a more extensive use of micro
data, especially given the limitation of macro indicators of labour market institutions.
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6 In search of lost market share:
the French case
Maria Bas, Lionel Fontagné, Philippe Martin and Thierry Mayer
The arrival of powerful new players on world markets – the foremost being China – au-
tomatically reduces the market share of advanced economies. But France’s export
market share has decreased more than those of other European countries. This is not
a result of poor geographic or sectoral specialisation, insufficient exporter support,
under-representation of SMEs in exports or credit constraints, but, more fundamentally,
is caused by an inadequate 'quality/price ratio' for French products on average. When
products are high quality, results are exceptional, as demonstrated by the luxury, aero-
nautical and electrical distribution goods sectors and/or by brands, which appear to
play a key role.
A country’s competitiveness comprises a price dimension and a non-price dimension.
Regarding price competitiveness, direct labour costs represent just 23 percent on av-
erage of the total value of French exports and 44 percent when including the cost of
labour for domestic intermediate consumption. Price competitiveness is therefore not
solely a matter of labour costs for exporting companies. We also need to look at the
input side, whether it be intermediate goods (possibly imported), energy or even serv-
ices produced in France for exporting companies. The central message is that com-
petitiveness is everybody’s concern, and not just a concern of industrial companies.
Greater efficiency in non-tradable sectors (business services, construction, public
services) also contributes to price competitiveness.
Non-price competitiveness is more difficult to measure. We rely on disaggregated data
to provide a per-product diagnosis, a micro-economic approach that is particularly
well-suited to demonstrate the quality effect. Among the OECD countries, France retains
a relatively good position in terms of the number of sectors in the top ten for non-price
competitiveness (7th). However, there has been a drop-off since 2008 with a downturn
in a number of sectors.
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Non-price competitiveness policies and productivity policies to a great extent overlap,
which is why we emphasise the importance of reallocating production factors (labour
and capital) to help the most productive companies develop faster. Reforms to reduce
the regulation of the goods, services and labour markets need to explicitly take this
objective into account. Moreover, the example of luxury goods demonstrates the im-
portance of brands in the creation of non-price competitiveness. The protection of in-
tellectual property rights should be a priority for France and the European Union in
international negotiations.
6.1 How France is losing market share
The rise of emerging economies on world markets has automatically led to a drop in
the market shares of all advanced economies. This downward trend of French market
share, which is well documented in a number of reports, is therefore in part a reflection
of the reconfiguration of world trade. Nevertheless, we should be concerned by the
fact that French market share has dropped further than that of other countries in the
European Union, with the exception of Italy (Figure 1)65. Between 1995 and 2013,
France’s market share dropped by 42 percent for goods and services, as did that of
Italy, whilst this figure stood at just 21 percent for Germany and 27 percent for the
United Kingdom, with Spain retaining an almost stable market share66.
In this chapter, we focus solely on the export of goods that are central to international
trade and for which detailed statistics are available by product and trading partner67.
6.1.1 State of play
France’s poor exporting performance is sometimes attributed to its poor geographic
or sectoral positioning. If this were true, a solution to reduce loss of market share would
be to target high-growth countries and sectors (such as large emerging economies,
agri-food, health, new information and communications technology68), maybe by pro-
viding incentives for firms to redirect exports towards them.
65. We work on the basis of world market share, including intra-European trade ﬂows. France’s market share is the
ratio between French exports to all foreign markets (including European) and all global exports (including intra-
European).
66. The drop in French market share stood at 47 percent for goods (between 1995 and 2014) compared with 21 percent
for Germany, 30 percent for Italy and 41 percent for the United Kingdom. We note however that the French
performance is average within the OECD.
67. For an analysis of services exports, please see, for example Gaulier et al (2010).
68. See the Direction générale du Trésor (2012).
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Figure 1: Changes in world market share for goods and services for the ﬁve largest
EU countries, 1995 to 2013
Source: The World Trade Organisation. Note: exports in goods and services in percentage of world exports in-
cluding intra-European trade.
European countries, which trade a great deal between themselves, suffer from a neg-
ative geographic composition effect because Europe is growing at a slower pace than
the rest of the world (Asia in particular). No European country has escaped this effect
and France is, from this point of view, average over the period 2006 to 2014 (Table 1
and method in Box 1). The countries that have been most successful in positioning
themselves on emerging markets have suffered slightly less from this 'European' ef-
fect: this is the case for Germany and Italy. However the geographical effect has a
greater impact on Spain and the United Kingdom than it does on France.
As for product specialisation, this generally accounts for very little in the market share
variations observed between 2006 and 2014, as shown in Table 1. In the case of France
however, this specialisation has proved to be an advantage compared to Germany: the
geographic disadvantage of French exporters compared to German exporters has been
more than compensated for by more favourable product positioning. The combined
contribution of country specialisation and product specialisation in explaining loss of
market share is practically zero in the case of France (–0.1 percent average per
annum) whilst it is clearly negative for Germany (–0.7 percent per annum). Germany’s
better performance is therefore solely explained by ‘pure’ competitiveness effects:
French exporters are less effective than German exporters in selling the same product
on the same market.
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Table 1: Changes in world market share for goods, 2006-Q1 to 2014-Q3 annual
average variation in %
Rate of growth
in exports
Annual variation
in world market
share
Of which:
Geographic
eﬀect
Sectoral eﬀect
Pure
performance
EU-28 4.4 –1.9 –0.8 –0.1 –1.0
Euro area 17 4.3 –0.8 –0.1 –1.1
France 3.0 –3.2 –0.8 0.7 –3.1
Germany 4.5 –1.7 –0.5 –0.2 –1.0
Italy 4.0 –2.2 –0.5 –0.6 –1.1
Spain 4.5 –1.7 –1.1 –0.1 –0.5
United Kingdom 2.3 –3.9 –0.9 0.4 –3.3
World 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: World Bank, Export Competitiveness Database. Note: variations are in delta-log. For example, where
market share falls from 10 to 9%, the variation recorded is ln(9/10) = – 10.5 %.
BOX 1: BREAKDOWN OF MARKET SHARE VARIATIONS BETWEEN 2006 AND 2014
In order to pinpoint the contribution made by geographic and sectoral specialisa-
tions in market share evolution, we made use of the Export Competitiveness Data
Base developed by the World Bank in collaboration with the Banque de France and
the International Trade Centre (CNCUCED-OMC). The ‘shift share’ method proposed
by Gaulier et al (2013) was applied to quarterly data starting in 2006 for 228 coun-
tries or territories at the HS-6 level of the Harmonised Commodity Description and
Coding System which comprises some 5,000 products. The latest data available
was for the third quarter of 2014. Compared with the ‘traditional shift-share’ method
(Cheptea et al, 2005; Cheptea et al, 2014a; Cheptea et al, 2014b), the one used to
create this database has a greater frequency of data and takes into account exten-
sive trade margins (increase in the number of products exported or the number of
destinations served).
Variations in exports for each category of product/exporting country/importing coun-
try/quarter are regressed under the fixed effects of product, exporter and importer
enabling the effect of ‘pure’ competitiveness to be isolated by deduction for each
exporting country. This ‘pure’ competitiveness effect answers the following question:
“What would the variation in exports for a country be if the geographic and sectoral
structure of its exports were the same as that of its competitors?”
We would like to thank Gianluca Santoni (CEPII) for extracting the data.
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Table 2: Changes in world market share for goods, 2009-Q1 to 2014-Q3 annual
average variation in %
Rate of growth
in exports
Annual variation
in world market
share
Of which:
Geographic
eﬀect
Sectoral eﬀect
Pure
performance
EU28 0.3 –2.3 –1.8 0.5 –1.0
Euro area 17 0.1 –2.5 –1.8 0.5 –1.3
France –1.0 –3.5 –1.5 1.5 –3.5
Germany 0.5 –2.0 –1.3 0.5 –1.2
Italy –0.3 –2.8 –1.4 0.2 –1.6
Spain 1.1 –1.4 –1.9 0.7 –1.8
United Kingdom –0.2 –2.7 –1.6 0.7 –1.8
World 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: World Bank, Export Competitiveness Database.
69. This calculation is based on the variation when comparing Germany’s market share and that of France up to the
fourth quarter of 2013. The export ‘deﬁcit’ measured in this way at the end of 2013 is applied to world trade in
2014; 0.76 points of 18,784 x 1,021/1.3 with world exports of goods of $18,784 billion in 2013 and world trade
growth estimated at 2.1 percent in value terms in 2014 (CPB, World Trade Monitor estimate). We use an average
euro-dollar exchange rate of 1.3.
This ‘pure’ competitiveness effect is quantitatively significant. To see this at work, it is
possible to compute what France’s market share would have been if it had not lost
more ‘pure’ competitiveness than Germany between 2006 and 2014. Its loss in market
share would thus have been 0.75 percent on average per annum instead of the 3 per-
cent loss shown in Table 1. This represents a loss of €112 billion for 2014 in terms of
the export of goods69.
World trade declined sharply in 2009, followed by a more long-term slowdown after
the automatic rebound in 2010. The specifically European economic crisis also started
in 2009, which placed European Union exporters in an even less favourable position,
given their strong exposure to EU markets. Table 2 shows that between 2009 and 2014,
the contribution made by geographic specialisation to losses of market share practi-
cally doubled for all European countries. In France however, this negative effect was
offset by a strongly positive product-specialisation effect. As such, loss of French mar-
ket share since 2009 (–1 percent per annum on average) is essentially explained, as
since 2006, by a competitiveness factor. However, these global developments hide
very different realities. One sector in particular – luxury goods – has recorded a good
trade performance and deserves closer analysis.
Observation 1: Poor French export performance is linked to an inadequate
‘quality/price ratio’, not to poor country or product positioning.
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6.1.2 The counter-example of luxury goods
A labour-intensive industry located – at least in part – in a country deemed to have
high labour costs, the French luxury goods industry has proved able to compete with
emerging countries and to benefit from the rapid growth of an affluent class within
those countries. Two recent studies shed light on this success based on data from the
grouping of part of the luxury goods industry within the Comité Colbert70. A number of
sectors are covered: tableware, decoration, clothing, drinks, perfumes, jewellery, hand-
bags and shoes and confectionery.
Three results emerge: advanced countries are less disadvantaged, all other things
being equal, in the export of luxury goods than in that of other industrial products: the
high-end positioning protects them from competition from emerging countries; the ex-
port of luxury goods is less sensitive to distance than other products on average; luxury
goods react to a greater extent than other exports to an increase in purchasing power
in destination markets, but this is only the case for a handful of exporting countries,
including France.
At the centre of this success is one crucial variable: brands. The factor explaining
France’s difference (as well as Italy’s and Switzerland’s) is the number of luxury brands
from the exporter country among the top 100 global brands. In France there are 24
compared to 10 in Switzerland, 7 in Italy and just 1 in Japan (World Luxury
Association).
Observation 2: The sectors which have been most successful in resisting com-
petition rely on strong brands.
6.1.3 Too few exporters?
We have seen above how export growth can be broken down into a geographic
specialisation component, a sectoral specialisation component and a ‘pure’
competitiveness factor. Another interesting analysis separates the increase, over time,
of already existing flows (for example exports from France of small Peugeot cars to
Denmark), from the creation of new flows (new products, new markets or new exporting
companies).
70. See www.comitecolbert.com. See Martin and Mayneris (2015), and Fontagné and Hatte (2014). The results of
these two studies are conﬁrmed, in the special case of champagne, by Crozet, Head and Mayer (2012).
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In the short term (from one year to the next), the growth of French exports is over-
whelmingly explained by an increase of the flows already in place, known as the in-
tensive mark-up (87.7 percent) (Berman et al, 2015). The remainder (12.3 percent),
known as the extensive mark-up, is new flow creation: 2.4 percent is the result of the
arrival of new companies (net of the departure of companies which were previously
present in the export market), and 9.9 percent is the result of companies which were
already present in the market but which have added or withdrawn products and/or des-
tination markets to/from their export portfolios. Therefore, over the short term it is not
the arrival of new exporting companies that is the principal explanation for the growth
in French exports.
On the other hand, over a ten-year period, the extensive mark-up accounts for 53.5
percent of export dynamics: 26.2 percent as a result of new companies entering the
export market and 27.3 percent through the multiplication of products or markets by
existing companies. Over this period, the intensive mark-up accounts for just 46.5 per-
cent of the growth of all exports. The difference between a short-term analysis and an
analysis over a period of 10 years lies in the fact that the new export flows are small
in size but liable to grow rapidly over time (because of drastic selection of best en-
trants, with the remainder exiting the market fairly quickly) to such an extent that after
10 years, these initially weak flows become significant.
France’s weak export performance does not result from a different distribution between
the development of existing markets (which would have be maintained) and entering
new markets (which would have been insufficient – see the drop in the number of ex-
porting companies between 2000 and 2009, Figure 2). The very strong reliance of
French exports on a small number of exporting companies is a phenomenon that is
characteristic of advanced economies71, and the share of the export dynamics be-
tween intensive and extensive mark-ups is similar in other countries. Moreover, the
French performance is not the result of a peculiar under-representation of SMEs in ex-
ports: one third of the value of French exports to outside of the EU was accounted for
by SMEs in 2011. This is lower than for Italy (49 percent) but higher than for Germany
(28 percent) and falls within the European average (Cernat et al, 2014).
71 .In 2003, the top 5 percent largest French exporters accounted for 73 percent of the country’s exports. The
corresponding ﬁgure was 81 percent for Germany and 69 percent for the United Kingdom. Italy was slightly lower
at 59 percent. See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007). This extreme concentration remains true at a more detailed level:
in 2008, the largest 10 French exporters represented just over 20 percent of total exports; in Spain this ﬁgure
exceeded 40 percent and in Italy it stood at approximately 10 percent, see: Berthou et al (2015).
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Figure 2: Number of exporting companies in France, 2002 to 2014
Source: French customs.
6.1.4 Export support policies
As we have seen, the creation of new export flows is a key element in export dynamics
at least within a 10 year timeframe, if not in the short term. These new flows might
come from large companies developing new products or investing in new markets.
They might also come from SMEs that are first-time exporters. There are three grounds
for public intervention in this area.
6.1.4.1 Information costs
According to recent theories of international trade (Melitz, 2003), first-time exporters
face fixed information-gathering costs that weigh proportionately more on small com-
panies than on large ones. Numerous SMEs do not export because their productivity
is inadequate to cover this fixed cost. Governments might therefore wish to support
those SMEs closest to the productivity threshold to enable them to export, given that
the start-up cost has only to be borne once. Government action is however faced with
a number of problems (Box 2): it is difficult to identify companies close to the produc-
tivity threshold enabling them to export; a large number of first-time exporters are not
able to retain their place in target markets, which reduces the return on government
intervention72; if a multiplicity of support packages for growing overseas leads to the
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72 .According to Bentejac and Desponts (2013) about one third of ﬁrst-time exporters (not having exported in the
previous ﬁve years) survive beyond one year. This proportion is 70 percent for businesses that are members of a
group.
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Box 2: Government export support policies
In France, a large number of agencies are involved in helping companies grow their
business overseas and more than 90 percent of medium-sized businesses and
SMEs that are already trading internationally or are about to do so (2 percent of all
companies) state that they use at least one support body (Bentejac and Desponts,
2013). The processes cover two major types of support packages:
• Advisory: information, access to international contacts or partners in the target mar-
ket, attendance at trade shows, employment assistance through the post-graduate
students for international business programme, etc. Business France (previously
Ubifrance) provides trade advice and support to some 9,000 businesses each year
to which is to be added the networks of French chambers of commerce located over-
seas and that of the Department of Finance, the diplomatic network, foreign trade
advisers, as well as sectoral agencies (such as agriculture and cultural products),
help provided at the regional and local levels and EU schemes for promoting exports;
• Financing and insurance: public intervention is essentially carried out by BPI France
and by Coface. Three schemes, targeting approximately 1,000 companies per year,
are provided by BPI France: export development loans (unsecured loans guaranteed
by public funds); cash flow loans (export loans, buyer-credit); bank loan guarantees.
Coface offers credit insurance (as a private insurer) and assistance in surveying po-
tential markets (on behalf of the State). It boasted 37,000 customers in 2013.
Crozet et al (2013) have assessed the direct impact of a small number of services
provided by Ubifrance and Coface on the export performance of French companies
between 2005 and 2010, by comparing those companies receiving support with their
peers (same characteristics in terms of sector, size and productivity) not receiving
support. According to this study, the main impact of the assistance in surveying po-
tential markets provided by Coface appears to be an increase in export volumes for
exporters already in place (about +20 percent) and in the number of destinations (ap-
proximately one additional country). Support packages set up by Ubifrance and which
focus on coaching a group of companies appear to be the only ones that encourage
companies to get started in international trade; both schemes have an impact on ex-
ported volumes that is similar in size, but the latter appears to be short-term while as-
sistance in surveying markets has a more sustainable impact. These results are in
line with those from other countries (Cadot et al, 2011; Volpe Martincus and Carballo,
2008; Van Biesebroeck et al, 2015) although it should be noted that all studies (in-
cluding this one on France) are quite sensitive to the choice of control group. These
results are also in line with surveys carried out by Business France and BPI France.
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replacement of the entry cost to a foreign market (subsidised by the government) by
a research cost for an adequate support mechanism (supported by the SME) the net
effect on export capability could be uncertain. In fact, the complexity of mechanisms
in France is regularly highlighted by assessment committees in spite of rationalisation
efforts73.
In any event, export-support policies as they are currently structured fail to explain
the worsening of the French balance of trade. The businesses involved are generally
small in size and contribute only modestly to external trade; in addition, external trade
has declined while support mechanisms have improved. The significant government
support (estimated at some €600 million in 2012)74 has recently shifted away from
first-time exporters towards companies that already have overseas activities, with the
aim of increasing their exports and the number of their subsidiaries abroad.
6.1.4.2 Imperfections in the credit market
A second justification for government intervention is the financial constraints on SMEs,
especially when they invest in order to reach export markets. Assessing these inter-
ventions in terms of financing poses the same problems as those related to support
(identifying the reference group).
Whereas government intervention in terms of financing affects a sizeable proportion
of exporting companies (see Box 2), it is unlikely that financing is a decisive factor in
France regaining its market share. According to Bricongne et al (2012), during the 2008
world financial crisis, French exporters were less affected by the discontinuation of
funds than by the fall in international trade: over 60 percent of the fall in French exports
was due to the ‘net intensive mark-up’ of the largest exporting companies (the top 1
percent), which were barely affected by credit restrictions. The credit squeeze was di-
rectly felt by companies that were already in financial difficulty and for which restric-
tions on loans related to the crisis were an aggravating factor; however as their number
was low, the impact was limited.
6.1.4.3 Externalities
A last justification for export aid relates to positive external effects on companies up-
stream and downstream of the exporting company. Enabling a company to export has
73. See Bentejac and Desponts (2013) and Cour des Comptes (2011).
74. See Bentejac and Desponts (2013).
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a multiplying effect insofar as it is able to share information with other potential ex-
porters, or simply serve as a demonstration model for close competitors. Recent stud-
ies confirm the existence of these positive effects75. However, competitiveness
clusters do not seem to have a knock-on effect on R&D, the number of patents or
turnover. Some studies do demonstrate the positive impact of competitiveness clus-
ters on the probability that exporters in these clusters will continue exporting. However,
these companies are more dependent on the cluster’s ‘lead’ company and their pres-
ence within clusters did not seem to protect them during the 2008-09 financial crisis76.
Compared to other European countries, France is in the upper range for government
export support (Box 3). The types of support mechanism are similar from one country
to another. However, French support schemes are characterised by a larger share of
services invoiced to companies.
Observation 3. A wide range of government export support mechanisms are
available to French SMEs. Even though they would gain from being further ra-
tionalised, these mechanisms are not the primary answer to the erosion of
French market share.
6.2 Inadequate non-price competitiveness
‘Pure’ competitiveness, as defined in the previous section, comprises a price dimen-
sion and a non-price dimension. Price competitiveness is the result of unit production
costs (including labour costs, energy costs, cost of capital and intermediate consump-
tion, net of productivity gains), mark-ups and nominal exchange rates. Non-price com-
petitiveness can be considered as a residual in that it is the part of demand that is not
explained by price. It has a variety dimension (horizontal product differentiation, dif-
ferent yoghurt flavours for example) and a quality dimension (vertical product differ-
entiation, more- or less-creamy yoghurt for example).
The fact that non-price competitiveness is not directly measurable makes any diag-
nosis rather precarious, particularly when it is based on aggregated data77. Here we
have adopted a micro-economic perspective: we compare changes in non-price com-
petitiveness for products exported by France, to those of other major OECD countries
on the basis of disaggregated data by product for the period 2000-13. The non-price
75. Koenig et al (2010).
76. See Askenazy and Martin (2015), who recommend an independent assessment of competitiveness clusters and
a reduction in their number, and Bellégo and Dortet-Bernadet (2013).
77. See for example Borey and Quille (2013).
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competitiveness indicator used reflects product characteristics which see increased
demand at a given price. The idea is that consumers are ready to pay a higher price for
products with attributes – other than price – that they value strongly, such as brand,
company image, exporting country, quality of associated services, reputation, product
reliability or design. The methodology is set out in Box 4.
BOX 3: SUPPORT POLICIES FOR GROWING OVERSEAS IN SOME EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
In Germany the promotion of exports is by and large in the hands of the Ministry of
the Economy with a 2012 budget of €138.4 million. A large share of this is invested
in organising trade fairs and exhibitions (40 percent) and in the consular networks
of 120 bilateral chambers of commerce (27 percent). The latter have 2,200 staff
and 50,000 member companies spread over 80 countries. Support schemes at fed-
eral level are also based on financial advisors at embassies and on the German Trade
and Invest agency, an agency of the Ministry of the Economy with some 300 agents
and a budget of €17 million. Companies are supported at state or Länder level by
local chambers of commerce; in the most industrialised Länder, specific advisory
bodies support locally-based companies in exporting. In addition, companies re-
ceive guarantees and credit insurance (€30 billion in 2011) of which 75 percent is
allocated to trade with emerging and developing countries; this budget supports ex-
port growth but also covers industrial policy, foreign policy and employment pro-
tection objectives.
The Italian system is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry
of Economic Development, the former having a coordinating role based on its diplo-
matic networks whilst the latter is responsible for granting export aid (supporting
promotional work, preferential loans or credit insurance products, in particular for
SMEs). This system was reformed in 2013 to recentralise certain skills which had
been devolved to the regions, with the aim of making processes more transparent
and efficient. Financial support granted by the Italian state has been halved over
the past years, reaching €33 million in 2012.
In the United Kingdom, export support is organised jointly by the Ministries of Trade
and Foreign Affairs, via UKTI (UK Trade and Investment – the equivalent of Business
France). This is based on a regional organisation of 12 agencies dispersed throughout
the country. The UKTI has a budget equivalent to €368 million for 2014-15, more than
double the 2013-14 budget. It has nearly 2,300 employees, half of which are based
abroad. Moreover, the British model is based on cooperation with private service
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6.2.1 France ranks 7th in the OECD...
We limit ourselves here to sectors that represent more than 1 percent of exports for
each country under consideration. Table 3 sets out the 10 leading sectors for non-price
competitiveness in France and Germany in 2013. The sectors are classified by de-
creasing ranking within the OECD. As such, France’s number one sector in terms of non-
price competitiveness is aeronautics, in which France ranks top among OECD countries.
This non-price competitiveness is assessed in section 2.4: in this sector, French ex-
porters could set prices more than twice as high what they would be if their quality
was identical to the average for OECD countries. This advantage stands at 7.3 in the
leather goods sector, in which France ranks second among OECD countries in terms of
non-price competitiveness.
The three sectors in which France is most competitive in non-price terms are aeronau-
tics, leather goods and wine. In Germany, is it automotive spare parts, non-ferrous met-
als and plastic products. These top three sectors represent 15 percent of German
exports, compared with just 7 percent of French exports. In addition, Germany ranks
top in the OECD in three sectors, while France ranks second in leather goods and third
for wine. Moving down the list, Germany remains the top performer in its first ten sectors,
whilst France falls to eighth in the OECD in its tenth sector (plastic products). Germany
thus clearly ranks ahead of France in terms of non-price competitiveness. This is even
more disadvantageous for French exports given that, among the ten most competitive
sectors in non-price criteria, four are common to both countries: Germany is France's
closest competitor and outperforms France in terms of non-price competition.
providers and chambers of commerce located abroad (for example the China Britain
Business Council). Sectoral priorities (health, defence, creative industries, oil and
gas and agribusiness) and geographic priorities (high growth emerging markets)
were set out. 54,190 companies used one or more of the UKTI services between Oc-
tober 2013 and September 2014 (compared with 25,400 in 2011) including 11,430
first-time exporters. The latter have access to a number of free services or grants, for
example export advice from a UKTI expert, financial help in attending exhibitions and
trade shows overseas and access to market research for overseas. Other services
are to be paid for, as with the Overseas Market Introduction Service (which offers a
number of schemes using on-site UKTI experts) or Postgraduate Students for Inter-
national Business introduced in 2014. Via UK Export Finance, businesses that have
not been able to secure insurance on the private market were able in 2013 to benefit
from insurance products amounting to approximately £2 billion.
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We now turn to the top 10 countries in terms of non-price competitiveness for each
sector. In 2013, France had 55 sectors (out of 102 analysed) in the OECD ‘top 10’ (Fig-
ure 3), placing it in seventh position overall in the OECD, a relatively good (and stable)
position78. The graph shows that Germany is out in front with 85 sectors in the 'top 10'.
Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Japan are all slightly
BOX 4: MEASURING NON-PRICE COMPETITIVENESS
Bas, Martin and Mayer (2014) have adapted the method developed by Khanelwal,
Schott and Wei (2013) in order to estimate the quality of exported products at the
HS-6 level (over 5,000 products) using bilateral international trade data (Bas et al,
2014; Khandelwal et al, 2013). The data used here is that of BACI, a database de-
veloped by the CEPII based on the United Nations’ COMTRADE data (see Gaulier and
Zignago, 2010). Estimates concentrate on the 50 exporting and importing countries
with the highest flows of trade (the list of countries is set out in Bas et al, 2014). To
compare countries similar to France, we have concentrated on exporting countries
which are members of the OECD.
Non-price competitiveness is estimated on the basis of a demand function which
depends negatively on prices, with a constant elasticity of substitution, and posi-
tively on non-price products’ attributes (including perceived quality):
xkint + σk pkint = ßPIBit + λDin + αknt + εkint
where xkint and pkint are logarithms of the quantity and price (unit values) of a prod-
uct k exported by country i to destination n in year t.
The method has been changed to take into account bilateral determinants of inter-
national trade such as distance, shared language, border effects and colonial links,
grouped together in the term Din. In addition, the fixed effect αknt includes demand
as well as the degree of competition in the destination country. Finally, the equation
controls for the effect of the country of origin’s size. The elasticity of substitution
between products σk is from Broda and Weinstein (2006).
Estimated non-price competitiveness qkint is the residual of the equation εkint stan-
dardised by the elasticity of the corresponding product: qknt - εkint/(σk - 1). An
equivalent residual reveals higher non-price competitiveness when related to prod-
ucts with low elasticities for which price variations have little impact on sales. This
measure of non-price competitiveness is then aggregated by sector (102 sectors).
78. The conclusion about relatively high export unit values in the case of France is conﬁrmed by Fontagné et al (2008).
The authors deal with non-European trade.
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ahead of France but to a lesser degree (between 57 and 65 products). The USA per-
formed slightly less well than France (51 products).Figure 4a breaks down the market
share variations of several OECD countries into variations resulting from price compet-
itiveness and non-price competitiveness, for the period 2000-13. Here we examine
market share compared to the OECD average, and therefore between comparable coun-
tries. This figure compares Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA on the one hand,
which lost greater market share than the OECD average, and Germany and above all
Poland on the other hand, which lost less than average market share and even gained
market share (in the case of Poland and more generally central and eastern European
countries, Mexico and Turkey which are not represented on the graph). In both cases,
changes in market share seem to be primarily explained by non-price competitiveness,
which decreased in the first group and increased in the second. France finds itself in
Table 3: 10 leading sectors for non-price competitiveness, France and Germany, 2013
Market share
within OECD
(%)
Sector share of
total country
exports (%)
Non-price
competitive-
ness*
OECD ranking
FRANCE
Aeronautics 10.2 3.4 2.4 1
Leather goods 25.6 1.3 7.3 2
Wine 28.0 2.4 2.2 3
Electrical distribution equipment 6.0 1.7 4.5 3
Automotive spare parts 6.2 6.0 1.4 5
Dairy products 14.6 2.2 1.2 5
Clothing 9.3 1.1 1.2 5
Plastics 7.5 3.9 1.1 7
Other metal products 5.8 2.2 1.2 7
Plastic products 6.4 2.8 1.3 8
GERMANY
Automotive spare parts 22.6 8.0 3.4 1
Non-ferrous metals 16.4 3.6 1.4 1
Plastic products 20.4 3.3 2.8 1
Automotive vehicles 16.8 3.0 1.6 1
Other metal products 21.5 3.0 2.2 1
Electrical distribution equipment 24.2 2.5 34.2 1
Machinery, other 20.7 2.3 3.7 1
Machine-tools 27.4 2.3 2.1 1
Precision instruments 21.1 2.2 21.4 1
Electronic components 17.1 1.8 25.6 1
Source: MAPCOMPETE. Note: * = price equivalent. For example, the figure ‘2’ means that in that sector, exporters
may set prices that are twice as high as they would be if their quality was identical to the average for
OECD countries.
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an intermediate position which, nonetheless, masks contrasting changes between
sectors79 and over time.
Figure 3: Number of sectors by country in the top 10 for non-price competitiveness,
2000, 2007 and 2013
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
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79. The top two French sectors in terms of non-price competitiveness – aeronautics and leather goods – have shown
strong increases in competitiveness since 2000. See http://www.cae-eco.fr.
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Figure 4: Relative annual variations in market share and price and non-price
competitiveness component, %
Source: MAPCOMPETE. Note: Relative change compared with the OECD average.
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6.2.2 ...but has dropped in several sectors since 2008
From 2000-07, French market share dropped a little less rapidly than the OECD average
(Figure 4b). Over this period, French price competitiveness worsened (partly because
of the appreciation of the euro), but this was offset by a net increase in non-price com-
petitiveness. Over this same period, Germany improved its price competitiveness
thanks to wage moderation and the delocalisation of the less-competitive segments
of its production chain. But the marked increase in its non-price competitiveness
demonstrates that Germany used this period to increase the quality of its products.
This observation downplays the view that Germany has carried out a strategy based
solely on reducing related costs over this period.From 2008-13, French performance
was far below the OECD average, even though its price competitiveness improved
slightly (Figure 4c). Its non-price competitive greatly deteriorated. It is possible that
the pre-2008 non-price competitiveness improvement was primarily driven by a se-
lection effect: given the decline of price competitiveness during this period, only the
most productive exporters and those with high non-price competitiveness were able
to survive, which is consistent with the drop in the number of exporters recorded up
to 2009 (Figure 2) and the drop in industry mark-up rates80. As of 2008, while France’s
cost-competitiveness improved slightly, the lack of innovation, investment and an up-
market shift (difficult when mark-ups are weak) seem to have led to a non-price com-
petitiveness fall-out. Although still in the top 10, a number of sectors have declined for
France: electrical distribution equipment, wine, automotive spare parts and furnishings.
Observation 4. Among OECD countries, France enjoys relatively good (7th in the
OECD) non-price competitiveness, but this competitiveness has declined
since 2008. Germany is in pole position among OECD countries.
6.3 How can market share be regained?
Debates on competitiveness tend to focus on less-important explanations of France’s
export underachievement (poor geographic or sectoral specialisation, credit con-
straints or insufficient exporter support) and give insufficient prominence to the most
important quantitative factor: the quality/price ratio of products.
80. See Martin and Méjean (2014) and Aghion et al (2014).
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6.3.1 Price competitiveness
Price competitiveness is understood differently according to whether we are looking
at the euro-area markets or the non-euro area, even if we need to put this distinction
into perspective insofar as France is in competition with countries in the euro area in
non-euro area markets.
6.3.1.1 Exchange rate
Competitiveness in non-euro area markets strongly depends on the euro exchange
rate. Estimates of data from French companies suggest that, all other things being
equal, a 10 percent depreciation of the euro compared to a partner country outside of
the euro area increases the sales value of the average exporting company to that coun-
try by some 5 to 6 percent. This increase – which generally takes place in the same
year as the depreciation – arises mainly from an increase in export volumes (4 to 5
percent) and the remainder (0.5 to 1 percent) from an increase in mark-ups on each
unit sold (via a slight increase in the price in euro)81. Overall, the impact of a 10 percent
depreciation of the euro on the value of exports is greater – some 7 to 8 percent – be-
cause this depreciation not only improves the position of exporters already in the mar-
ket but also encourages new companies to enter export markets. From March 2014 to
March 2015, France’s effective exchange rate depreciated by approximately 6 percent.
Applying a simple rule of three suggests that our exports should increase by 4 to 5
percent.
6.3.1.2 Labour and intermediate consumption
What then are the cost components thanks to which French economic policy can stand
out from its competitors in the euro area? The debate tends to focus on direct labour
costs in exporting sectors, while a breakdown of the value-added of exports shows
that only 23 percent of export value is attributable to labour costs in the export sector
directly concerned. Labour costs in other areas used in domestic intermediate con-
sumption represents 21 percent of export value. The remaining 56 percent comes from
intermediate consumption (excluding labour costs from domestic intermediate con-
sumption) including imported products (25 percent of export values). These figures
encourage an examination of imports as a way of optimising the value chain, of
smoothly increasing the price of electricity which weighs heavily on some exports82
81. See Bénassy-Quéré et al (2014).
82. See Bureau et al (2013).
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and, finally, of controlling the costs associated with services, which have increased
greatly over the past 10 years compared to Germany, not only because of labour costs
but also because of the still high level of obstacles to competition in the service sector83.
More generally, it should be emphasised that the entire French economy contributes
to the creation of price compe titiveness. Improving the way that the housing market
works, for example, contributes to competitiveness insofar as an increase in rents and
property prices weighs heavily on household budgets and over time leads to increases
in salaries. This line of reasoning can be extended to all services in the sheltered sector
including government offices: the entire French economy is affected by the question
of price competitiveness, not just front-line exporting companies.
6.3.1.3 ‘CICE targeting’
The Employment Competitiveness Tax Credit (CICE) implemented at the start of 2013
following the Gallois report on French industrial competitiveness84, has as its explicit
aim the stimulation of employment and improvement of business competitiveness.
We concentrate here on this second objective.
The yearly €20 billion of CICE tax credits represents, in principle, an overall reduction
in labour costs of 3 percent for those companies concerned. Exporting companies
therefore have a choice between lowering their export price and therefore increasing
their price competitiveness and market share, or raising their mark-ups and offering
wage increases. We still lack hindsight in knowing how French companies have re-
acted, although the results of surveys shed some light85. But we know that the CICE
covers wages up to 2.5 times the legal minimum salary (SMIC), a threshold chosen in
order to affect the industrial companies accounting for a large share of exports and
whose employees are, on average, paid more than in the service industries. At these
levels of remuneration, (skilled) employees face a relatively low risk of unemployment:
recent secondary school graduates are faced with an unemployment rate close to 5
percent. In these circumstances exemptions reducing, a priori, labour costs by 1 per-
cent could result in an increase in salaries of 0.9 percent86. A posteriori, the fall in labour
83. See the Conseil d’analyse économique (2014).
84. Gallois (2012).
85. See INSEE outlook paper on the use of CICE tax credits (2014). Generally, companies state that they will use this
tax credit to increase their operating proﬁts; for 58 percent of industrial companies and 52 percent of service
companies this extra resource will be used mostly for investment.
86. Cahuc and Carcillo (2014). See also Plane (2012) or Bock et al (2015), which uses a decreasingly elastic proﬁle
of employment in relation to cost according to wage level.
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costs would therefore only be 0.1 percent for employees subject to a low unemploy-
ment rate. The possible gain in price competitiveness or increase in mark-ups would
therefore be limited. These results suggest that the effect of CICE on wage dynamics
should be assessed and, if this analysis were to show a stronger growth in wages
above 1.5 times the legal minimum wage after these tax credits have been set up, then
the benefit of these tax credits and the responsibility agreement should be re-focused
on wages lower than 1.5 times the legal minimum.
The counter-argument generally put forward is that decreasing costs on low wages pri-
marily benefits the non-tradable sector – retail or personal services, for example. Ex-
porting companies, which are generally industrial companies, employ more workers
at relatively high salaries. By not affecting higher salaries, the CICE tax credit would be
missing its competitiveness objective. However, as we have seen, a large proportion
of export value is made up of incorporated services, including a share of low-skilled
services (cleaning, security, catering and transport). A decrease in the cost of low-
skilled labour is therefore an important component of price competitiveness.
Recommendation1: Assess the impact of CICE on wage dynamics. If there is
stronger growth in relatively high wages after CICE tax credits have been im-
plemented then reductions in social security contributions should be con-
centrated on lower wages.
6.3.2 Non-price competitiveness
Non-price competitiveness policies largely overlap with productivity policies which
also involve stimulating innovation and increasing quality. This is why we can here
refer to the recommendations made by the French Conseil d’analyse économique on
training and research87. This is, in particular, the case with professional training, which
should also be considered as an investment for increased competitiveness and an up-
market shift.
However, as the example of luxury goods demonstrates, brands play a specific role in
exports by offsetting cost disadvantages and eliminating the handicap of geographic
distance. Intellectual property rights issues should be a priority in international trade
negotiations in which Europe is engaged, and this should be clearly affirmed by the
French authorities. The rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) by
the European Parliament in July 2012 is, from this point of view, particularly concern-
87. Artus et al (2014); Fontagné et al (2014).
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ing, in contrast to its signature in 2011 by Canada, the USA, Japan, Korea, Singapore,
New Zealand and Morocco.
Recommendation 2: Make defending intellectual property rights a priority in in-
ternational negotiations.
However, productivity is not just a question of design and innovation. Recent studies
suggest that an important part (between one quarter and one third) of differences in
productivity between companies and between countries is simply due to the quality
of company management88. France ranks seventh among OECD countries in terms of
the average quality of its company management. Compared with countries like Ger-
many or the USA, it is nevertheless characterised by a large proportion of small com-
panies with weaker management quality on average and therefore lower productivity.
Lastly, growth in the productivity, and therefore competitiveness, of a country comes
largely (50 percent according to recent studies) from reallocating production factors
from under-productive to more-productive companies. Rigidity in the employment and
goods markets limits this reallocation89. Measured at company level for each French
industrial sector, the average difference between wages and productivity increased
by almost 15 percent in real terms between 2002 and 200790. This phenomenon of
companies not working at optimum size is most marked at around 50 employees, re-
flecting a threshold effect. But this worsening is no more marked in the area of this
threshold. Other possibilities need therefore be considered such as the cost of redun-
dancies, bankruptcy law and goods and services market regulations91.
Recommendation 3: In deliberations on structural reforms, the impact of these
reforms on the reallocation of production factors (labour and capital) to the
more productive companies should be explicitly taken into consideration.
Finally we can see that export performance is, to a great extent, a simple reflection of
the efficiency of the national production system, such that competitiveness policies
overlap with policies to improve productivity.
88. See Bloom et al (2014).
89. Aghion et al (2008) show the link between rigidity in the labour and goods markets and productivity. Dostie et al
(2009) suggest that the reallocation of production factors could explain between 50 and 70 percent of overall
growth in productivity of these factors.
90. Fontagné and Santoni (2015).
91. A recent International Monetary Fund study demonstrates that regulations reducing competitiveness on the goods
and services market have a negative impact on productivity growth. See International Monetary Fund (2015) World
Economic Outlook, pp104-107.
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7 Global value chains and GDP
growth in the post-crisis
context
Carlo Altomonte, Italo Colantone and Elena Zaurino
7.1 Introduction
“...one of the most perplexing questions facing economists in recent years:
does a continuing slowdown in the growth of international commerce means
globalisation has peaked?” (‘IMF and World Bank warn of “peak trade”’, Financial
Times, 2014).
The recent financial crisis generated a ‘Great Trade Collapse’ (Baldwin, 2009) in 2008-
09, followed by a brisk recovery in 2010. Since then, however, international trade has
grown at a markedly slower pace than in the previous fifteen years, a period in which
yearly trade growth at times even doubled global GDP growth. Post-crisis, the growth
of world exports has essentially been in line with GDP growth – slightly above or below
depending on the data used (ie volume versus nominal flows). This pattern has been
referred to as the ‘Global Trade Slowdown’, and has attracted the attention of econo-
mists and policymakers92. Trade is widely recognised as an important driver of growth,
so there is a concern that the current slowdown might hurt growth prospects in the
coming years.
The ongoing debate is essentially focusing on the causes of the trade slowdown. Un-
covering the causes might help us understand whether the slowdown is a temporary
phenomenon related to the economic cycle, or it represents a ‘new normal’ resulting
from a structural change in global activities. According to many observers, a structural
reason behind the trade slowdown could be related to the role of global value chains
92. See, among others, 'A troubling trajectory', The Economist, 13 December 2014.
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(GVCs), ie the breaking-up of production processes into ever-narrower discreet activi-
ties and tasks, combined with the dispersion of these activities and tasks across coun-
tries. The development of GVCs was one of the key factors behind fast trade growth
starting from the 1990s. However, recent contributions suggest that the expansion of
GVCs might have levelled off already before the crisis, thus contributing to a structural
reduction in the elasticity of trade with respect to GDP (Al-Haschimi et al, 2015; Con-
stantinescu et al, 2015). According to this view, the current trade slowdown is then
likely to be largely ascribable to structural, GVC-related reasons, rather than cyclical
ones. In this chapter, we argue that, even if trade dynamics can largely be explained
by the development of GVCs, cyclical factors can also be at play in the adjustment of
GVCs to the post-crisis context. In particular, exploiting a dataset on trade in value
added by Wang et al (2013), we show that the crisis hit different components of trade
in different ways, with two main findings: (1) the components of trade that are more
directly linked to GVCs have been more heavily affected; (2) these components display
the slowest speed of cyclical adjustment, ie it takes more time for them to recover from
a negative shock (about six years). The combination of these factors sheds light on
an additional cause of the trade slowdown, which might therefore have a greater cycli-
cal component than so far thought, even as part of a GVC-related explanation. Overall,
our results suggest that the trade slowdown is likely to be partly reabsorbed over the
coming years, at least to the extent that GVC dynamics are responsible for it.
7.2 GDP vs. export growth and the role of GVCs
Figure 1 shows the evolution of world exports and GDP in volumes, from 2001 to 2013.
Both indexes have 2008 as a base year, denoting the pre-crisis peak. Trade growth
was clearly much higher than GDP growth until the crisis: 6 percent against 2.8 percent.
The ‘Great Trade Collapse’ is then evident in 2009, when global exports dropped by al-
most 10 percent, much more than the drop in GDP. This was the biggest drop in trade
since the Second World War. The trade slump starting in November 2008 was even
much steeper than during the Great Depression, which ultimately led to a larger trade
shock worldwide. In fact, over the Great Depression, world trade took almost two years
to fall as much as it did in the first nine months of the last financial crisis (Eichengreen
and O’Rourke, 2009). Global exports rebounded strongly in 2010, but since then their
growth has been essentially in line with GDP growth, leading to the ‘Global Trade Slow-
down’ puzzle93.
93. See Hoekman (2015) for an extensive treatment of this issue.
Figure 1: GDP and exports in volumes - index 2008=100
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Some studies have attributed much of the current trade slowdown to cyclical factors,
in particular weak (import) demand in European Union countries, which are recovering
from the crisis in a very slow and anaemic way (Boz et al, 2014; Gavyn, 2013). As the
EU accounts for about 35 percent of global trade, any slowdown in the EU has a sub-
stantial impact on world figures. Another cyclical explanation is related to the changing
composition of GDP during the crisis, which has often witnessed a reduction in the in-
vestment component in favour of public expenditure. Since investment is more trade-
intensive than public expenditure, such a compositional shift might explain part of the
trade slowdown (Constantinescu et al, 2015). A third cyclical explanation relates to
the role of trade finance. Access to finance is crucial for firms’ exporting activities (eg
Chor and Manova, 2012). The credit crunch arising from the financial crisis was one of
the reasons for the trade collapse in 2009, and is likely to have hampered export
growth subsequently, as banks have de-leveraged and rebuilt their balance sheets.
Overall, to the extent that such cyclical drivers are responsible for the trade slowdown,
we should observe a convergence back to faster trade growth as the global economy
fully recovers from the crisis.
Another reason for the trade slowdown might be the reduced speed of trade liberali-
sation. High trade growth from the 1990s onwards was crucially driven by the suc-
cessful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, and by the integration of China and
the former Soviet countries into global markets (Bussière and Schnatz, 2009). The
Doha round has failed to deliver and this momentum has diminished over time. More-
over, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, many governments have adopted protec-
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tionist measures, which might also explain part of the slowdown (Evenett and Wer-
melinger, 2010; Evenett and Fritz, 2015).
A more structural explanation is related to the role of global value chains, the develop-
ment of which was a key factor behind fast trade growth before the crisis. According
to, for example, Al-Haschimi et al (2015) and Constantinescu et al (2015), this expan-
sion process might have now levelled off, especially for China and the US, leading to a
structural reduction in the elasticity of trade to GDP. 
An extensive literature exists on the emergence of GVCs, which have changed the very
nature of international trade94. Since the 1990s, trade has increasingly involved mul-
tiple flows of inputs and semi-finished products across borders, as different production
steps were moved to different countries. This in turn has led to trade growing much
faster than GDP, also as a result of so-called ‘double counting’ in gross trade figures.
The underlying idea is very simple. Think about an input ‘x’, which is produced in coun-
try A. Imagine that this input is exported to country B, where it is assembled with other
components into a semi-finished product ‘y’. The latter is then exported to country C,
where it is incorporated into the final product ‘z’, which is then exported to country D
for final consumption. In this example, the value of the input ‘x’ has contributed three
times to global (gross) export flows, while only once to global GDP, ie in the value-
added of country A. Such double counting, which is essentially driven by GVCs, has
been estimated to account for about 25 percent of gross trade flows (Koopman et al,
2014). 
In light of the above discussion, the gross export figures of any country have become
less and less informative over time, especially if one is interested in the contribution
that exports make to domestic GDP growth. Economists have thus recently developed
a methodology for decomposing each trade flow into its different value added compo-
nents, eg domestic versus foreign value added (Koopman et al, 2014; Wang et al,
2013). In what follows, we explain and make use of the decomposition by Wang et al
(2013), trying to uncover whether different components of trade have been affected
differently by the crisis. We will also study their adjustment behaviour after the shock,
uncovering specific patterns that contribute to a cyclical, GVC-related explanation of
the global trade slowdown.
94. A survey on the role and impact of global value chains can be found in Veugelers (2013), and in Amador and Di
Mauro (2015).
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7.3 GVCs and trade in value added
In a world characterised by GVCs, gross exports from country A to country B include
not only domestic value added generated in A, but also foreign value added generated
in any other country. Exports from country A to country B might even include value
added generated in B, which has first been embodied in inputs exported abroad and
is finally returning home within final goods (or more advanced intermediates). Being
able to decompose gross export flows into their different value added components is
key for our analysis. To do so, we rely on the methodology recently developed by Wang
et al (2013). Essentially, given a gross export flow equal to 100 from the home country
A to the partner country B, this methodology allows us to uncover which share of the
total gross flow corresponds to each value added component, such as domestic value
added or foreign value added. In particular, we focus on four main value added com-
ponents (Figure 2). The sum of these four components is always equal to the corre-
sponding gross flow95:
• Domestic value added (DVA): the value added generated in the exporting home
country (HC) which is finally absorbed abroad. 
• Domestic value added ﬁrst exported but eventually returned home (RDV): the do-
mestic value added embodied in the export flows which returns home. It includes
the export of intermediates that are processed abroad and return home, both as
final and as intermediate goods. 
• Foreign value added (FVA): the foreign value added embodied in domestic exports,
both in final goods and in intermediates.
• Pure double counting (PDC): the portion of gross exports accounted for by interme-
diates crossing borders several times before being finally absorbed. PDC may in-
clude value added generated both in the home country (HC) and abroad, and can
be considered as a sort of indicator for the extent of production-sharing across coun-
tries (Wang et al, 2013).
Wang et al (2013) have performed the decomposition of export flows for the period
1995-2011, considering the 40 countries covered by the WIOD database, as reported
in the Annex96. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on the four main components, ob-
95. As discussed by Wang et al (2013), their methodology is backward-linkage based. As such, it allows for a precise
decomposition of the disaggregated export ﬂows from each country to any partner country, at the industry-level.
As long as one focuses on the aggregate export ﬂows of each country, as we do later in our analysis, the Wang et
al (2013) decomposition is equivalent to that of Koopman et al (2014).
96 .The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) is a public database containing world input-output tables and export data
(http://www.wiod.org/new_site/home.htm). We are very grateful to Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei and Kunfu Zhu for having
shared with us their data on export decomposition.
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tained by decomposing the gross exports of each country towards all its partners. Do-
mestic value added (DVA) accounts on average for the greatest share of gross exports,
77 percent, followed by foreign value added (FVA), with 16 percent, and by pure double
counting (PDC), with 6 percent. The standard deviations reveal however a substantial
degree of heterogeneity across export flows, which will be useful in our empirical
analysis. RDV is essentially negligible for our purposes, as it makes up only 0.4 percent
of exports on average. Therefore, we will not consider its specific dynamics in the fol-
lowing analyses.
Figure 2: Gross exports accounting: major categories
Source: Wang et al (2013).
In previous studies, the share of FVA embedded in goods and services exported abroad
has been used as a proxy for the fragmentation of production processes across borders
(Amador et al, 2015). Exploiting the decomposition by Wang et al (2013), we are able
to improve on this measure by considering also the dynamics of pure double counting
(PDC). FVA and PDC are the two components of exports that are most directly related
to the participation of a country in global value chains, while DVA represents somehow
a more traditional component of exports.
Figure 3 shows the growth of gross exports and its components between 2001 and
2011. Export growth is comprised between the growth rates of its components.
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Gross exports
(E*)
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abroad
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exported but
eventually
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Foreign value-
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counted terms
(PDC)
Table 1: Export components: descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev Min Max
Share of DVA 680 0.77 0.08 0.60 0.93
Share of RDV 680 0.004 0.01 0.00 0.04
Share of FVA 680 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.30
Share of PDC 680 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.12
Source: MAPCOMPETE based on Wang et al (2013) data.
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Nevertheless, the growth rates of the different components show a considerable
heterogeneous variation over time, pointing at non-obvious compositional effects on
the overall pattern of export growth. Between 2003 and 2008, FVA and especially PDC
grew faster than gross export flows. Since these components of exports are directly
related to GVCs, such evidence is consistent with the global expansion of global value
chains that took place over this period.
In 2009, as already discussed, there was a sudden drop in trade, and all components
exhibited substantial negative growth rates (in nominal terms) in that year. However,
FVA and PDC witnessed a much larger reduction than DVA. In particular, while DVA
dropped by 19 percent, FVA dropped by 32 percent, and PDC by a striking 50 percent.
In other words, the components of exports that are most directly related to GVCs were
the ones most affected by the crisis.
Figure 3: Export components growth
Source: MAPCOMPETE based on Wang et al (2013) data.
Our finding of a larger collapse for GVC-related trade is consistent with earlier studies.
In particular, Gangnes et al (2014) identified two possible channels through which
GVCs might increase the responsiveness of trade to an income shock, namely a com-
position and a supply-chain effect. The composition effect is due to the fact that GVC-
related trade is concentrated in durable goods industries, which typically display high
income elasticities. Indeed, Eaton et al (2011) show that a reduction in spending on
durable goods during 2008-09 aggravated the downturn, a finding that supports the
composition-effect hypothesis. The supply-chain effect comes instead from higher in-
ventory holdings that GVC-related trade entails. For instance, Alessandria et al (2010)
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and Bems et al (2011) discuss how inventory adjustments induced by GVCs might
have increased the impact of the crisis on trade, because of the disproportionately
large inventories of imported inputs. Altomonte et al (2012) also stress the importance
of the adjustment of inventories within supply chains. Specifically, they show that
trade between related parties (ie within GVCs) is characterised by a faster drop com-
pared to trade between unrelated parties. This is because, for related-parties, a reduc-
tion in final demand recorded by a firm operating down the value chain is quickly
transmitted up to its suppliers. Trade in intermediates thus declines more rapidly than
trade in final goods (and demand), through a so-called ‘bullwhip effect’.
Nagengast and Stehrer (2015) apply a structural decomposition to value-added trade
data from WIOD, and explore the role of changes in the international organisation of
production as an additional variable explaining the trade collapse. They find that the
drop in the overall level of demand accounted for roughly a quarter of the decline in
value added exports, while just under one third was due to compositional changes in
final demand. As a result, changes in vertical specialisation accounted for almost half
of the great trade collapse, with the decline in international production-sharing during
the crisis partly accounting for the observed decrease in global trade elasticities in
the 2000s compared to the 1990s, a result in line with the previously discussed find-
ings of Constantinescu et al (2015).
From this analysis of the literature, we can conclude that GVCs seem to have had a
twofold impact on the dynamics of trade flows. They have magnified the responsive-
ness of trade to income shocks, through the composition and supply-chain channels
discussed above. In addition, to the extent that GVC expansion was levelling-off already
before the crisis, they might have been exerting a dampening effect on trade growth,
thus explaining in a structural way the global trade slowdown. And yet, given our novel
evidence on the decomposed value-added flows that make up gross exports, it could
also be the case that the GVC-related components of trade, which have been so inten-
sively hit by the crisis, are still on a (slower) recovery path, without necessarily having
undergone a structural slowdown. In what follows, we investigate this idea by using
our value added trade data within an error correction model analysis.
7.4 An error correction model for value added trade
We estimate an error correction model (ECM) in order to study the relationship between
gross exports, their different components and GDP at the country-level. Our approach
follows previous studies in the literature, for instance Constantinescu et al (2015). Es-
sentially, an ECM analysis of exports and GDP produces three interesting results: (1)
125
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an estimate of the long-run elasticity of exports to GDP, ie their long-term relationship;
(2) an estimate of the short-run elasticity of exports to GDP, ie their immediate respon-
siveness after an income shock; (3) an estimate of the speed of adjustment of exports
back to their long-term relationship after an income shock, ie how much time it takes
for exports to converge again to the equilibrium, ceteris paribus.
Our ECM analysis relies on the value added trade data previously described. That is,
we work with a panel of yearly aggregate exports from each country to all of its trading
partners97. For each gross export flow, we exploit the breakdown into the three relevant
value-added components: DVA, FVA and PDC. Our data spans the period 1995-2011.
However, in our baseline estimations we drop the year 2009, which is a clear outlier,
in order to avoid the risk of our results being biased by extreme values, as suggested
by Maddala and In-Moo (1998)98. Our specification of the ECM closely follows Gruber
et al (2011) and Constantinescu et al (2015). Box 1 describes the estimating equation.
Table 2 reports the results of the ECM estimated on gross exports. The short-run elas-
ticity is equal to 0.58, meaning that a drop in GDP by 1 percent is associated with a
drop in exports of about 0.6 percent. The coefficient on lagged exports is instead not
significantly different from zero. Results point to a long-term positive relationship be-
tween exports and GDP, as we were expecting. In particular, the coefficient on lagged
GDP (ie the long-run elasticity of exports) suggests that a 1 percent increase in GDP is
associated with higher exports by around 1.3 percent. Finally, the speed of adjustment
has a negative coefficient of about 0.22, pointing to adjustment dynamics spanning
about five years after a shock, ceteris paribus.
97. The cross-sectional dimension of our data is important for the identiﬁcation, and compensates for the unavailability
of quarterly data on value added trade. We have followed Blackburne and Frank (2007) and estimated a non-
stationary heterogeneous panel data ECM based on the dynamic ﬁxed-effect estimator. This methodology assumes
that the coefﬁcients of the cointegrating vector are equal across all panels, and that short-run and long-run
coefﬁcients are the same across groups. In a robustness check, we have replicated the same regressions also
with mean-group estimators, which relax some of the stringent assumptions of the error-correction model with
ﬁxed effects, without signiﬁcant differences in our results. Technically, there are two fundamental steps we had
to undertake before proceeding with the estimation of an ECM: (1) verifying that the time-series of GDP, export and
its components are integrated of the same order through a unit-root test, the Harris-Tzavalis one, speciﬁcally
developed for panel models; (2) checking that the series are cointegrated (Wasterlund cointegration test for panel
data). The results, available upon request, suggest that these two preliminary conditions are fulﬁlled.
98. We discuss later in the chapter how including 2009 changes some of the estimated coefﬁcients. Our main result
is essentially unaffected.
MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS  THE POST-CRISIS CONTEXT
127
Our results are in line with earlier studies, especially with Constantinescu et al (2015).
In particular, the magnitude of the estimated long-run elasticity, 1.3, is the same as
they found for the period 2001-13. Our estimated speed of adjustment is also very
close to theirs (0.3), notwithstanding the differences in the data employed. In fact,
they work with global exports, exploiting the long time-dimension of their data (1970-
BOX 1: THE ERROR CORRECTION MODEL
The ECM equation is specified as follows:
Δexportit = α + φ(exportit-1 – ßGDPit-1) + γ1ΔGDPit + γ2Δexportit-1 + εit
The term in brackets on the right hand side represents the co-integrating vector, ie
the long-term relationship between exports and GDP, here represented by the (sta-
tionary) lagged residual of the regression of exports on GDP. The coefficient φ de-
notes the speed of adjustment of exports to the long-run equilibrium relationship.
ß represents the long-run elasticity of exports to GDP. γ1 is the short-run elasticity
of exports to GDP, ie the responsiveness to contemporaneous income shocks. To
better take into account the dynamics of exports, we also control for export growth
in the previous period (coefficient γ2), as in Gruber et al (2011). α is a constant and
ε is an error term. In all regressions, residuals are clustered at the country level. All
variables are in logarithms.
Table 2: Estimation results: ECM with gross exports
Dependent variable: Gross exports growth
Intercept (α) -1.048*** 
(0.23)
Long-run elasticity (ß) 1.306*** 
(0.09)
Speed of adjustment (φ) -0.215***
(0.05)
Short-run elasticity ( ) 0.581*** 
(0.06)
Lagged export growth (γ2) -0.022
(0.04)
R-squared 0.43
N. of observations 640
Source: MAPCOMPETE
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2013), while we employ country-level exports for the period 1995-2011, exploiting
the cross-sectional nature of our database for identification.
Overall, our results seem to support the idea that, in the medium-term, global export
growth could revert back to its long-run equilibrium relationship with GDP growth. How-
ever, the crisis might have led to a structural change in the trade-GDP relationship, and
thus the same long-run equilibrium relationship might have changed. It is clearly too
early to evaluate this, given the limited amount of data points available after 2009.
Moreover, the analyses undertaken so far, including ours, treat GDP as exogenous with
respect to trade outcomes, whereas the two variables are clearly endogenous. Results
should thus be interpreted with some caution. 
Nevertheless, our data allows us to investigate more in depth the adjustment dynamics
of trade in the post-crisis context with respect to the rest of the literature, by analysing
separately how the different components of exports respond to changes in GDP. This
is key to better understand the role of GVCs in explaining the global trade slowdown.
Indeed, we have found that FVA and PDC –the components of trade most directly re-
lated to GVCs – dropped much more than DVA in 2009. If on top of that we would find
that the GVC-related components of trade adjust more slowly to income shocks, then
we would shed light on an additional explanation for the global trade slowdown. This
explanation would be cyclical in nature rather than structural, thus departing from what
has been suggested so far on the role of GVCs.
Table 3 reports the results from three ECM estimations, one for each relevant compo-
nent of gross exports: DVA, FVA and PDC. The specification is essentially the same as
in Box 1, but here we employ the value-added trade components instead of gross ex-
ports99.
Two interesting results emerge. First, FVA and PDC have a higher long-run elasticity
with respect to GDP. This is consistent with the view that the emergence of GVCs has
been an important driver for the fast trade growth observed since the 1990s. In par-
ticular, a 1 percent increase in GDP is associated with an almost double increase in the
pure double counting term (PDC), in line with the interpretation that much of trade
growth has been related to inputs and semi-finished products crossing borders multi-
ple times as GVCs spread across countries.
99. As before, for each component of exports we have run the necessary preliminary tests before estimating the ECM,
always detecting the required conditions. See the previous methodological footnote. Results are available on
request.
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The second important result is that FVA and PDC exhibit a significantly lower speed of
adjustment than DVA. The estimated coefficients suggest that it takes about six years
for FVA and PDC to converge after a shock, ceteris paribus, against slightly more than
four years for DVA. As previously anticipated, considering that FVA and PDC dropped
by more than DVA in 2009, such evidence of a slower adjustment sheds light on a new
cyclical explanation for the trade slowdown, as the hardest-hit components of trade
are also the slowest to recover100.
Table 3: Estimation results: ECM with export components
Export Components  Growth
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
Dependent variable: DVA FVA PDC
Intercept (α) -0.980*** -1.439*** -2.414*** 
(0.20) (0.36) (0.58)
Long-run elasticity (ß) 1.213*** 1.503*** 1.994*** 
(0.07) (0.18) (0.22)
Speed of adjustment (φ) -0.235*** -0.166*** -0.155***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Short-run elasticity (γ1) 0.650 *** 0.304*** 0.387***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Lagged DVA growth -0.043
(0.04)
Lagged FVA growth 0.013
(0.04)
Lagged PDC growth -0.072*
(0.04)
R-squared 0.53  0.20  0.19
N. of observations 640 640 640
Source: MAPCOMPETE.
100. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimated short-run elasticities for FVA and PDC are lower than that for DVA (0.30 and
0.39, respectively, vs. 0.65). This result changes if we include 2009 in the analysis, consistent with the descriptive
evidence presented before. In fact, we then ﬁnd a short-run elasticity of 1.1 for PDC, 0.78 for FVA, and 0.86 for DVA.
The evidence on a lower speed of adjustment for FVA and PDC is preserved also when including the year 2009.
Results keep holding also when estimating the ECM for the 1995-2008 period only.
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7.5 Conclusion
We have provided additional evidence on the ‘Global Trade Slowdown’. Specifically, we
have exploited a new dataset on value added trade in order to shed light on an addi-
tional cyclical driver of the slowdown, which is related to global value chains. In par-
ticular, we have shown that those components of trade that are most directly related
to GVCs experienced the largest drop during the ‘Great Trade Collapse’ of 2009. More-
over, these components also exhibit the slowest speed of adjustment after an income
shock. Taken together, these two pieces of evidence suggest that at least part of the
GVC-induced trade slowdown is cyclical in nature, and might be re-absorbed in the
coming years. In other words, GVCs might not just be having a structural dampening
effect on trade growth, as suggested so far, because of their potential convergence to-
wards a global-scale equilibrium.
Our results have two implications for policy. First, to the extent that trade is a driver of
economic growth, it is important that policies be put in place to smooth the adjustment
process of trade back to its long-term relationship with GDP. This entails exerting more
effort in multilateral negotiations within the Doha round, and on bilateral agreements
such as the EU/US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. These agreements
are in fact instrumental to trade facilitation, and to the reduction of non-tariff barriers. 
A second implication is related to the fact that GVCs are known to be relatively more
important in some industries (eg automotive or chemicals) than in others (eg food).
Therefore, country-specific patterns of the trade-GDP relationship are likely to depend
on each country’s industry specialisation. In particular, our analysis suggests that
those countries that are relatively more specialized in GVCs-intensive industries (eg
France or Germany) may expect their export slowdown to be less structural than
thought so far. In fact, while part of the slowdown is certainly likely to depend on the
deceleration of GVCs expansion, there seems to be also a GVC-induced cyclical com-
ponent of the slowdown that is likely to be re-absorbed over time. By the same token,
countries in which GVCs play a relatively lesser role (eg Portugal or Finland) might ex-
pect to experience a relatively more persistent trade slowdown.
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ANNEX
List of countries in the WIOD sample.
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Country: code and name
AUS Australia IRL Ireland
AUT Austria ITA Italy
BEL Belgium JPN Japan
BGR Bulgaria KOR South Korea
BRA Brazil LTU Lithuania
CAN Canada LUX Luxembourg
CHN China LVA Latvia
CYP Cyprus MEX Mexico
CZE Czech MLT Malta
DEU Germany NLD Netherlands
DNK Denmark POL Poland
ESP Spain PRT Portugal
EST Estonia ROM Romania
FIN Finland RUS Russia
FRA France SVK Slovak Republic
GBR United Kingdom SVN Slovenia
GRC Greece SWE Sweden
HUN Hungary TUR Turkey
IDN Indonesia TWN Taiwan
IND India USA United States
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